There is more to memory than recollection and familiarity. by Kihlstrom, John F
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
There is more to memory than recollection and familiarity.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1rb738hf
Author
Kihlstrom, John F
Publication Date
2020-01-03
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x19001808
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Dear Author, 
 
Please find attached a PDF file containing your typeset Target Article for Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 
 
Please review the page poofs of your article and make any last-minute changes that may be necessary. This will be 
the final opportunity you'll have to alter your article before publication. Please update all references that need to be 
updated, both in the text and in the consolidated reference list. Also, carefully read any quotes from or cross 
references to the TA in the Commentaries (and, likewise, between your Response article and the Commentaries) to 
make sure that they are correct. 
 
If any corrections to the text are necessary, print out the PDF file and make the change directly on the page. The 
corrected article can be faxed or mailed back to the address listed below. As well, please email a list of 
the corrections needed on the proof to Jonathan Geffner at bbsproduction@cambridge.org. 
 
Please note that Adobe Acrobat Reader is needed to open the PDF files. This software can be downloaded for free at 
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html. 
 
If you prefer to have the proof mailed to you, let me know and I'll be happy to accommodate. 
 
Please return your corrections in 1 week. 
 
Thank you for your attention. 
 
Jonathan Geffner 
Production Editor 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
 
Journals Department 
Cambridge University Press 
Old Liberty Plaza 
Floor 20 
New York, NY 10006 
Tel: +001 212 337-5979 
Fax: +001 212 337-5959 
 
email bbsproduction@cambridge.org 
 
 
Proof Delivery Form
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Date of delivery:?????????
Journal and vol/article ref:
Number of pages (not including this page):???
Please find attached a PDF file containing the typeset treatment for Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, including your commentary. Review the page proofs of your commentary and make any
changes that may be necessary. This will be the final opportunity you'll have to alter your
commentary before publication.
Please update all references that need to be updated, both in the in-text citations and in the
consolidated reference list. Also, carefully read any quotes from or cross references to the TA in
your commentary to make sure that they are correct.
The corrected proof can be sent as an email attachment to Jonathan Geffner at
bbsproduction@cambridge.org. Adobe Acrobat Reader is needed to open the PDF files. This
software can be downloaded for free at http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html.
You can also print out the PDF file, make the change directly on the page, and scan the
corrected proof.
As well, a list of the corrections needed on the proof can be sent in an email message.
Please return your corrections in two days.
Thank you for your attention.
Jonathan Geffner
Production Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Journals Department
Cambridge University Press
Old Liberty Plaza
Floor 20
New York, NY 10006
Tel: +001 212 337-5979
Fax: +001 212 691-3239
email jgeffner@cambridge.org
This proof is sent to you on behalf of Cambridge University Press.
bbs B?????????
page 1 of 2
Authors are strongly advised to read these proofs thoroughly because any errors missed
may appear in the final published paper. This will be your ONLY chance to correct your
proof. Once published, either online or in print, no further changes can be made.
Proof Delivery Form
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Please note that this pdf is for proof checking purposes only. It should not be distributed to third
parties and may not represent the final published version.
Important: you must return any forms included with your proof.
Please do not reply to this email
• The proof is sent to you for correction of typographical errors only. Revision of the substance of the
text is not permitted, unless discussed with the editor of the journal. Only one set of corrections are
permitted.
• Please answer carefully any author queries.
• Corrections which do NOT follow journal style will not be accepted.
• A new copy of a figure must be provided if correction of anything other than a typographical error
introduced by the typesetter is required.
• If you have problems with the file please contact jgeffner@cambridge.org
Please note:
page 2 of 2
NOTE - for further information about Journals Production please consult our FAQs at
http://journals.cambridge.org/production_faqs
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
cambridge.org/bbs
Target Article
Cite this article: Bastin C, Besson G, Simon J,
Delhaye E, Geurten M, Willems S, Salmon E.
(2019) An integrative memory model of
recollection and familiarity to understand
memory deficits. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
1–60. doi:10.1017/S0140525X19000621
Target Article Accepted: 8 January 2018
Target Article Manuscript Online: 19 January
2019
Commentaries Accepted: 22 January 2019
Keywords:
Alzheimer’s disease (AD); cerebral network;
dual-process models of recognition memory;
episodic memory; familiarity; fluency;
hippocampus; perirhinal cortex; posterior
cingulate cortex; recollection.
What is Open Peer Commentary? What
follows on these pages is known as a
Treatment, in which a significant and
controversial Target Article is published
along with Commentaries (p. 15) and an
Author’s Response (p. 40). See bbsonline.
org for more information.
© Cambridge University Press 2019
An integrative memory model of recollection
and familiarity to understand memory deficits
Christine Bastina , Gabriel Bessona, Jessica Simonb, Emma Delhayea,
Marie Geurtena, Sylvie Willemsc and Eric Salmon
Q1
a,d
aGIGA-Cyclotron Research Centre In Vivo Imaging & Psychology and Neuroscience of Cognition Research Unit,
University of Liège, 4000 Liège, Belgium; bPsychology and Neuroscience of Cognition Research Unit, University of
Liège, 4000 Liège, Belgium; cPsychological and Speech Therapy Consultation Center & Psychology and
Neuroscience of Cognition Research Unit, University of Liège, 4000 Liège, Belgium and dMemory Clinic, University
Hospital, 4000 Liège, Belgium.
Christine.Bastin@uliege.be http://www.giga.uliege.be https://www.psyncog.uliege.be
Gabriel.Besson@uliege.be http://www.giga.uliege.be https://www.psyncog.uliege.be
j.simon@uliege.be https://www.psyncog.uliege.be
Emma.Delhaye@uliege.be http://www.giga.uliege.be https://www.psyncog.uliege.be
mgeurten@uliege.be https://www.psyncog.uliege.be
sylvie.willems@uliege.be https://www.psyncog.uliege.be
Eric.Salmon@uliege.be http://www.giga.uliege.be https://www.psyncog.uliege.be
Abstract
Humans can recollect past events in details (recollection) and/or know that an object, per-
son, or place has been encountered before (familiarity). During the last two decades, there
has been intense debate about how recollection and familiarity are organized in the brain.
Here, we propose an integrative memory model which describes the distributed and inter-
active neurocognitive architecture of representations and operations underlying recollection
and familiarity. In this architecture, the subjective experience of recollection and familiarity
arises from the interaction between core systems (storing particular kinds of representa-
tions shaped by specific computational mechanisms) and an attribution system. By inte-
grating principles from current theoretical views about memory functioning, we provide
a testable framework to refine the prediction of deficient versus preserved mechanisms
in memory-impaired populations. The case of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is considered as
an example because it entails progressive lesions starting with limited damage to core sys-
tems before invading step-by-step most parts of the model-related network. We suggest a
chronological scheme of cognitive impairments along the course of AD, where the inaugu-
rating deficit would relate early neurodegeneration of the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhi-
nal cortex to impaired familiarity for items that need to be discriminated as viewpoint-
invariant conjunctive entities. the integrative memory model can guide future neuropsy-
chological and neuroimaging studies aiming to understand how such a network allows
humans to remember past events, to project into the future, and possibly also to share
experiences.
1. Introduction
Episodic memory allows us to remember objects and people that we have encountered as well
as details about events that we have personally experienced. It gives us awareness of our past
experience, it is crucial to a smooth functioning in our daily life, and it permits that we mentally
project what might subsequently happen on the basis of our past memories (Tulving 1999).
Unfortunately, episodic memory is fragile and can be disrupted by certain conditions. Some
people experience memory impairments (amnesia) suddenly after an acute brain damage.
Others experience a progressive memory decline because of a neurodegenerative pathology
such as Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
The understanding of episodic memory mechanisms and how they are implemented in the
brain has progressed extensively thanks to research in neuropsychology and neuroimaging.
Current theories posit that episodic memories can be retrieved via two processes: recollection,
which designates the recall of the specific details from the initial experience of the events,
including details about the spatiotemporal context, and familiarity, which refers to knowing
that one has experienced something in the past without recalling details about the encoding
episode (Mandler 1980; Tulving 1985; Yonelinas 1994).
In the following sections of this target article, we first define the processes of recollection
and familiarity in psychological terms (sect. 2). Then, we summarize the current most influ-
ential frameworks that describe their neural substrates. The existing frameworks differ by
their focus on cognitive operations versus type of representations, by the emphasis on a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
specific brain region versus neural systems, and by the assump-
tion that recollection and familiarity processes are either local-
ized to a brain region or not localized (section 2). Next, we
consider how a more complete understanding of recollection
and familiarity would benefit from combining different accounts
into a unified framework that bridges several cognitive and neu-
ral mechanisms (sect. 3). Therefore, we propose an integration
of principles, currently pertaining to separate theories, in a neu-
rocognitive architecture of interacting operations and represen-
tations within large-scale cerebral networks that allow
familiarity and recollection (sects. 4 and 5). Such an integrative
perspective allows us to generate new hypotheses about the
nature of memory deficits in brain-lesioned populations and
neurodegenerative diseases. Section 6 thus presents predictions
about recollection and familiarity deficits in memory-impaired
populations, with a detailed illustration on AD.
2. Recollection and familiarity
In psychological terms, recollection is defined as a retrieval pro-
cess whereby individuals recall detailed qualitative information
about studied events (Montaldi & Mayes 2010; Yonelinas et al.
2010). Some authors consider that there is recollection as soon
as one retrieves at least one detail that is not currently perceived,
inducing moderate to high confidence that the event actually
occurred (Higham & Vokey 2004; Yonelinas et al. 2010), but
the amount of details may vary from one trial to the other
(Higham & Vokey 2004; Parks & Yonelinas 2007; Wixted &
Mickes 2010). These associated details typically represent the con-
text in which an event took place (i.e., place, time, environmental
or internal details) (Ranganath 2010). Recollection can be accom-
panied by a subjective experience of mentally reliving the prior
experience with the event, as if one were mentally traveling
back in time to re-experience it (Tulving 1985).
In contrast, familiarity is a feeling of oldness indicating that
something has been previously experienced. It is thought to support
predominantly recognition of single pieces of information (i.e.,
items such as objects and people; Ranganath 2010), but associations
between similar types of information could also be recognized as
familiar (Mayes et al. 2007). Subjectively, feelings of familiarity are
more or less strong feelings that one knows that something has
already been encountered, leading to varying degrees of confidence
(Tulving 1985; Yonelinas et al. 2010). According to some theories,
the feeling of familiarity arises when one interprets enhanced pro-
cessing fluency of a stimulus as a sign that it was previously encoun-
tered (Jacoby et al. 1989; Whittlesea et al. 1990). Fluency is typically
defined as the speed and easewith which a stimulus is processed and
may arise from many sources (e.g., mere repetition, perceptual clar-
ity, rhyme, predictive context, oral-motor sequence), including past
occurrences (Oppenheimer 2008; Reber et al. 2004a; Topolinski
2012; Unkelbach & Greifeneder 2013). Because people intuitively
know from their earliest years that fluently processed items are
more likely to have been encountered previously, a feeling of fluency
during a memory task will be likely interpreted as related to prior
exposure (Schwarz 2004). However, several conditions have to be
fulfilled for fluency to be used to guide memory. First, fluency has
to be judged as a diagnostic cue for memory (Westerman et al.
2002). Second, the experienced fluency has to be greater than
expected in a given context (i.e., individuals have to be surprised
by the ease with which they are able to process an item) and should
not be attributed to a more plausible source (e.g., the intrinsic per-
ceptual quality of the stimulus) than past occurrence. Thus, if people
appraise past encounter as an improbable source of fluency or if a
more plausible source is detected, individuals will disregard fluency
as a relevant cue for recognition decisions (Kelley & Rhodes 2002;
Miller et al. 2008; Willems & Van der Linden 2006). This disquali-
fication will prevent fluency to give rise to a feeling of familiarity.
2.1 Existing models of recollection and familiarity
Neuropsychological investigation of recollection and familiarity in
memory-impaired populations (e.g., those with normal aging,
amnesia, epilepsy, neurodegenerative diseases) as well as neuroim-
aging studies examining the neural correlates of recall and recogni-
tion memory tasks (using mainly functional magnetic resonance
imaging [fMRI]) have provided a huge corpus of data that have
led to the development of neurocognitive models of episodic
memory functioning. Most memory models focus on the role of
the medial temporal lobe (MTL) in recollection and familiarity,
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since seminal neuropsychological work has shown that amnesia
arises followingMTL damage (Scoville &Milner 1957). Much con-
troversy still surrounds the precise contributions of the different
MTL subregions, most notably the hippocampus and the adjacent
perirhinal and entorhinal cortices. With the exception of unitary
models suggesting that MTL structures contribute to both recollec-
tion and familiarity as a function of memory strength (Squire et al.
2007; Wixted & Squire 2011), the majority of models suggest that
there is fractionation of memory processes in the MTL by reference
to recollection and familiarity. These MTL models can be distin-
guished as a function of whether they define the role of the hippo-
campus and adjacent MTL cortices in terms of putative cognitive
operations or according to the nature of representations. Most
frameworks target the role of anatomical regions (and their func-
tional network), but a few speak at the scale of individual neurons
or populations of neurons within a brain region.
2.1.1. MTL process models
These models propose that the different MTL regions have distinct
computational properties (Montaldi & Mayes 2010; Norman &
O’Reilly 2003). In particular, only the hippocampus is capable of
pattern separation (to create distinct memory representations for
similar inputs) and pattern completion (once the hippocampus
has bound the elements of an episode into a memory trace, subse-
quent experience of a subset of the elements causes the remaining
elements to be reactivated by association). Thanks to these proper-
ties, the hippocampus is specialized for recollection of details. In
contrast, the perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices extract stat-
istical regularities in repeated inputs by creating sharper patterns.
By contrast with novel inputs that activate weakly a large pattern
of units, the sharpness of MTL cortical patterns indexes familiarity
(Norman & O’Reilly 2003). The perirhinal cortex would thus
encode similarities between events (LaRocque et al. 2013) and sup-
port familiarity. At the scale of neurons, some models describe
familiarity signals as resulting from decreased firing of perirhinal
neurons for repeated stimuli (Bogacz & Brown 2003; Bogacz
et al. 2001; Sohal & Hasselmo 2000). This would arise because
the number of active neurons that responded to a novel stimulus
reduces as the stimulus becomes familiar.
2.1.2. MTL representational models
These models emphasize the different kinds of information incor-
porated in representations formed in the hippocampus versus the
parahippocampal region (Aggleton & Brown 1999; Davachi 2006;
Eichenbaum et al. 2007; Ranganath 2010). Whereas the perirhinal
and parahippocampal cortices encode specific constituent ele-
ments of an event (e.g., objects, spatial layout), the hippocampus
encodes representations of the relationships between the elements.
According to the binding of item and context model (Diana et al.
2007; Ranganath 2010), the perirhinal cortex and parahippocam-
pal cortex encode, respectively, item and context information, and
the hippocampus encodes representations of item-context associ-
ations. Retrieval of item representations in the perirhinal cortex
can support familiarity, while context representations and item-
context bindings support recollection. As in MTL process models,
the hippocampus is important for recollection, but these views
consider that the parahippocampal cortex is also important for
recollection because it represents contextual information.
2.1.3. The representational-hierarchical models
Recently, there has been accumulating evidence that the MTL
mediates processes beyond long-term episodic memory. It is
also involved in perception and short-term memory. In this
view, the role of the MTL would be best described in terms of
how each region represents information rather than in terms of
a specific process (Cowell et al. 2006; Graham et al. 2010;
Saksida & Bussey 2010). Actually, the MTL is considered an
extension of the representational hierarchy of object processing
within the ventral visual stream. The complexity of representa-
tions increases from posterior occipital areas to the anterior lateral
and medial temporal regions. The perirhinal cortex represents the
culmination of this object processing pathway, performing the
most complex feature computations required to discriminate
objects with a high degree of visual feature overlap. In a memory
task, the perirhinal cortex can differentiate between objects that
share features. Most recent suggestions also posit that the capacity
of the perirhinal cortex to distinguish between overlapping item
representations makes it a critical region to disambiguate concep-
tual entities with shared properties, such as living objects (Clarke
& Tyler 2015; Inhoff & Ranganath 2015), in various tasks such as
naming or recognition memory. As for the hippocampus, its
function goes beyond object processing, as it represents relational
configurations and scenes that can support performance in a vari-
ety of tasks, such as perceptual discrimination of scenes, naviga-
tion, imagination, source memory, and so forth (Clark &
Maguire 2016; Cowell et al. 2010). So, this theoretical approach
does not map recollection and familiarity onto specific regions.
The role of MTL subregions are rather defined in terms of the
type and complexity of representations they contain and all
could generate familiarity and recollection (Cowell et al. 2010).
In all these models, the role of another region of the MTL, the
entorhinal cortex, is poorly specified. The entorhinal cortex receives
the inputs and outputs of other MTL regions, but its anterolateral
and posteromedial parts appear to belong to different systems.
Indeed, it has been suggested that the anterolateral entorhinal cortex
may have functional specialization similar to the perirhinal cortex,
whereas the posteromedial entorhinal cortex would support the
same function as the parahippocampal cortex (Keene et al. 2016;
Maass et al. 2015; Schultz et al. 2012). Moreover, investigation of
connection pathways in the MTL suggests that the hippocampus
should not be treated as a unitary region, but has distinct connectiv-
ity preference along its anterior-posterior portions and as a function
of its subfields (Aggleton 2012; Libby et al. 2012). The perirhinal cor-
tex has preferential connection with anterior CA1 and subiculum,
whereas the parahippocampal cortex connects more with the poste-
rior CA1/CA2/CA3/dentate gyrus and subiculum.
2.1.4. Whole-brain network models
However, the MTL is not the only region that contribute to rec-
ollection and familiarity. As notably evidenced by neuroimaging
studies, recollection also involves the posterior cingulate cortex,
the retrosplenial cortex, the inferior parietal cortex, the medial
prefrontal cortex, anterior nuclei of the thalamus and mammillary
bodies (Aggleton & Brown 1999; Ranganath & Ritchey 2012).
This network has been labeled the general recollection network
(Rugg & Vilberg 2013). The extended cerebral network for famil-
iarity involves, besides the perirhinal cortex, the ventral temporal
pole, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsomedial nuclei of
the thalamus, and the intraparietal sulcus (Johnson et al. 2013;
Kim 2010; Ranganath & Ritchey 2012). Currently, very few
theoretical models of recollection and familiarity have integrated
these large-scale cerebral memory networks. Recently, however,
Ranganath and colleagues (Ranganath & Ritchey 2012; Ritchey
et al. 2015) revised the binding of item and context model to
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suggest that the MTL regions are actually part of two broad mem-
ory systems. The perirhinal cortex is considered as a core compo-
nent of an extended anterior temporal system that also includes
the ventral temporopolar cortex, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and
amygdala. This system may be essential for processing entities
(that is, people and things), and would be involved in item famil-
iarity. In contrast, the parahippocampal cortex is considered as
core component of an extended posterior medial network that
includes the mammillary bodies and anterior thalamic nuclei,
presubiculum, the retrosplenial cortex, and the default network
(comprising the posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, lateral pari-
etal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex). It would be involved in
tasks that require a mental representation of the relationships
between entities, actions, and outcomes, such as recollection-
based memory tasks. Such models considering the whole-brain
network architecture of memory processes are critical, given the
fundamentally interconnected nature of brain structures.
Currently, yet, some aspects of recollection and familiarity
have not been fully integrated in memory models. In particular,
current models do not encompass the notion that explicit mem-
ory judgments and experiences, such as feelings of remembering
and familiarity, arise from attribution mechanisms that interpret
memory signals, such as fluency cues (Voss et al. 2012;
Whittlesea 2002), and take into account expectations in a partic-
ular context (Bodner & Lindsay 2003; McCabe & Balota 2007;
Westerman et al. 2002). A line of research considers how feelings
of familiarity emerge when previous exposure to some
information induces a sense of facilitated processing (i.e., fluency
feeling) that is attributed to past occurrence of the information
(Westerman et al. 2002; Whittlesea & Williams 2001a; 2001b).
Similarly, both fluency signals and attribution mechanisms may
also contribute to the experience of recollection (Brown &
Bodner 2011; Li et al. 2017; McCabe & Balota 2007).
Here, we propose to integrate the current state of knowledge
about the neurocognitive bases of recollection and familiarity by
incorporating, into a single model, separate lines of research,
namely neural models of recollection and familiarity and attribu-
tional models of memory experiences. This integrative memory
model builds on currently most influential dual-process views
of the cognitive and neural bases of recollection and familiarity,
and takes into account the highly interconnected nature of the
human brain in order to propose a distributed and interactive
neurocognitive architecture of representations and operations
underlying recollection or familiarity.
3. The integrative memory model: A neurocognitive
architecture of recollection and familiarity
The notion of recollection and familiarity has been used to refer
to processes and subjective experiences, leading sometimes to
confusion between these aspects. In the integrative memory
model (see our Figure 1), we describe recollection and familiarity
as the interaction between core systems that store specific types of
representations uniquely shaped by specific computational
Fi
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Figure 1. Integrative memory model. Key: OC: occipital cortex; OTC: occipito-temporal cortex; PrC: perirhinal cortex; aTC: anterior temporal cortex; alERC: antero-
lateral entorhinal cortex; PhC: parahippocampal cortex; OPC: occipito-parietal cortex; pmERC: posteromedial entorhinal cortex; antThal: anterior nuclei of the thal-
amus; MB: mamillary bodies; RsC: restrosplenial cortex; vPCC: ventral posterior cingulate cortex; dPCC: dorsal posterior cingulate cortex; oPFC: orbital prefrontal
cortex; (v)mPFC: (ventro)medial prefrontal cortex; vPC: ventral parietal cortex; dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; dPC: dorsal parietal cortex; vlPFC: ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex; dmThal: dorsomedial nuclei of the thalamus.
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operations and make up the content of the memory and an attri-
bution system framed by the task context that translates content
reactivation into a subjective experience. Recollection emerges
preferentially from reactivation of traces from a relational repre-
sentation core system, whereas familiarity emerges mainly from
reactivation of traces from the entity representation core system.
The distinction between core systems and an attribution system
has two implications. First, the core systems build the memory trace
and damage to these systems induces severe degradation of the con-
tent of the memory. In contrast, the attribution system modulates
the use of memory traces as a function of expectancies, task context,
and goals, leading to subjective experiences and explicit judgments.
Lesion of the attribution system affects mainly the quality and
adequation of the memory output to the task at hand. Second,
although most memory situations generate an explicit output that
matches the content of the memory (e.g., recollection follows reac-
tivation of a relational representation), this might not always be the
case. This means that the qualitative and subjective experience that
one has in a given memory task may dissociate from the memory
reconstructed by a core system. For instance, even if the relational
representation core system reactivates specific item-context details,
one may experience a feeling of familiarity. This is because explicit
outputs during a memory task (i.e., old/new decisions, confidence
judgments, and subjective experiences of remembering or knowing)
follow from processing the outputs of the relational or entity repre-
sentation core system in an attribution system. We assume that the
attribution mechanisms are common down-stream mechanisms
that serve both recollection and familiarity. In this framework, rec-
ollection and familiarity are considered as independent processes,
in the sense that the underlying memory representation can be
retrieved via the entity representation core system only, the rela-
tional representation core system only, or via both concomitantly
(Jacoby et al. 1997).
4. Detailed description of the integrative memory model
4.1. Encoding
Core systems are specialized for encoding and storing specific
kinds of representations. The nature of the information that is pro-
cessed in each core system is determined by the computational
operations and level of associativity that characterize its constitu-
ent brain regions. Although each core system must be viewed as
a representation system rather than as harboring recollection or
familiarity processes, we suggest that recollection and familiarity
are preferentially associated with specific types of representations:
relational representations (centered on the hippocampus) for
recollection, and entity representations (centered on the perirhinal
cortex) for familiarity. Consistently, fMRI studies examining
encoding-related activities observed that hippocampal activity is
predictive of subsequent source recollection but uncorrelated
with item recognition, and that perirhinal activity predicts item
familiarity–based recognition, but not subsequent recollection
(Davachi et al. 2003; Kensinger & Schacter 2006; Ranganath
et al. 2004). Recollection of details from the initial experience of
an event also usually relies on contextual information that is stored
in a context representation core system, but, as detailed below, some
contextual tagging of entities occurs and elements of context (e.g.,
a building) may be subsequently recognized as familiar. Finally,
the notion that these objects, people, and events have been person-
ally experienced is recorded by the interaction between representa-
tion core systems and a self-referential system.
In the entity representation core system, encountered entities
pertaining to experienced events are encoded. An entity is defined
as an exemplar item (i.e., token) from a category (i.e., type) that
distinguishes itself from other similar items thanks to its unique
configuration of perceptivo-conceptual features. The entity repre-
sentation core system comprises the perirhinal cortex, anterolateral
enthorinal cortex, occipitotemporal cortex, and anterior temporal
cortex. Of note, even if the entorhinal cortex has a hierarchically
higher level of associativity than the perirhinal cortex (Lavenex &
Amaral 2000) and recent data speak for a specific role of the ante-
rolateral entorhinal cortex in object-in-context processing (Yeung
et al. 2019), there are currently not sufficient data to clearly dis-
tinguish the role of the perirhinal cortex and the anterolateral
entorhinal cortex. Based on studies showing a role for the antero-
lateral entorhinal cortex in disambiguation of similar objects
(Yeung et al. 2017), we will consider here that the perirhinal cor-
tex and anterolateral entorhinal cortex together form a system
specialized for entity representation. This system is dedicated to
the processing and encoding of single entities (Ranganath &
Ritchey 2012), with preferential represention of objects and
faces (Kafkas et al. 2017; Martin et al. 2016), unified associations
(Haskins et al. 2008), and pairings of similar entities (e.g., two
faces) (Hirabayashi et al. 2013; Mayes et al. 2007). It has been
suggested to additionally represent the association of a written
concrete word with its corresponding object concept (Bruffaerts
et al. 2013; Liuzzi et al. 2015).
Critically, the entity representation core system is defined by the
nature and complexity of the representations it can process and
encode for long-term memory after a single exposure to the
stimulus. More specifically, in line with the representational-
hierarchial view (Cowell et al. 2010; Graham et al. 2010; Saksida
& Bussey 2010), there is a hierarchy in terms of the complexity
of the representation in the entity representation core system.
Consider here the example of object processing (Fig. 1). While
individual features (e.g., shape, texture, color) are processed in
ventral occipitotemporal areas (visual object features), integration
of these features into more and more complex entities are
achieved as one moves anteriorly along the ventral visual stream.
It is at the level of the perirhinal cortex and anterolateral entorhi-
nal that all visual features are integrated in a single complex
representation of the object that can be discriminated from
other objects with overlapping features. Moreover, the perirhinal
cortex may also act as a conceptual binding site. Whereas defining
conceptual features such as the category are represented in the
anterior temporal areas, the integration of the meaning to object
representations will occur in the perirhinal cortex via its interac-
tion with the anterior temporal area (conceptual features) (Martin
et al. 2018; Price et al. 2017; Taylor et al. 2011). Indeed, the peri-
rhinal cortex is notably recruited when concepts with confusable
features must be distinguished (Clarke & Tyler 2015). For
instance, the perirhinal cortex is needed to distinguish between
living things during naming (and recognition memory tasks), as
living things share a lot of common features and are more easily
confusable than non-living things (Kivisaari et al. 2012; Wright
et al. 2015). By incorporating features from various sensory and
conceptual areas, the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex
forms unique conjunctive representations of entities allowing
the resolution of ambiguity in the face of objects with overlapping
features and the identification of objects in a viewpoint-invariant
manner (Erez et al. 2016). These representations rely on a compu-
tational property of the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex
that can be referred to as entity pattern separation, by which
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similar objects are given separate representations based on specific
conjunctions of features, even after a single exposure (Kent et al.
2016). This property allows humans to quickly recognize familiar
objects in the stream of resembling objects from the environment.
Given that entities are typically experienced as part of an event,
the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex also encodes the sig-
nificance of entities in a context-dependent manner (Inhoff &
Ranganath 2015; Ranganath & Ritchey 2012; Yeung et al. 2019).
This is possible thanks to the connections between the perirhinal
cortex and the parahippocampal/posteromedial entorhinal cortex,
which is part of the context representation core system together
with the occipitoparietal cortex and retrosplenial cortex. The par-
ahippocampal cortex represents, preferentially, buildings and
scenes, which often constitute the contextual setting for an
event (Bar et al. 2008; Kafkas et al. 2017; Martin et al. 2013;
Preston et al. 2010), and the posteromedial entorhinal cortex
encodes an internally generated grid of the spatial environment
(Doeller et al. 2010). The context representation core system
would provide a contextual tagging of the entity, which allows
us to take into account the background in which the entity
occurred and give distinct meanings and values to the entity. In
their article, Inhoff and Ranganath (2015) give the example of a
ticket purchased at a county fair to buy food and rides, whose sig-
nificance changes beyond the fairgrounds because that same ticket
would have little value outside the fair. In addition, we recognize
entities that we have personally experienced. Self-reference is also
important to define the significance of entities. Via connections of
the perirhinal cortex to the orbital prefrontal cortex (Lavenex et al.
2002), the entity representation may also record the self-
relatedness of the entity (D’Argembeau et al. 2005; Northoff
et al. 2006). Like the contextual significance, self-relatedness of
entities may modulate our behavior with regard to the entities.
For example, a piece of clothing should lead to different behaviors
depending on whether it belongs to me or somebody else.
In brief, entities encountered as part of experienced events are
stored in long-term memory in a distributed and hierarchical
manner in the entity representation core system. While simple
perceptual and conceptual features are represented in occipito-
temporal and anterior temporal areas, the conjunctions of multi-
modal features are represented as pattern-separated entities in the
perirhinal cortex and the anterolateral entorhinal cortex. Some
contextual and self-related tagging via interactions between the
entity representation core system and the context representation
core system and self-reference system will modulate the signifi-
cance of entities. The concept of unification is close to the notion
of conjunction, with the difference that unification can sometimes
be an active encoding strategy whereas conjunction refers to the
configurational nature of stimuli. Indeed, unification consists in
encoding different pieces of information in a way that integrates
them into a single entity (Parks & Yonelinas 2015). Previous
fMRI studies have shown that processing object-color associations
by mentally integrating color as an object feature activates the
perirhinal cortex (Diana et al. 2010), as does the encoding of
word pairs as new compound words (Haskins et al. 2008).
The relational representation core system involves the hippo-
campus, subiculum, mamillary bodies, and the anterior nuclei
of the thalamus. It rapidly encodes a detailed representation of
the item bound to associated contextual information (Montaldi
& Mayes 2010; Ranganath & Ritchey 2012) or more generally
complex high-resolution bindings (Yonelinas 2013). In the case
of item-context binding, inputs consist in the entity representa-
tions from the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex entering
the hippocampus anteriorly, and context representations (e.g.,
spatial layout) from the parahippocampal/posteromedial entorhi-
nal cortex entering the hippocampus posteriorly (Ranganath &
Ritchey 2012; Staresina et al. 2011). The context representation
in the parahippocampal cortex is itself fed by inputs from neocor-
tical regions that represent the specific contents of the context in
which the item is embedded (e.g., sounds, visual details, and spa-
tial layout), stored in occipitoparietal sites (visuospatial processing;
Rissman & Wagner 2012), and brought to the parahippocampal
cortex via the retrosplenial cortex. The self-referential nature of
the experienced episodes is also embedded in the memory trace
thanks to connection of the hippocampus and retrosplenial cortex
with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Andrews-Hanna et al.
2010). The binding of multimodal and qualitatively different
pieces of information occurs in the hippocampus (CA3 via the
dentate gyrus) where each unique episode is encoded as a separate
represention via relational pattern separation (Berron et al. 2016;
Leal & Yassa 2018; Montaldi & Mayes 2010; Norman & O’Reilly
2003), so that two very similar events will have two distinct mem-
ory traces. For instance, if we attend two concerts based on the
same album of our favorite band, we will still be able to remember
the details of each concert as a unique episode.
This pattern-separated representation in the hippocampus
constitutes a summary, or an index, of the distributed neocortical
representations of the specific details of the episodes (Teyler &
Rudy 2007). Contrary to the conjunctive representations in the
entity representation core system where components are fused
in a frozen integrated trace, the hippocampal representation
keeps components separate and flexibly bound (Eichenbaum
2017c). This allows the learning of inferences between items
that are indirectly related, and subsequent flexible use of represen-
tations (Eichenbaum & Cohen 2014). So, relational binding and
pattern separation are the core computational properties of the
relational representation core system.
While the nature of the representations in the entity represen-
tation core system makes it specialized for rapidly signaling that
objects, faces, and simple combinations of those are known (i.e.,
familiarity judgments), the bound representations in the relational
representation core system makes it specialized for reactivating
the specific details of experienced events (i.e., recollection). In
other words, familiarity and recollection are processes that emerge
naturally from the ways in which different brain regions represent
the experienced world. But, as will be detailed next, the final
explicit memory output will depend on the attribution system.
4.2. Retrieval
4.2.1. Familiarity-based retrieval
As illustrated in Figure 2, the typical sequence of operations lead-
ing to familiarity starts with the repetition of an encoded entity
(Montaldi & Mayes 2010; Ranganath 2010; Voss et al. 2012).
For instance, during a recognition memory test, target items are
the replication of previously studied items. In our example of
the processing of an object item, the repetition of the perceptual
and/or conceptual features of the item triggers enhanced process-
ing fluency (and reduced activity) in the occipitotemporal and
anterior temporal areas where these features were first processed
(Reber 2013). Several fMRI studies also showed that enhanced
processing fluency of items induces a reduction of activity in
the perirhinal cortex that predicts familiarity-based memory
(Dew & Cabeza 2013; Gonsalves et al. 2005; Meyer et al. 2010).
Here, we make the novel hypothesis that the perirhinal and
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anterolateral entorhinal cortices are sensitive to the repetition of
the actual conjunction of features that makes up the specific
and viewpoint-invariant representation of the item, associated
with a specific meaning, and thus generates enhanced entity-level
processing fluency and can lead to familiarity for this entity. In
addition, any region representing features of the previously
encountered object can reactivate these specific features when
re-exposed to them and thus generates familiarity-based memory
through fluency. So, perceptual and conceptual fluency for fea-
tures arising in occipitotemporal and anterior temporal cortices
can also generate familiarity for these features. The dominant
type of signal that will contribute to familiarity depends on the
characteristics of the memory task (Lanska et al. 2014; Lucas &
Paller 2013; Taylor & Henson 2012b). For instance, in a task
where participants have to rapidly discriminate between old pic-
tures of objects and new pictures of completely different objects
(e.g., Besson et al. 2015), reactivation of simple perceptual features
(e.g., a small grey fluffy object for the picture of a grey kitten) or
conceptual features (e.g., a feline) is sufficient to successfully iden-
tify the studied stimuli. In contrast, if old objects are mixed with
very similar objects from the same category (e.g., Yeung et al.
2013), accurate familiarity-based discrimination will rely on the
reactivation of the studied conjunctions of features. This implies
that familiarity may arise from different regions, depending on
the materials (e.g., Kafkas et al. 2017) and demands of the task,
and that lesions to the perirhinal cortex will not necessarily affect
all forms of familiarity.
Besides fluency signals, other signals may also operate in rec-
ognition memory tasks. We focus here on fluency signals because
we wish to model recognition memory decisions that allow the
brain to identify a specific stimuli as previously encountered.
Item-specific discrimination is a key property of familiarity in
everyday life, as we adapt our behavior to familiar unique entities.
For instance, we will speak to people we know, we will take our
own cup to fetch some coffee, we will pick up our coat among
others in a cloakroom, and so forth. For all these situations, we
propose that fluency-based familiarity is central. However, feel-
ings of familiarity can arise from many other sources. Some of
them are non-memory, such as affective information (Duke
et al. 2014) or proprioceptive information (Fiacconi et al. 2016)
that have been shown to generate a subjective sense of familiarity
if manipulated in memory situations. Others are from the mem-
ory domain, but support global matching or similarity judgments
when a presented stimulus globally maps onto a stored
representation (Norman & O’Reilly 2003). But even then, the
involvement of fluency in the emergence of a feeling of familiarity
through affective information, proprioceptive information, or
global matching cannot be ruled out (Duke et al. 2014).
Still, whatever its source, enhanced processing fluency in itself
is not sufficient to produce familiarity. It has been suggested that
fluency only minimally contributes to memory decisions because
some patients with amnesia demonstrate chance-level recognition
memory (hence, no sign of familiarity), despite successfully
completing priming tasks conducted on the same set of stimuli
(priming being also driven by fluency) (e.g., Levy et al. 2004). In
the same vein, enhancing the processing fluency of some stimuli
had only a small influence on amnesic patients’ memory perfor-
mance in some studies (Conroy et al. 2005; Verfaellie & Cermak
1999), while other studies found reliable improvement of recogni-
tion memory performance in amnesia following manipulation that
enhanced processing fluency (Keane et al. 2006). Such findings
can be explained if one considers that the transformation of flu-
ency signals into familiarity-based decisions involves complex cog-
nitive and metacognitive mechanisms (Whittlesea & Williams
2000; Willems et al. 2007). Accordingly, our integrative memory
model argues that one cannot explain familiarity-based memory
decisions without considering the role of the attribution system.
Therefore, explicit familiarity judgments and the subjective
feeling of familiarity result from attribution of fluency to the
prior occurrence of the stimulus (via the attribution system)
(Whittlesea &Williams 2000). The fluency heuristic relies on signal
flow from the entity representation core system regions to the attri-
bution system, via connections between the perirhinal cortex and
the prefrontal cortex (mainly, orbitofrontal, medial, and dorsolat-
eral prefrontal areas; see Aggleton & Brown 1999; Lavenex et al.
2002; Libby et al. 2012). The mechanisms thought to intervene in
the attribution system, such as metacognitive and monitoring oper-
ations, have been notably associated with the prefrontal cortex in
the context of memory tasks (Chua et al. 2014; Henson et al.
1999). Direct involvement in the fluency heuristic comes from elec-
trophysiological studies (i.e., event-related potentials) (Kurilla &
Gonsalves 2012;Wolk et al. 2004), notably showing that the attribu-
tion of fluency to the past versus the disqualification of fluency as a
memory cue was associated with late frontal potentials.
The fluency heuristic involves sophisticated monitoring and
metacognitive mechanisms. First, the metacognitive knowledge
(supported by medial prefrontal areas) that fluent processing is
a sign of prior occurrence exists since childhood (Geurten et al.
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Figure 2. Main mechanisms supporting familiarity-based retrieval in the example of a lab-based object recognition memory task with resembling targets and lures.
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2017; Olds & Westerman 2012; Oppenheimer 2008); but this
metacognitive heuristic can be unlearned through regular encoun-
ter with memory errors, as this might be the case for patients with
severe memory problems (Geurten & Willems 2017). Second, the
characteristics of the specific task at hand will determine the rel-
evance of using fluency signals. This is determined via several
monitoring mechanisms, supported by dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and that may happen at a non-conscious level. Fluency
cues will be used if they are expected as diagnostic cues for recog-
nition decisions (Westerman et al. 2002) and if the experienced
fluency is salient relative to the context (Jacoby & Dallas 1981;
Westerman 2008). People set an internal criterion along the vary-
ing dimension of memory strength depending on the task speci-
ficities. A feeling of surprise is experienced when the intensity of
the fluency signal exceeds this criterion (Yonelinas et al. 2010). If
no alternative source is detected to explain the intensity of this
signal, fluency will be attributed to past occurrence and will
give rise to a feeling of familiarity. If not so attributed, fluency
will be disregarded and no feeling of familiarity will arise.
Such an explicit judgment of familiarity occurs when top-down
attention, supported by the dorsal parietal cortex, is focused on
recognition memory decisions. According to the attention-to-
memory model (Cabeza et al. 2008; Ciaramelli et al. 2008), the
dorsal parietal cortex allocates attentional resources to memory
retrieval according to the goals of the person who remembers,
and is often involved in familiarity-based decisions because famil-
iarity may induce low confidence. This is the case in recognition
memory paradigms where participants must judge how familiar
stimuli are, but this can also occur in daily life (e.g., judging the
most familiar brand of an article at the supermarket in order to
choose the one usually bought). Yet, this explicit expression
of familiarity may be distinguished from the subjective feeling of
familiarity. Although both often co-occur in memory tasks – so
that a participant can gauge how strong is his or her feeling of
familiarity during confidence judgments, for example – a strong
feeling of familiarity may sometimes arise outside of any memory
task and capture attention in a bottom-up fashion. One typical
example is the butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon where one is sur-
prised by the involuntary strong feeling of knowing the person,
albeit in the absence of any recollection.
To come back to the cases where amnesic patients failed to use
fluency cues in recognition memory tasks despite preserved
perceptual or conceptual fluency, a likely interpretation in the
framework of the attribution system considers that this is due to
changes in metacognitive knowledge and monitoring in amnesic
patients compared to controls (Geurten & Willems 2017). More
specifically, because of their continued experience of memory
errors in everyday life, amnesic patients may have modified
their metacognitive knowledge so as to unlearn the fluency
heuristic (Geurten & Willems 2017; Ozubko & Yonelinas 2014).
Additionally, their expectations relative to the origin of fluency
feelings may have adapted in a way that makes them readier to
detect alternative sources to fluency (Geurten & Willems 2017).
Altogether, this will lead them to disqualify fluency as a cue for
memory decisions (Conroy et al. 2005; Ozubko & Yonelinas
2014; Verfaellie & Cermak 1999), unless other fluency sources
are very difficult to detect (Keane et al. 2006).
In initial network models (Aggleton & Brown 1999), the dorso-
medial nucleus of the thalamus has been considered as a node
within the familiarity system. However, its critical involvement
remains unclear because of the divergence of findings relative to
a selective impairment of familiarity following lesion to the
dorsomedial thalamus (Danet et al. 2017; Edelstyn et al. 2016).
Theoretical positions about the role of this region currently diverge.
On the one hand, the dorsomedial thalamus could support famil-
iarity, but the loss of inputs to the prefrontal cortex following dam-
age to this region would have wider consequences on cognition,
with possible impact on recollection (Aggleton et al. 2011). On
the other hand, it could have a general role in several cognitive
domains by virtue of its regulatory function over the prefrontal cor-
tex, allowing the maintenance of frontal activity over delays neces-
sary to perform complex reflections and decisions (Pergola et al.
2018). In a recognition memory task, the dorsomedial thalamus
was found to become critical when interference between stimuli
increased (Newsome et al. 2018). Following on this latter view
(Pergola et al. 2018), in the integrative memorymodel we have posi-
tioned the dorsomedial thalamus as a modulator of prefrontal activ-
ity, such that it would support the maintenance of prefrontal
activities during tasks that are demanding in terms of attribution
processes (e.g., discrimination between similar interfering stimuli).
4.2.2. Recollection-based retrieval
Figure 3 illustrates the mechanisms involved in recollection-based
retrieval. Typically, recollection-based retrieval starts with exposi-
tion to partial information from a past episode (either an entity or
elements of the context). The partial information cue triggers the
reactivation of the complete pattern via pattern completion within
the hippocampus (CA3/CA1) (Norman & O’Reilly 2003;
Staresina et al. 2013). As the pattern stored in the hippocampus
is an index of distributed contents in the neocortex, its reactiva-
tion induces the reinstatement of stimulus-specific neocortical
representations (Rissman & Wagner 2012; Staresina et al. 2013)
in such a way that the contents that were processed when the
event was initially experienced and encoded are reactivated at
retrieval. Thus, the sensory-perceptual and visuo-spatial details
of the memory (e.g., object features, persons’ characteristics,
spatial configuration, sounds) stored in posterior cerebral areas
are brought back. The signal from the hippocampal index is trans-
ferred to distributed neocortical sites via the mammillary bodies
(connected to the hippocampus by the fornix), the anterior nuclei
of the thalamus, and the retrosplenial cortex (Brodmann areas
BA29 and BA30). In other words, Papez’s circuit is the core path-
way for recollecting the content of past experienced episodes
(Aggleton & Brown 1999).
In addition to strong connections with the hippocampus and
anterior thalamus, the retrosplenial cortex is linked to the para-
hippocampal cortex, occipital areas, and adjacent posterior cingu-
late cortex (BA23 and BA31) (Kobayashi & Amaral 2003; Parvizi
et al. 2006; Suzuki & Amaral 1994; Vogt & Pandya 1987; Vogt
et al. 1987). The posterior cingulate cortex and the retrosplenial
cortex appear to play a pivotal role as interfaces between the hip-
pocampus and the neocortex, thanks to their highly connected
nature. Indeed, they have been identified as hubs of connectivity
(Hagmann et al. 2008; van den Heuvel & Sporns 2013). However,
the different patterns of connection of the retrosplenial cortex
and posterior cingulate cortex suggest different contributions
(Greicius et al. 2009). As a gateway between the hippocampus
and regions storing the sensory-perceptual details of the memory
(especially, visuo-spatial information in the parahippocampal cor-
tex and occipitoparietal cortex), the retrosplenial is a key region
for enabling cortical reinstatement of the content of memories.
It is part of the context representation core system, and its damage
will likely prevent content reactivation and lead to amnesia
(Aggleton 2010; Valenstein et al. 1987; Vann et al. 2009a).
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In contrast, the posterior cingulate cortex sits outside the con-
text and relational representation core systems because it does not
contribute to recollecting the content of episodes like the retro-
splenial cortex does. Intracranial recordings from posterior cingu-
late sites in epileptic patients show enhanced gamma band activity
specific to autobiographical remembering (Foster et al. 2012), but
perturbation of posterior cingulate neurons by electric brain stim-
ulation in the intracranial electrodes do not produce any observ-
able behavioral responses, nor any subjective experience in the
participants (Foster & Parvizi 2017). By contrast, electrical stimu-
lation of the MTL evokes a subjective experience of déjà vu/déjà
vécu, reminiscence of scenes or of visual details of known objects
(Barbeau et al. 2005; Bartolomei et al. 2004). This suggests that
the posterior cingulate cortex does not store any content related
to experienced memories, but rather plays a supportive role dur-
ing recollection. More specifically, the posterior cingulate cortex
contributes to the quality of recollection and the subjective expe-
rience of remembering due to its central position as hub of con-
nectivity. A distinction is made between the ventral and dorsal
posterior cingulate cortex (Vogt et al. 2006). While the ventral
posterior cingulate cortex connects notably with the inferior pari-
etal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the dorsal poste-
rior cingulate cortex has main connections with the superior
parietal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Bzdok
et al. 2015; Leech et al. 2011; Parvizi et al. 2006; Vogt et al. 2006).
The ventral posterior cingulate cortex is part of the default
mode network (Leech & Sharp 2014; Margulies et al. 2009),
which has been associated with various internally-directed
cognitive functions, such as episodic memory retrieval, self-
referential processing, and mentalizing (Buckner et al. 2008).
During recollection, the ventral posterior cingulate cortex will
support pattern completion by allowing the reactivation of the
self-referential character of memories for personally experienced
events via its connection to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(D’Argembeau 2013). It should be noted that recollection can
occur in the absense of self-referential feeling, as illustrated by
the case of a patient who remembered personally experienced
events with contextual details, but who had the feeling that
these events did not belong to him (Klein & Nichols 2012).
However, the lack of self-referential character in recollected mem-
ories would prevent them from inducing the subjective feeling of
travelling back in time to re-experience one’s past (Tulving 1985).
Then, the sudden recovery of the whole memory trace on the basis
of a simple cue (i.e., ecphory) captures bottom-up attention and
engages the ventral attention network, more specifically the ven-
tral parietal cortex (supramarginal gyrus and angular gyrus
[attention-to-memory model, Cabeza et al. 2012]), via the ventral
posterior cingulate cortex connection.
As for the dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, it is thought to be
a transitional zone of connectivity, linking the default mode net-
work and a frontoparietal network involved in executive control
(Leech & Sharp 2014). In our integrative memory model, this
frontoparietal network corresponds to the attribution system
interacting with attention. Of note, the retrosplenial cortex also
has direct connections with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Kobayashi & Amaral 2003; Vann et al. 2009a), suggesting that
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Figure 3. Illustration of the main steps for a recollection-based memory judgment in the example of an object recognition memory task (following encoding of
objects in various spatial locations).
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the posterior cingulate gyrus as a whole acts as a gateway between
the hippocampally centered relational representation core system
and the frontoparietal attribution and attention system. Therefore,
we propose that the posterior cingulate gyrus hub of connectivity,
comprising the retrosplenial cortex and posterior cingulate cortex,
has a pivotal role in the integration of all the recollection-related
operations and contents. It would act as a relay node allowing
activation to spread from the relational representation core system
throughout the entity representation core system, context repre-
sentation core system, self-referential system, and the attribution
system. Dysfunction of this node would disintegrate the network,
preventing the full reinstatement of the memory. Consistently,
Bird et al. (2015) have shown that the posterior cingulate gyrus
allows the reinstatement of episodic details and the strength of
the posterior cingulate reinstatement activity correlated with the
amount of details that the participants could subsequently recall.
Finally, in order for the individual to report an “old” judgment
based on a recollective experience, attribution mechanisms should
come into play, taking into account the task context and memora-
bility expectations (metacognitive knowledge and monitoring;
McCabe & Balota 2007).We assume that the fundamental cognitive
operations are the same as in the case of familiarity, but the nature of
representations on which this applies differs. Here, the attribution
system will assess, notably, the amount of recollected details
(Johnson et al. 2009) and their relevance (Bodner & Lindsay
2003). This implies that, even if an individual recollects qualitative
details about an event, he or she may report a familiarity-based rec-
ognition decision if the retrieved information is judged irrelevant or
insufficient to succeed at the task and to be qualified as recollection
(e.g., “Remember” response; Bodner & Lindsay 2003). In addition,
the criterion for recollection will depend on task context. For
instance, in McCabe and Balota’s (2007) study, medium-frequency
words were intermixed with high-frequency or low-frequency
words at test. Remember responses were greater for medium-
frequency targets when they were tested among high-frequency,
as compared with low-frequency words. This suggests that partici-
pants are more likely to experience recollection when targets exceed
an expected level of memorability in the context of words that were
relatively less distinctive.
In linewith the hypothesis that the posterior cingulate gyrus con-
tributes to consciousness (Vogt & Laureys 2005), an additional
hypothesis of the integrative memory model is that the spread of
activation throughout distributed brain regions via the posterior
cingulate gyrus hub, the catching-up of attention related to ecphory,
and the high diagnosticity of such signal in terms of evidence of past
experience is equivalent to amobilisation of a global neuronal work-
space (Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Vatansever et al. 2015) that con-
veys consciousness of remembering and a feeling of re-experiencing
(i.e., autonoetic consciousness). In this view, autoneotic conscious-
ness would thus be an emerging property of integrated reactivation
of the representation core systems together with the attribution sys-
tem, where the posterior cingulate gyrus plays a central role.
Table 1 summarizes the key computational operations and the
corresponding types of content that can be represented thanks to
these properties, according to the integrative memory model. We
distinguish the core systems that create the memory trace, that will
become available for familiarity- and recollection-based memory
decisions (as well as other cognitive functions, as described in
sect. 5.3 below), and the subjective experience of remembering
and knowing which are emerging psychological phenomena aris-
ing from the interaction between the core systems representations
and the cognitive operations of the attribution system.
5. Further characteristics of the integrative memory model
5.1. Interactions within the integrative memory model
Although the core systems that represent the memory traces gen-
erating recollection and familiarity are independent, it is important
to consider how these systems interact. Interaction will occur when
the representations from the entity and context representation core
systems are used to create relational associations in the relational
representation core system, which are subsequently reinstated dur-
ing pattern completion. For instance, fMRI studies have shown
that covert retrieval of the context previously associated with an
item activated the parahippocampal cortex when probed with
the item alone, whereas perirhinal-related representations of the
item were activated by presenting the associated context, with
Table 1. Main computational/cognitive operations and associated representations/psychological consequences in the integrative memory model.
Entity representation core system Relational representation core system
Computational
operations Representations
Computational
operations Representations
Hierarchical integration From features to conjunctions of features Relational binding Item-context associations
Entity pattern
separation
Unique conjunctive representations of objects,
people, and simple associations
Relational pattern
separation
Unique representations of complex
associations (index)
Fluency due to prior
exposure
Reactivated features/conjunctions Pattern completion Reactivation of distributed
representations of components
Feeling of familiarity Remembering
Cognitive operations Psychological phenomenon Cognitive operations
Psychological
phenomenon
Fluency heuristic (i.e., attribution) Feeling of familiarity Attribution Recollective experience
Metacognitive knowledge &
monitoring
Modulation of use of the fluency
heuristic
Metacognitive knowledge &
monitoring
Modulation of attribution
Top-down attention Explicit judgment of familiarity Global neuronal workspace Autonoetic
consciousness
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the hippocampus coordinating the reinstatement (Diana et al.
2013; Staresina et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2013).
Moreover, at the level of memory outputs from the attribution
system, familiarity and recollection can interact (Kurilla &
Westerman 2008; 2010; Mandler et al. 1969; Whittlesea 1997).
Notably, a feeling of familiarity can trigger an active search inmem-
ory to recollect specific details about some event. For instance, when
seeing a familiar face in the crowd, one often wishes to remember
one’s past interactions with that person. Typically, we will elaborate
retrieval cues, with the support of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(i.e., cue specification, Figure 1), trying to specify contextual infor-
mation associated with the face until we find an appropriate cue
that will trigger pattern completion in the hippocampus
(Ciaramelli et al. 2008). Alternatively, recollection acts as a control
over familiarity. For instance, when some aspects of a stimulus
feels familiar, remembering that they were actually part of another
memory allows us to correctly reject the current stimulus (e.g.,
recombined pairs in associative memory tasks, exclusion trials in
the Process Dissociation Procedure).
Also, expectancies induced by the task characteristics can shift
the balance between recollection and familiarity as outputs. For
instance, some materials such as pictures induce high expectations
in terms of memorability compared to other kinds of materials
(i.e., the distinctiveness heuristic). In this case, participants
think that they will recollect many perceptual details. If they do
not for a given stimulus, they will consider it is new even if
they experience fluency feelings. As recollection was anticipated
but not familiarity, fluency cues are disregarded because of the
absence of recollection (Dodson & Schacter 2001; Ghetti 2003).
Finally, the individual may set specific goals for a given memory
situation, that will generate a retrieval mode orientating attention
towards the search for particular types of information. This will
rely on the interaction between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
and dorsal parietal cortex (Cabeza et al. 2008; Lepage et al.
2000). For instance, an individual may favor global processing of
information leading to familiarity versus analytic processing lead-
ing to recollection of details (Whittlesea & Price 2001; Willems
et al. 2008), or may even search for specific types of details
(Bodner & Lindsay 2003; Bodner & Richardson-Champion 2007).
5.2. Beyond recollection and familiarity
In the integrative memory model, similarly to models emphasizing
the nature of representations used for memory, core systems store
specific contents that serve in memory tasks to retrieve the objects,
people, actions, settings, and so forth, that have been experienced.
But the same representations can also be used to perform other
tasks. Indeed, perceptual discrimination between entities with
overlapping features and their maintenance in short-term memory
have been found to involve the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal
cortex (Barense et al. 2016; Graham et al. 2010). Naming and
conceptual discrimination of such entities also rely on perirhinal
integrity (Clarke & Tyler 2015). Similarly, the hippocampus uses
relational representations in navigation, short-term memory,
perceptual discrimination, imagination, and so forth (Clark &
Maguire 2016; Lee et al. 2012; Yonelinas 2013). Hence, even if rec-
ollection and familiarity recruit relational and entity representa-
tions, they are not the only functions to do so. This has
implications for the pattern of deficits arising from damage to
these core systems (see sect. 6.1).
Actually, the whole architecture described in the integrative
memory model may not be uniquely mnemonic in nature. For
instance, the interaction between fluent processing of repeated
items in the entity representation core system and the attribution
system may lead to affective judgments. This is well illustrated by
the mere repetition effect in which repeated items are judged
more pleasant and prefered over non-repeated items (Willems
et al. 2007). Moreover, the default network, that overlaps partly
with the relational representation core system, self-reference sys-
tem, posterior cingulate gyrus hub of connectivity, ventral parietal
cortex, and regions from the attribution system involved in meta-
cognition, is also recruited during imagination of future events,
mind wandering, and reflection about one’s and others’ mental
states (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010). This network may have an
adaptive role by which the brain uses past experiences to simulate
possible future scenarios in order to prepare humans to react to
upcoming events (Buckner et al. 2008). Additionally, the com-
bined use of the default network and the frontoparietal network
(corresponding to interacting core and attribution systems here)
supports creative thinking (Madore et al. 2019). Thus, the core
systems provide the building blocks that are reconstructed and
recombined, depending on the individual’s goals, with the help
of the attribution system.
The very facts that consistent impairments are observed fol-
lowing brain damage and that the same brain regions are activated
when different individuals perform a given task, suggest that the
neural networks underlying cognitive functions are common to all
individuals. The purpose of theoretical models, like the integrative
memory model and others, is precisely to reveal the universal
neurocognitive architecture of memory. Beyond anatomical simi-
larity of memory functioning, one may wonder about the social
role of such organization. Regarding memory, it appears that,
when individuals recall a given event (e.g., a TV show episode)
with their own words, the pattern of cerebral activation is more
similar between people recalling the same event than between
recall and actual perception (Chen et al. 2017). This suggests
that perceived events are transformed when entering memory in
a systematic way that is shared across humans. If true, this
would mean that the main purpose of our memory-related neuro-
cognitive scafolding is not only to allow each individual to
remember the events that he or she experienced, but more widely
to communicate and share beliefs about the past with other
people (Mahr & Csibra 2018) and to facilitate the creation of
collective memories that build the social identity of human groups
(Halbwachs 1980; Hirst et al. 2018).
5.3. Novelty of the integrative memory model compared to
other current models of recollection and familiarity
As indicated by its name, the integrative memory model does not
have the ambition to propose a novel framework, but rather to
integrate some principles from currently most-influential theories.
There are therefore a lot of similarities with existing models,
although some differences exist. The integrative memory model
borrows from representational models the idea that memory pro-
cesses arise from the use of particular types of representations.
The entity representation core system relies on hypotheses from
the representational hierarchical view (Cowell et al. 2006; 2010;
Saksida & Bussey 2010) and the emergent memory account
(Graham et al. 2010). Like the emergent memory account, we
consider that memory emerges from hierarchically organized rep-
resentations distributed throughout the brain. The consequence of
this is that familiarity can arise from the reactivation of any of
these representations (including outside the MTL). In turn, the
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relational representation core system builds on relational theories
about the role of the hippocampus, by suggesting that the hippo-
campus flexibly binds disparate pieces of information (Aggleton
& Brown 1999; Eichenbaum & Cohen 2014; Eichenbaum et al.
2007). However, our view departs slightly from another represen-
tation-based model, Binding of Item and Context (Diana et al.
2007; Ranganath 2010), which posits that the perirhinal cortex
supports familiarity for items in general, whereas recollection
will rely on context representation in the parahippocampal cortex
and item-context binding in the hippocampus. We instead
propose that the perirhinal cortex is specifically tuned for the rep-
resentation of complex conjunctive entities, but not items of lower
levels of complexity. Moreover, the context representation core
system can support familiarity for scene and buildings.
Contrary to process-based models, the integrative memory
model does not localize the recollection and familiarity processes
themselves to certain regions, but conceptualizes them as pro-
cesses emerging from the interaction between specific kinds of
representation and attribution mechanisms. However, in line
with process models like the convergence, recollection, and famil-
iarity theory and the complementary learning systems (Montaldi
& Mayes 2010; Norman & O’Reilly 2003), we consider that the
core systems have unique computational properties (e.g., entity
versus relational pattern separation) that contribute to shaping
the content of stored information. The combination of computa-
tional properties and the associated representations makes the
relational and entity representation core systems more tuned to
recollection and familiarity, respectively. But the ultimate memory
output will depend on attribution mechanisms.
The network organization of the integrative memory model
clearly resonates with the posterior medial anterior temporal
(PMAT) framework (Ranganath & Ritchey 2012; Ritchey et al.
2015), but here we separate the network into several subsystems
rather than in two systems. The two views share the idea that this
neurocognitive architecture not only supports episodic memory,
but also other functions like perception, navigation, and semantic
processing. In the PMAT framework, the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex is a site of convergence between prefrontal andMTL compo-
nents of the anterior temporal and posterior medial systems. This
region would provide the value of item and bound representations,
and exercise some control over the representations – notably, to
select the relevant content as a function of the situation, and to
help with the integration of new information within existing repre-
sentations. Similar ideas figure in the integrative memory model,
notably by suggesting that the self-representation system (involving
the orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex) interacts with
the core systems to provide some self-referential tagging, thus mod-
ulating the value of the representations in core systems. Close to the
idea of control over mnemonic traces, we also include the prefrontal
cortex in the attribution system. Although both the PMAT frame-
work and the integrative memory model include the retrospenial
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, their role is conceived slightly
differently. In the PMAT framework, both the retrosplenial cortex
and the posterior cingulate cortex form parts of the posterior medial
system that allows individuals to orient in time, space, and situation.
In our model, we suggest that the retrosplenial cortex is an integral
part of a core system dedicated to storing visuo-spatial and contex-
tual information. In contrast, the posterior cingulate cortex acts as a
relay node during cortical reinstatement of the memory trace and,
by connecting all systems within the network, including the attribu-
tion system, it would contribute to the subjective experience of
mentally reliving the episode. This is an original hypothesis of
the integrative memory model suggesting a key role of the posterior
cingulate gyrus in autonoetic consciousness.
Finally, the articulation of the model around the interaction
between core systems and the attribution system is probably the
most novel aspect of the integrative memory model. Currently,
no recollection/familiarity neurocognitive framework has taken
into account the principles from attribution theories. A first pro-
posal relating the fluency heuristic to the perirhinal cortex has how-
ever been formulated by Dew and Cabeza (2013). We expand it by
suggesting that reactivation of any component of the hierarchically
represented item (i.e., object, face, building, word, simple associa-
tion) will generate a fluency signal which is interpreted by the attri-
bution system in the light of metacognitive knowledge. Similarly,
reactivated patterns of complex representations via the hippocam-
pus are also evaluated through the glasses of metacognitive
knowledge before being attributed to the past. Because the mapping
of attribution processes with cerebral regions is still to be con-
firmed, a lot remains to be learned about the exact neurocognitive
mechanisms involved in the attribution system. For now, we have
integrated theories about control mechanisms over memory to pro-
pose a mechanistic account of the attribution system. Notably, the
attention-to-memory model (Cabeza et al. 2008; 2012; Ciaramelli
et al. 2008) is key in describing the role of the parietal and prefron-
tal regions in attention and monitoring mechanisms.
6. The integrative memory model to understand
recollection and familiarity deficits
6.1. Damage to core systems versus attribution system
According to the integrative memory model, the dissociation of
recollection and familiarity in patients with lesions selective to
the hippocampus or perirhinal/entorhinal cortex (Barbeau et al.
2011; Bowles et al. 2010; Brandt et al. 2016) would arise because
the core representations are damaged. Hippocampal lesions pre-
vent the encoding and retrieval of relational representations,
and so hamper the possibility to re-experience all details from a
past episode. In contrast, perirhinal/entorhinal lesions affect the
creation of entity representations that cannot be subsequently
felt as familiar. However, in the latter case, our model predicts
that not all forms of familiarity will be impaired following perirhi-
nal/entorhinal damage, but, more specifically, familiarity-based
discrimination between stimuli that share features and require a
conjunctive trace. This should be tested by directly manipulating
the level of confusability of targets and distractors in recognition
memory tests. Moreover, if the same representations support epi-
sodic recognition memory, short-term memory, and perception, a
patient with a selective hippocampal lesion should present with
impaired use of relational representations in a variety of tasks,
beyond the episodic memory domain. For example, K.A., a
patient with developmental amnesia and atrophy of the hippo-
campus, fornix, mammillary bodies, and anterior thalamic nuclei
(i.e., the relational representation core system) shows both
impaired source memory and impaired relational binding in
short-term memory, with preserved conjunctive binding in short-
term memory (Jonin et al. 2018; 2019). In contrast, a patient with
a selective perirhinal/entorhinal lesion should be impaired in the
processing of entities across recognition memory, perception, and
short-term memory. Recently, Lacot et al. (2017) reported that
J.M.G., who had damage to the MTL cortices preserving the
right hippocampus, failed on a variety of recognition memory
tasks involving objects and abstract pictures, but had good visual
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recall for spatial patterns and geometric figures and good
scene-recognition performance. Interestingly, recollection as well
as familiarity for objects and abstract pictures were affected,
emphasizing the idea that the nature of representations carried
by the perirhinal/entorhinal cortex versus the hippocampus mat-
ters more than the memory processes to explain J.M.G.’s profile.
With regard to the context representation core system, severe
anterograde amnesia associated with mild retrograde amnesia has
been described following lesion to the retrosplenial cortex (for
reviews, see Aggleton 2010; Vann et al. 2009a). As the retrosplenial
cortex connects the hippocampus to regions storing the sensory-
perceptual details of memories, patients with retrosplenial amnesia
should present with a recollection deficit (Aggleton 2010), as well
as poor scene recognition and perceptual discrimination. The pau-
city of retrosplenial amnesia cases has not allowed researchers to
test this prediction yet. However, Valenstein et al. (1987) described
a case that showed impaired recall of paired associates and complex
figures, but relatively preserved recognition memory for faces. This
finding could speak for intact familiarity-basedmemory for entities
contrasting with deficient relational memory.
Finally, frontal lesions should affect the adequacy of the
explicit output with regard to the characteristics of the task or
the quality of the subjective experience because of disruption of
the attribution system. Some studies described impairment of
monitoring of memory output following lateral prefrontal cortex
lesions, leading notably to false recognitions (Schacter 1997).
Moreover, metamemory abilities are negatively affected by frontal
lesions, especially in medial prefrontal cortex (Pannu & Kaszniak
2005). If such monitoring and metacognitive mechanisms are
common to recollection and familiarity processes, as we suggest,
both should be impacted by prefrontal lesions. A few studies
have assessed the consequences of frontal lesions on recollection
and familiarity. Their results were inconclusive, with some studies
reporting deficits only in recollection (Anderson et al. 2011;
Stamenova et al. 2017; Wheeler & Stuss 2003), others indicating
deficits only in familiarity (Aly et al. 2011; MacPherson et al.
2008), and a few studies describing deficits in both recollection
and familiarity (Duarte et al. 2005; Kishiyama et al. 2009). This
inconsistency is perhaps not surprising if one takes into account
the fact that prefrontal areas are not supporting recollection and
familiarity processes per se, but rather, are dealing with expecta-
tions, and with selection and monitoring processes operating on
the reactivated content in answer to the specificities of the task
at hand. In this view, a prefrontal lesion could reduce the expres-
sion of recollection/familiarity-based memory outputs in some
conditions, but not others. We believe that the effect of frontal
lesions on recollection and familiarity would be best apprehended
by examining variation in memory outputs as a consequence of
manipulations affecting expectations and criterion setting.
6.2. Recollection and familiarity in the course of Alzheimer’s
disease
The case of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is interesting to consider in
the light of the integrative memory model for at least two reasons.
First, this is a progressive disease in which the trajectory of cogni-
tive decline is related to the spreading of neurofibrillary tangles and
neuronal loss (Jack et al. 2013) starting in the anterolateral entorhi-
nal and perirhinal cortices (Braak & Braak 1995; Braak & Del
Tredici 2015), corresponding to Braak’s Stage 1. As hippocampal
pathology comes later (Braak’s Stage 3), Braak’s Stage 1 represents
a unique model of selective MTL lesions targeting the entity
representation core system, which is very rarely encountered in
other neuropsychological populations (Barbeau et al. 2011;
Bowles et al. 2007). Moreover, in amnestic mild cognitive impair-
ment (aMCI), a diagnostic entity at high risk of developing AD
(Albert et al. 2011), dysfunction of the posterior cingulate gyrus
appears as a prominent feature (Chetelat et al. 2003; Dunn et al.
2014; Salmon et al. 2008). More specifically, although both the ven-
tral and dorsal posterior cingulate cortex show hypometabolic
activity in aMCI (Mutlu et al. 2016), the retrosplenial cortex dem-
onstrates the most consistent reduction in metabolism (Nestor
et al. 2003). Two mechanisms may contribute to such
retrosplenial hypometabolism in aMCI: atrophy of the region
(Pengas et al. 2010; Scahill et al. 2002), and distant consequence
of the pathology affecting the hippocampus and anterior nuclei
of the thalamus (Braak & Braak 1991; Villain et al. 2008). This
loss of inputs is aggravated by disruption of the cingulum bundle
that connects the hippocampus to the retrosplenial cortex (Villain
et al. 2008). Patients with aMCI would therefore be a target
population to link changes in recollection-based memory to the
pathology of regions within the relational and context representa-
tion core systems.
Second, even if several studies have investigated the integrity of
recollection and familiarity in aMCI and AD, the exact profile of
deficits is still unclear. Most puzzling is the lack of any consensus
regarding the fate of familiarity in aMCI and AD. Whereas a
number of studies have reported preserved familiarity in these
populations, an almost equal number of studies have shown
that familiarity is deficient (for reviews, see Koen & Yonelinas
2014; Schoemaker et al. 2014). Of course, this divergence across
studies can be partly explained by differences in terms of methods
(i.e., paradigm used to assess recollection and familiarity, nature
of the materials, etc.) and characteristics of the patients (i.e.,
severity of cognitive decline, cognitive domains affected beyond
memory, heterogeneity of the aMCI population, and so forth).
A systematic evaluation of these factors that modulate familiarity
performance in aMCI and AD would actually be warranted.
Beyond these methodological issues, we propose that considering
the complex multifaceted nature of familiarity may shed some
light on these divergent findings.
One factor that could help explain why it is difficult to get a
clear picture of the exact profile of impairment of recollection
and familiarity from current findings in aMCI and AD is the pro-
gressive nature of the pathology. Because key regions within the
cerebral architecture of the integrative memory model are affected
at different stages of the disease, we hereby propose a hypothetical
scheme for the chronological pattern of deficits in the course of
AD (see Figure 4). More specifically, some dimensions of recollec-
tion and familiarity processes may become dysfunctional at a spe-
cific stage of the disease depending on the brain regions most
affected at that time. Progression stages will mainly refer to
Braak’s neuropathological stages (Braak & Braak 1991; 1995), in
association with hypometabolism and atrophy. Amyloid burden
does not appear to correlate with cognitive decline, but provides
the background that defines Alzheimer’s pathological changes
(Jack et al. 2018). Figure 4 indicates when a deficit starts to
appear, assuming that already existing impairments are still
present and exacerbated by increased pathological burden.
In Stage 1, neurofibrillary tangles and neuropil threads are
limited to the transentorhinal cortex, corresponding to the medial
portion of the perirhinal cortex and the anterolateral entorhinal
cortex (BA 35) (Taylor & Probst 2008). Even if individuals in
that stage have amyloid pathology, they are asymptomatic and
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cognitively healthy. Nevertheless, we predict that the presence of
neuropathology in the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex
would affect the ability of Stage 1 individuals to create complex
conjunctive representations (i.e., entity pattern separation). This
may not impact everyday life functioning, as the difficulty
would be limited to specific cases requiring fine-grained entity-
level discrimination, but could be seen in tasks that particularly
probe rapid familiarity-based recognition of entities among very
similar stimuli (Besson et al. 2017). Familiarity for non-
conjunctive information and recollection should remain intact.
Stage 2 is still called a “transentorhinal stage” because it is char-
acterized mainly by an aggravation of transentorhinal pathology.
While most individuals in Stage 2 are asymptomatic, a few aMCI
patients may harbor Stage 2 neuropathology (Petersen et al.
2006). Whereas impaired familiarity for entity should be relatively
modest in Stage 1, it would be more clearly established in Stage 2,
proportionally to neuropathology in the perirhinal/anterolateral
entorhinal cortex. Of note, Braak and Braak (1991) reported
mild changes to the anterior nuclei of the thalamus. As an impor-
tant relay node in the Papez’s circuit (Aggleton & Brown 1999), the
anterior thalamic nuclei participate in the recollection of the con-
tent of past experienced episodes (i.e., relational representation
core system). Therefore, slightly impoverished recollection
should accompany these early pathological changes in the anterior
thalamus. Still, poor familiarity for entities should dominate.
Stage 3 corresponds to invasion of neurofibrillary tangles in
the hippocampus, initially affecting CA1 and the subiculum.
Individuals in Stage 3 present significant memory decline compared
to Stage 2, but no general cognitive decline (Grober et al. 1999).Most
aMCI patients are indeed in this stage (Petersen et al. 2006).
Moreover, in aMCI, hippocampal atrophy is typically found, espe-
cially in CA2 and CA3 (Hanseeuw et al. 2011), and a consistent
hypometabolism is observed in the retrosplenial cortex (Nestor
et al. 2003). Altogether, this would lead to dysfunction of the rela-
tional and context representation core systems, affecting the ability
to bind item and context information in pattern-separated represen-
tations. Reinstatement of encoded patterns should also be impaired.
Thus, recollection deficits are expected to occur, together with famil-
iarity for entities as in earlier stages. Familiarity for non-conjunctive
information still remains intact and poor recollection may dominate
the memory profile in Stage 3/aMCI patients.
Stage 4 starts to include demented AD patients, with more and
more severe cognitive impairment as one moves towards Stages 5 to
6 (Braak & Braak 1991; Grober et al. 1999; Petersen et al. 2006). In
Stage 4, in addition to pathology affecting most parts of the hippo-
campal formation, mild changes to the isocortex can be seen. From
Stage 5 onwards, the isocortex becomes more and more severely
and widely affected, with a spreading of tau pathology to connected
regions (Brettschneider et al. 2015). Initial isocortical pathology is
notably present in the retrosplenial cortex and inferior occipitotem-
poral cortex (Braak & Braak 1991), and then transmits progressively
to connected regions. On FDG-PET (i.e., fluorodeoxyglucose-
positron emission tomography), one can see a typical pattern of
temporoparietal, ventromedial prefrontal, and posterior cingulate
hypometabolism from the mild AD stage (Herholz et al. 2002).
Frontal atrophy also emerges, although later (Salat et al. 2001).
In Stage 4 and early Stage 5, impaired recollection should dom-
inate as more and more regions contributing to the creation and
reinstatement of complex relational representations are lesioned,
notably the retrosplenial cortex. Consistently, an fMRI study indi-
cated that, when AD patients used residual recollection capacities,
they activated the posterior cingulate gyrus as healthy controls did,
but showed impaired functional connectivity between the posterior
cingulate gyrus and the hippocampus, inferior parietal cortex,
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Genon et al. 2013). Moreover,
decreased self-reference memory effects suggest that the connec-
tion between the content of the memory trace and the self-
reference system is reduced in early AD (Genon et al. 2014), in
relation to atrophy in the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior
cingulate gyrus (Wong et al. 2017). In addition, the difficulty to
process entities, in memory tasks as well as in others such as
perceptual tasks, would still correlate with the degree of pathology
in perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex, as suggested by recent
data in mild AD (Bastin et al. 2014; Delhaye et al. 2019; Kivisaari
et al. 2013; Yeung et al. 2017). Finally, creation and reactivation of
traces for simple items and associations associated with feelings
of familiarity should remain possible, but mild pathology in the
inferior occipitotemporal area could disturb processing of certain
categories of stimuli that depend on this area, such as faces.
However, when attribution still functions relatively well (likely
Stages 3 and 4, and maybe early Stage 5), in the context of objec-
tive (recollection) memory difficulties in everyday life, we predict
that fluctuant familiarity may be observed because of metacogni-
tive changes. Indeed, studies in amnesia have suggested that
awareness of memory deficits in everyday life may modify the
metacognitive assessment of fluency cues and lead to increased
disqualification of such cues (Geurten & Willems 2017; Ozubko
& Yonelinas 2014). Along those lines, for early stages of AD,
the interaction between anosognosia and reliance on fluency
cues would be a promising avenue for research. In aMCI and
AD, awareness of memory difficulties is variable among patients
(Starkstein 2014). It is possible that patients who acknowledge
their memory deficits may be less prone to rely on fluency-based
feeling of familiarity and would discard them more readily,
whereas anosognosic patients would not and may even demon-
strate an over-reliance on fluency-based familiarity.
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Figure 4. Chronological unfolding of deficits to specific mechanisms as a function of neuropathological changes in the course of Alzheimer’s disease.
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When the disease starts to impact regions belonging to the attri-
bution system (late Stage 5 and Stage 6), the interaction between
(already degraded) contents and attribution becomes severely com-
promised, and both recollection and familiarity are likely to appear
impaired in recognition memory tasks. In particular, patients will
lose the ability to subjectively relive past events (i.e., autonoetic con-
sciousness) and this deficit would correlate with decreased func-
tional connectivity between the posterior cingulate hub and the
rest of the network. Moreover, less efficient attribution processes
could modify the transformation of reactivated content into subjec-
tive judgments and feelings. For example, in AD, despite the deficit
in their recollection abilities, patients show increased false recollec-
tions (Gallo et al. 2010) and have a continued willingness to adopt
retrieval strategies oriented towards recollection (Willems et al.
2008). To explain false recollections, it can be hypothesized that
patients relax their criterion for experiencing recollection and
even very partial recollection may trigger a feeling of remembering.
This hypothetical scheme of chronological changes in key
mechanisms within the integrative memory model suggests that
cross-sectional comparisons of groups of aMCI or AD patients
on general measures of recollection and familiarity would provide
divergent results because of variability in the pathological status
(in terms of Braak’s staging) of patients and in the type of mech-
anisms that tasks preferentially assessed. An ideal approach to test
the unfolding of memory impairments would be longitudinal
assessments of individuals from the asymptomatic stages of AD,
with tasks designed to measure specific mechanisms such as
entity pattern separation, relational pattern separation, pattern
completion, and so forth, and with a possibility to relate these
cognitive changes to the progressive topography of neurodegener-
ation, using, for example, tau-PET tracers (Schwarz et al. 2016).
7. Conclusions
The integrative memory model presents a framework of the com-
putational mechanisms and their cerebral bases which support the
encoding and retrieval of events in interacting core systems and
attribution system. This model is not opposed to existing influen-
tial neurocognitive models of memory, but rather complements
them by integrating many of their principles into a single view.
This integration allows us to generate novel hypotheses. For
instance, we have proposed that disruption of the posterior cingu-
late connectivity hub, where the retrosplenial cortex and ventral
and dorsal posterior cingulate cortex play distinct but comple-
mentary roles, will alter cortical reinstatement of encoded details
and autonoetic consciousness. Another novel prediction is that
reactivation of traces in core systems does not necessarily lead
to the subjective experience of recollection and familiarity.
Subjective feelings and final explicit recognition judgments
involve late attribution mechanisms. The intervention of such
attribution processes could explain why apparently impaired use
of familiarity may result from a strategic disqualification of flu-
ency cues in people with memory problems.
We propose the integrative memorymodel with the aim tomove
forward research on the nature of the memory deficits in brain-
damaged populations, as we believe that future studies should be
framed in accordance with the latest advances in the knowledge
about memory functioning. In particular, we consider the course
of AD as a good example for applying our framework, by suggesting
a scheme of chronological dysfunction of specific mechanisms
depending on the topographical progression of neuropathological
changes. Such a scheme suggests that the predominant impairment
in terms of recollection and familiarity will shift during the course of
the disease, with very early neurodegeneration of the perirhinal cor-
tex associated with deficits in tasks that rely on the representation of
items as viewpoint-invariant conjunctivewholes (e.g., familiarity for
entities), and with increasingly dominant impairment of recollec-
tion when pathology invades several regions from the relational rep-
resentation core system.
Our model could also serve as the basis to understand memory
impairments in various conditions, ranging from healthy aging to
disorders such as amnesia, temporal lobe epilepsy, and frontotem-
poral dementia. Further studies on brain damage that affects specific
regions related to recollection and familiarity might provide impor-
tant tests of the neurocognitive architecture of memory, and these
could lead to a reconsideration of the proposedmodel – for example,
if some hypothesized region-mechanism links were falsified by
experiments. The proposed neurocognitive architecture is certainly
not comprehensive and should evolve to incorporate other mecha-
nisms. For instance, the notion of time, which is critical in episodic
memory (Eichenbaum 2013), is not considered here.
Finally, a broader avenue for research would be to examine the
role of the proposed neurocognitive architecture beyond memory:
the role it plays in allowing humans to prepare for future events
and to share the past.
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Abstract
The integrative memory model contains multiple subsystems. In
this commentary, the processes within these subsystems are
questioned. First, the assumption that familiarity largely reflects
perceptual fluency is examined. Next, the distinction between
“process” and “representational” models of temporal lobe
function is challenged. Finally, the “relational representation
core system” (or “extended hippocampal system”), which is cen-
tral to the model, is especially sketchy. Here, I highlight key
questions to be addressed in order to understand this system’s
role in trace formation.
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Bastin et al. attempt to reconcile a plethora of different models
concerning brain networks for the encoding, consolidation, and
retrieval of episodic memory. There is much to admire, especially
as a voice is given to many different ideas that have evolved over the
past 20 years. The emphasis is on picking out common themes and
bringing them together. A related theme is to look beyond the tem-
poral lobe, to integrate parietal and frontal areas, as well as the
medial diencephalon. These represent significant achievements,
not least because they create bridges between the memory network
models largely derived from classic neuropsychology, for example,
the study of amnesic patients with confirmed brain pathology
(which highlights the “relational representational core system”)
and wider network models, largely derived from functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI). An almost inevitable cost of
this amalgamation is that elements of the current model remain
underspecified, leaving them difficult to test.
The integrative memory model is embedded within dual-
process models, which distinguish recollection from familiarity. It
is presumed that the principal signal for familiarity comes from
perceptual fluency, the change in threshold for information that
has been previously experienced. This is an odd choice for several
reasons. First, as stated, some amnesics can show seemingly intact
repetition priming yet catastrophic recognition memory. Second,
experiments showing that perceptual fluency can contribute to rec-
ognition often require special constraints. Third, electrophysiolog-
ical studies, starting from the pioneering work of Malcolm Brown,
reveal that for visual information, at least, some neurons in the rhi-
nal cortex reduce their firing following stimulus repetition. This
attenuated activity is not only seen in single-cell recordings in ani-
mals but is also present in fMRI studies (Aggleton & Brown 2006).
The reduced activity in these neurons, thought to reflect long-term
depression (Griffiths et al. 2008), would be sufficient to solve both
familiarity and recency judgments. At the same time, it would be
odd to categorise this signal reduction as perceptual fluency, as
the latter would be expected to increase activity on stimulus repeti-
tion, given the fall in threshold. While it is the case that some peri-
rhinal neurons may increase their firing gradually after hundreds of
stimulus repetitions in test conditions associated with reinforce-
ment (Holscher et al. 2003), this methodology is a far cry from cog-
nitive tests of recognition memory. Although I agree with the
authors’ statement that “lesions to the perirhinal cortex will not
necessarily affect all forms of familiarity” (target article, section
4.2.1, para. 1), their model places undue emphasis on what is prob-
ably a subsidiary process (perceptual fluency).
The authors also discuss distinctions between “process” and
“representational” models within the medial temporal lobe.
Process models emphasise the computational properties of a struc-
ture (e.g., pattern separation by the hippocampus) whereas repre-
sentational models emphasise the different kinds of information
available in different brain sites (e.g., context-rich information in
the hippocampus versus context-sparse information in perirhinal
cortex). This distinction has been previously made, but represents
a false dichotomy. Those espousing “representational” models
surely do not presume that changes in representation happen by
magic, they arise from the novel connections and architecture
that permit different computations in different areas. At the
same time, the dense, reciprocal interconnections between differ-
ent medial temporal lobe sites result in the shared ownership of
some representations (and processes).
Central to the integrative memory model is the “relational rep-
resentation core system” (see sect. 3). The key components of this
system are the hippocampus, mammillary bodies, anterior
thalamic nuclei, and their interconnections – the “extended hippo-
campal system” (Aggleton & Brown 1999). These medial dience-
phalic interconnections are presumed to help build the memory
trace, in which item and context are bound. Recollection then
emerges preferentially from reactivation of traces within this sys-
tem. Surprisingly little evidence is provided by Bastin et al. for
this core system, yet animal models and the analysis of patients
with colloid cysts have proved most insightful. To take the latter,
it has been repeatedly shown that interruption of the fornix
(which provides hippocampal inputs to both the anterior thalamus
and mammillary bodies, among other sites) is sufficient to cause
an anterograde amnesia that preferentially impairs recollection
(Vann et al. 2009b). The resulting losses in recollection, but not
familiarity, correlate closely with the extent of mammillary body
atrophy (Tsivilis et al. 2008). Renewed interest in the mammillary
body–anterior thalamic axis has provided novel insights into the
memory loss in conditions such as developmental amnesia
(Dzieciol et al. 2017), Korsakoff’s syndrome (Segobin et al.
2019), thalamic vascular damage (Carlesimo et al. 2011), and
Alzheimer’s disease (Aggleton et al. 2016).
Even less consideration is given in the integrativememorymodel
for why these two medial diencephalic structures are so critical. It
appears that these particular structures provide key information
for memory encoding that otherwise not would not reach the hip-
pocampus (Aggleton et al. 2010). If we just focus on the anterior tha-
lamic nuclei, we can see that afferents potentially matching the
above criteria arise from themammillary bodies, parts of the frontal
lobe (especially more dorsal areas), the reticular thalamic nucleus,
and Gudden’s tegmental nuclei (via the mammillary bodies).
These inputs can interact with hippocampal processing via projec-
tions from the anterior thalamic nuclei to hippocampal and para-
hippocampal areas. A related possibility is that anterior thalamic
and hippocampal efferents converge on a third site, for example, ret-
rosplenial cortex, where their combined interaction is critical for
memory. The discovery of spatial cells in the rat anterior thalamus
(Jankowski et al. 2015) adds weight to the idea that these dience-
phalic processes involve individual mnemonic representations, as
suggested by the integrative memory model. Key questions remain
as to why there is an apparent duplication of information across
medial diencephalic and temporal structures, allied to the need to
test their independence and interdependence.
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Abstract
Episodic memories are shaped by the representational format of
their contents. These formats are not only determined by medial
temporal lobe areas, but essentially also by the neocortical
regions which these areas control. The representational formats
of medial temporal lobe and neocortex are sufficient to deter-
mine both, memory contents and subjective memory qualities,
without the further need for an attribution system.
Bastin et al. propose an integrative framework for episodic memory
based on interactions between two representational subsystems
and an attribution system. They suggest that an “entity representa-
tion core system” supports familiarity, a “relational representation
core system” is recruited for recollection, and an “attribution
system” determines subjective memory qualities (target article,
sect. 3). I agree with many aspects of their proposal. Describing
memory in terms of the representational formats in which prior
experiences are reinstated, and linking these formats to specific
brain structures and distinct subjective qualities, is a fruitful and
innovative approach. The authors nicely describe that the common
distinction between representational and process-based memory
theories is not as clear-cut as it may seem, since specific types
of representations lend themselves more naturally to specific
computational processes.
Despite my overall agreement, I would like to make two critical
comments. First, I believe the proposed framework could empha-
size more the impact of memory representations in neocortical
areas beyond the medial temporal lobe. Second, I am not con-
vinced that representational systems only determine the content
of memories whereas an attribution system defines their subjec-
tive quality. Instead, I suggest that the subjective qualities of mem-
ory can also be explained by specific representational formats,
rather than by a separate system for metacognitive judgments.
With regard to the first aspect, Bastin et al. strongly focus their
proposal on the contribution of the hippocampus and the perirhi-
nal cortex. As demonstrated by decades of neuropsychological
research, these structures are indeed central and indispensable
for memory functioning. Nevertheless, the representational fea-
tures of memories as well as their subjective properties (see also
my second point below) are determined not only by properties
of medial temporal areas, but crucially also by the representational
formats in specific neocortical areas which they control during
retrieval. The authors do acknowledge the role of neocortical
regions such as the occipitotemporal and posterior parietal cortex
for the entity representation core system and for integrative
functions; however, they do not attempt to explain properties of
memory representations by the representational features of
these neocortical areas. In fact, it is unlikely that the full content
of memories resides in the distribution of synaptic weights in
medial temporal areas. Instead, as acknowledged by the authors,
these regions act as “pointers” to neocortical areas (Pacheco
et al. 2019; Teyler & Rudy 2007).
I would like to give four examples where neocortical areas are
relevant for understanding memory representations. First, epi-
sodic memories are characterized by either an egocentric or an
allocentric visual perspective (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce 2000;
Nigro & Neisser 1983). These perspectives are putatively deter-
mined by egocentric representations in posterior parietal cortex
(e.g., Byrne et al. 2007) versus perspective-invariant (allocentric)
representations in the temporal neocortex. Second, memory
representations contain varying degrees of perceptual detail versus
general semantic information, and in extreme cases may only
consist of schematic event knowledge. The perceptual versus
conceptual representational format of a memory likely maps
onto neocortical processing steps (with schema representations
depending strongly on prefrontal regions). Third, episodic mem-
ories rely on the construction of mental scenarios (Barry &
Maguire 2019; Cheng et al. 2016) whose level of detail can be flex-
ibly adapted to fit situational demands. Their different degrees of
representational detail may reflect the different processing steps in
sensory areas as well as contributions from semantic expectations
and schemas, which all rely on neocortical areas. Finally, autobio-
graphical episodic memories in healthy subjects can, if they are
sufficiently relevant, become central constituents of personal
narratives, that is, of the stories that people tell about themselves
(e.g., Renoult et al. 2012). By contrast, intrusions and flashbacks
in posttraumatic stress disorder patients are characterized by a
lack of semantic processing and narrative integration; therapeutic
concepts such as narrative expose therapy attempt to transform
these pathological representational formats into more context-
dependent and semantically integrated ones (Schauer et al. 2011).
Now, egocentric versus allocentric visual perspectives, percep-
tual versus conceptual representations, flexible representations,
and the amount of narrative integration are just some examples
for those representational features of memories which can only
be understood by taking into account the representational proper-
ties of neocortical areas – in particular, in ventral and dorsal
visual streams and in the corresponding networks in other sen-
sory modalities. This is emphasized in conceptual frameworks
such as Brewin’s “dual representation theory” (Brewin et al.
1996). These frameworks still assume a central role of medial
temporal lobe structures (including the amygdala, which is not
mentioned in the Bastin et al.’s proposal) for controlling these
representations, whose properties are nevertheless essentially
determined by the specific computations in neocortical areas.
With regard to my second point, I believe the authors underes-
timate the influence of representational properties on the subjective
features of memories. Although I agree that fluency signals and
context-dependent expectations may shape how we subjectively
experience a reinstated memory representation, the subjective, or
phenomenological, features of episodic memory are primarily
determined by the specific representational formats of the memo-
rized events. In addition to the examples described above, feelings
of familiarity and recollection can also be best explained by the rep-
resentational properties of an event – that is, whether individual
items or relational information is being remembered. In fact,
Bastin et al. acknowledge that these types of representations are
predominantly associated with feelings of familiarity or recollec-
tions; however, as there are some cases where these feelings
dissociate from their typical contents, they propose to explain the
feelings by metacognitive mechanisms rather than representational
features. I would actually find it more parsimonious to embrace the
general heuristic value of representational formats for explaining
subjective memory experiences and conceptualize possible dissoci-
ations as atypical effects of representations for which the overall
system was not designed. In fact, it is not even clear whether feel-
ings of familiarity that occur in atypical conditions – and in partic-
ular in patients with neurological disorders – are the same as those
under common circumstances. In other words, if feelings of famil-
iarity or recollection do not match with the typical representational
format of the corresponding memories, are these feelings really the
same as in more common cases?
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Abstract
The integrative memory model combines five core memory
systems with an attributional system. We agree with Bastin
et al. that this melding is the most novel aspect of the model.
But we await further evidence that the model’s substantial com-
plexity informs our understanding of false memories or of the
development of recollection and familiarity.
The integrative memory model is comprised of six interacting
memory systems. There is a relational representation core system
central to recollection, and an entity representation core system cen-
tral to familiarity. These connect to a context representation core
system, a self-referential system, and a connectivity hub. The
productions of these systems interfacewith a unitary attribution sys-
tem reminiscent of the evaluation process in Whittlesea’s (1997)
Selective Construction and Preservation of Experiences (SCAPE)
account of memory. SCAPE’s attribution system is where cued
memory traces, stimulus structure, task, and context interact in
what Leboe-McGowan (2019) dubbed the “hokey pokey” (in refer-
ence to the popular children’s participation dance) to yield subjec-
tive experiences and reports of recollection or familiarity.
We are thrilled to see a neurocognitive model that incorporates
an attributional process informed by Whittlesea’s work. And we
agree with Bastin et al. that the melding of the core and attribu-
tional systems is the most novel aspect of the integrative memory
model. However, the “hokey pokey” of multiple systems in the
integrative memory model, particularly the inclusion of separate
systems for recollection and familiarity, is antithetical to
Whittlesea’s unitary memory system approach. In Whittlesea’s
(1997) words, “Memory is fundamentally very simple. Human
performance derives its complexity not from the architecture or
processing of memory but from the variety of tasks, stimulus
structures, and contexts to which memory is exposed” (p. 260).
Here, we side with Whittlesea, and suggest that a drawback of
the integrative memory model’s complexity is that it may be
difficult to determine whether recollection or familiarity arise
from productions within the model’s core systems or evaluations
within the attribution system. Given the alignment of integrative
memory model systems with distinct brain architectures,
perhaps researchers can leverage brain imaging and connectivity
analyses to justify this complexity. Regardless of whether the
integrative memory model’s complexity proves justifiable,
however, we suggest that it currently has at least two major
blind-spots: false memories and development. We consider each
in turn.
False memories
Memory is a fundamentally reconstructive process; therefore, a truly
integrative model of memory must explain how false memories
arise. Rates of falsememory phenomena, including themisinforma-
tion effect, can exceed 50% of participants (e.g., Loftus et al. 1978).
Similarly, high levels of false memories occur in the Deese–
Roediger–McDermott effect, in which people falsely recollect a non-
studied word (e.g., sleep) that is the top semantic associate of a list of
presented words (e.g., bed, rest, tired, etc.) (Deese 1959; Roediger &
McDermott 1995). Finally, rates of rich false memories, in which
people come to believe entire events that never happened, can
reach 50% of participants (e.g., Scoboria et al. 2017). Some of
these false memories merely feel familiar. The integrative memory
model describes how familiarity-based retrieval can produce correct
or false recognition (see Bastin et al.’s Fig. 2). However, a sizable pro-
portion of these and other types of false memories are experienced
as recollected. Although the integrative memory model provides a
detailed description of recollection-based true memories (see their
Fig. 3), it does not currently address the processes underlying
recollection-based false memories.
From both theoretical and applied perspectives, it is important
to understand how and when false recollection versus false famil-
iarity arise, and how true and false memories differ (Bernstein &
Loftus 2009). Instead of tackling false memories, Bastin et al.
focus on the model’s ability to explain memory impairments,
including amnesia, frontal lesions, and especially the various stages
of Alzheimer’s disease. Damage to the integrative memory model
systems may explain deficits in recollection or familiarity, but how
does it explain whether someone experiences false memories as
recollected versus familiar? Do false recollections arise within the
core systems or the attribution system? How could we tell?
Perhaps the aforementioned brain imaging and connectivity anal-
yses can be used to answer these questions. We suggest that study-
ing the conditions that predict whether individuals with amnesia,
frontal lesions, and Alzheimer’s disease will experience a false
memory as recollected versus familiar would enhance the model’s
contribution.
Development
Bastin et al. thoroughly review the neuro-atypical memory
literature, and detail how lesions and other neural insults impair
recollection and/or familiarity. They suggest that longitudinal
study of memory impairments would have great utility. We
agree. However, we suggest that the authors have overlooked an
important complementary approach – namely, the study of how
recollection and familiarity develop and shift across the lifespan.
Childhood and old age involve dramatic structural and functional
changes to brain and behavior. Therefore, we believe that it would
be informative to consider developmental patterns in recollection
and familiarity across the lifespan. In the case of false memory,
the integrative memory model might be informed by considering
how the likelihood of different memory errors shifts in childhood
and adulthood. In memory implantation studies, experimenters
use suggestive techniques to lead participants to remember having
experienced certain event details or entire events that never
occurred (see Loftus 2018). From our reading of the lifespan devel-
opmental literature on false memory, misinformation-based and
rich false memories tend to follow a U-shaped development:
These false memories are more frequent in childhood and older
adulthood than in younger adulthood (see also Brainerd & Reyna
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2005; Frenda et al. 2011). Conversely, the Deese–Roediger–
McDermott illusion increases linearly from childhood to older
adulthood (e.g., Brainerd et al. 2008; Gallo 2010). How might
these different data patterns relate to the core versus attributional
systems in the integrative memory model? We welcome Bastin
et al.’s insights on how developmental patterns in false memory
illusions might constrain or validate their model. Indeed, we feel
it would be informative to consider the development of recollection
and familiarity processes for both true and false memories.
In sum, Bastin et al. should justify the integrative memory
model’s substantial complexity by addressing how that complexity
contributes to our understanding of (1) different types of false
memory phenomena (particularly false recollection), and (2)
the development of recollection and familiarity for true and
false memories across the lifespan. By incorporating these missing
elements, we feel the integrative memory model would be more
integrative and thus better live up to its name.
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Abstract
Although Bastin et al. propose a useful model for thinking about
the structure of memory and memory deficits, their distinction
between entities and relational encoding is incompatible with
data showing that even individual objects – prototypical “enti-
ties” – are made up of distinct features which require binding.
Thus, “entity” and “relational” brain regions may need to solve
fundamentally the same problems.
A fundamental tenet of the integrative memory model proposed by
Bastin et al. is the distinction between entity representation and rela-
tional representations. This distinction is based on the premise that
there is ameaningful sense of an “entity” that is holistic and unitized
and can be stored and retrieved without recollection or binding; for
example, Bastin et al.’s claim that at the “level of the perirhinal
cortex and anterolateral entorhinal all visual features are integrated
in a single complex representation of the object that can be discrim-
inated from other objects with overlapping features.”
It is natural to think that meaningful visual objects might be
unitized entities for visual memory, and indeed many memory
researchers take this claim for granted. However, we believe this
view of unitized, fully bound representation of objects is inconsis-
tent with the cognitive data on object memory. In particular,
supposed “entities” such as visual objects are not unitized repre-
sentations, but themselves are stored as separate features requiring
binding in the same fundamental way that objects need to be
bound to contexts. This calls into question the core distinction
between entities and relations proposed by the integrative
memory model and other similar models: If even single objects
are stored in a way consistent with the “relational system” –
where the “representation keeps components separate and flexibly
bound” (target article, sect. 4.1, para. 7) – then it is not clear what
an entity would be or whether the fundamental nature of the
brain regions subserving object memory are really distinct from
those subserving item-context integration.
Work from our labs shows that visual object features are stored
and accessed independently in long-term memory: Different
features of single individual objects are forgotten at different
rates (Brady et al. 2013); and people remember particular features
but don’t remember which objects these features belonged to
(Utochkin & Brady 2019). For example, if people are shown a
blue open backpack and then asked to choose among sets of
four backpacks that are blue/open, blue/closed, or red/open,
red/closed, people can forget the color but still can remember
its “open-ness” (Brady et al. 2013). Or, if people are shown one
mug (mug A) full of coffee and another mug (mug B) empty,
they are well above chance reporting that they saw one full mug
and one empty mug, and that they saw mug A and mug B, but
they are at chance at ascribing the “fullness” and “emptiness” to
the particular mugs A and B (Utochkin & Brady 2019).
Indeed, the idea that some items might be stored in a fully
unitized representation (in an “entity” system) seems incompati-
ble with the cognitive problem that object representations are
designed to solve. One of the central requirements of a visual
memory system is robustness to variation (Schurgin &
Flombaum 2018). If object representations were totally integrated
entities in memory, their recognition in the real world would be
extremely problematic, given the infinite number of poses and
states these objects can take, as well as variations in orientation,
lighting, and more. One might argue that this invariant recogni-
tion is possible if a unitized “concept” of a particular object is
formed during multiple episodes – connecting across multiple
experiences when an object is presented in different states and
viewpoints. But this claim immediately implies an independence
of the features forming the core of this concept and those repre-
senting the way it changes across contexts.
In contrast to any view based on unitized object memories, we
have demonstrated that people’s memories are extremely robust
to variation even at the level of individual objects, suggesting that
representations even at the level of objects are based on separate
features that are flexibly bound together rather than unitized. For
example, imagine you saw an open-doored cabinet, and then later
we asked which cabinet you had seen – but now the “old” item
was shown in a new state (the same cabinet now has its doors closed,
changing a huge number of visual features). We have shown that
people are nearly perfect at generalizing in this way, and can do
so even if the “foil” presented at test is a new open-doored cabinet,
designed to maximally mislead participants (Utochkin & Brady
2019). Therefore, we believe the flexible nature of binding attributed
by the integrative memory model only to item-context distinctions
and recollection situations, need to be extended to nearly every level
of representation of objects as well as contexts.
Similar evidence for independence and structured representa-
tion rather than unitized objects is present in the visual working
memory literature, where it is frequently found that both objects
and separate features can be stored and objects are not stored as
single integrated units (see Brady et al. 2011 for review). Since
working memory is critical for consolidation into long-term
memory, this may be the beginning of the non-unitized, non-
integral storage of items in memory.
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Overall, we believe that entities are stored in a way that is not
holistic or unitized – and thus, at nearly every level of representa-
tion, there is a need for flexible, relational encoding. If this is a
common property of memories for individual objects (which is
associated with “entities”) and complex episodes (requiring the
involvement of “relational representations”), then is there a funda-
mental difference in the representation of these two kinds of
information, as proposed by the authors? If there is, then how
does one know where an entity ends and a relational representa-
tion begins? We believe our work and that of the rest of the visual
memory community is more consistent with the idea that there
is a hierarchy of representations, each requiring the storage of
relational information and each allowing for the possibility of
misbinding and other retrieval failures. Thus, rather than a strong
dichotomy between entities and relational storage, the benefits of
flexible, independent storage, and the resulting problem of bind-
ing features together, occur at every level of the hierarchy – from
the simplest visual feature conjunctions to the binding of objects
into contexts and into events.
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Abstract
Despite highlighting the role of the attribution system and pro-
posing a coherent large-scale architecture of declarative memory,
the integrative memory model would be more “integrative” if the
temporal dynamics of the interactions between its components
was clarified. This is necessary to make predictions in patients
with brain injury and hypothesize dissociations.
“Integrative” is a major asset and is highly relevant to qualify the
model presented by Bastin et al. in the target article. Integration is
inseparable from multimodality and multidimensionality: the
integrative memory model postulates that the systems processing
representations, relations, and attributions are linked inside a
coherent “architecture” allowing emergent properties. Within
this context, one of the major advances proposed by the integra-
tive memory model is the integration and the clarification of the
role of the attribution system, which is thought to depend mostly
on the prefrontal cortex. In contrast, most previous models of
memory were centered on the temporal lobes and Papez circuit.
Some of the aspects of the temporal dynamics of memory that
are currently not fully described in the model are: time perception
during memory (Eichenbaum 2017a); time sequences that
distinguish temporally distinct episodes and stimuli (Ekstrom &
Ranganath 2018; Ranganath & Hsieh 2016); projection in the
future (Addis & Schacter 2012); and the time scale for building
memories at the cellular level (Kukushkin & Carew 2017).
However, in this commentary we want to focus on another aspect
of temporal dynamics that is essential to validate to clarify the
architecture of the integrative memory model. Because the inte-
grative memory model, as its name implies, integrates different
components, it is crucial to specify what kind of relation they
entertain. This information is also missing from the present
model. The authors have devoted a large portion of the target
article to describing the general architecture of the components,
leaving little space to discuss exactly how they relate. (We think
that their model could have been dubbed the interaction memory
model just as well as the integration memory model.)
Yet, although not fully specified, the integrative memory
model is already based on a few assumptions regarding its tempo-
ral dynamics. For example, in line with many previous studies,
familiarity is supposed to be rapid. The model also assumes
that memory “emerges from hierarchically organized representa-
tions distributed throughout the brain” (target article, sect. 5.3,
para. 1; emphasis added), which suggests a precise order in
which the different components are activated. In contrast, most
arrows connecting the different components of the model are
bidirectional, perhaps due to the lack of knowledge about the con-
nectivity between the components. However, the very presence of
these arrows suggests structural and functional connections that
have to be characterized.
Using behavioral reaction times for various memory tasks, it is
possible to get an idea of the latency of the activation of some of
these systems and such latencies can be used as upper time con-
straints. For example, behavioral paradigms based on time con-
straints can be used to precisely assess the speed of familiarity
(Besson et al. 2012). Recording brain activity using surface EEG
(electroencephalography) or MEG (magnetoencephalography),
possibly with source reconstruction, or combined EEG-fMRI (func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging) recordings (Hoppstädter et al.
2015) provides a more refined idea of the activation latencies of
each component of the model. Intracranial EEG is spatially more
precise and reveals, for example, a striking delay between the activity
of the perirhinal cortex and the hippocampus that should be taken
into account in models of memory (Barbeau et al. 2008; Trautner
et al. 2004). Methodological advances even allow comparison of
the neuronal activity of different medial temporal lobe regions
involved in memory (Mormann et al. 2008). Moreover, it is also
possible to calculate the strength of functional interactions between
brain regions, as well as causality and synchrony indices, using var-
ious approaches such as fMRI (Staresina et al. 2013), intracranial
EEG (Krieg et al. 2017; Kubota et al. 2013; Steinvorth et al. 2010),
and thorough analyses of neuronal activity (Staresina et al. 2019).
In parallel, validating these dynamics in clinical situations is
necessary. Alzheimer’s disease – inducing slowly increasing dam-
ages to many brain areas involved in both the representation and
attribution systems of the integrative memory model – is a perti-
nent example chosen by the authors. However, it is insufficient to
test the model’s dynamics. Experiential memory phenomena such
as déjà-vu (an erroneous feeling of familiarity) or reminiscences
(memories including a mental content and recollection) allow
testing of the model on another time scale (Curot et al. 2017).
These phenomena are highly transient – hundreds of milliseconds
to a few seconds. This is the real-time scale of familiarity feelings,
recollection, ecphory, and mental imagery. They become all the
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more valuable when they are induced by electrical brain stimula-
tions, since these stimulations also allow inferring the directional-
ity and latency of connectivity (David et al. 2013; Trebaul et al.
2018). For example, the absence of any subjective experience
after electrical brain stimulations of the posterior cingulate cortex
is mentioned in the target article, suggesting that the posterior
cingulate cortex is not involved in representations (Balestrini
et al. 2015; Foster & Parvizi 2017). In fact, it also suggests that
the posterior cingulate cortex cannot be an entry point in the
integrative memory model.
Using such approaches, it would be possible to get an idea of
how the model may work effectively. It would also be possible to
start making precise predictions about the consequences of injury
to specific components of the integrative memory model in neuro-
psychological populations. Dissociations could be hypothesized
and tested. As an important novel aspect of the integrative memory
model is the attribution system, it appears particularly relevant to
assess more specifically the relations between this system and the
entity and context core systems. It is likely that clarifying the
dynamics of these relationships will help to reveal novel findings
regarding a variety of neuropsychological syndromes. A positive
aspect of new neurocognitive models is that their details can be
refined, compared to observations, and tested in new experiments,
thereby opening new avenues for research. Let’s go.
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Abstract
The target article carefully describes the memory system, cen-
tered on the temporal lobe that builds specific memory traces.
It does not, however, mention the laterality effects that exist
within this system. This commentary briefly surveys evidence
showing that clear asymmetries exist within the temporal lobe
structures subserving the core system and that the right temporal
structures mainly underpin face familiarity feelings.
In their integrative memory model, Bastin et al. describe recollec-
tion and familiarity as the interaction between core systems,
which store specific types of representations, and an attribution
system that translates content reactivation into a subjective expe-
rience. According to the authors, within these systems, specific
types of representations (such as people and things) are uniquely
shaped by specific computational operations and are involved in
item familiarity. Therefore, these systems build specific memory
traces, and damage to them induces severe degradation of these
memory traces.
Bastin et al. distinguish the function of various structures
included in these systems (i.e., perirhinal cortex, ventral tempor-
opolar cortex, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and amygdala) but do
not mention the difference that, according to some authors
(e.g., Gainotti 2012; Woollams & Patterson 2018), could exist
between left and right anterior temporal lobes in the processing
of verbal and non-verbal representations. However, there is con-
vincing evidence that this lateralization of verbal and non-verbal
representations of people and things is reflected in the lateraliza-
tion of the corresponding familiarity feelings that can be observed
in both normal and pathological conditions. This is particularly
clear for face familiarity feelings, which are very important in per-
sonal interaction, because of the social relevance of distinguishing
well-known from unfamiliar people.
A relationship between the right hemisphere and face familiar-
ity feelings has, indeed, been repeatedly demonstrated in healthy
subjects, by asking them to make familiarity judgments about
faces presented separately to the right and left visual fields, and
by studying the lateralization of event-related potentials or of mag-
netoencephalographic (MEG) waveforms evoked by face familiar-
ity. For instance, Stone and Valentine (2005) showed that, when
faces were unilaterally presented so briefly that they could not be
consciously perceived, the right hemisphere differentiated famous
from unfamiliar faces more rapidly than the left hemisphere; and
Kloth et al. (2006) suggested that the mechanisms underlying
the right hemisphere involvement in face familiarity feelings
might primarily concern the early stages of visual processing.
Analogously, a selective defect of face familiarity feelings was doc-
umented by Gainotti and Marra (2011) in patients with unilateral
lesions of the anterior or the posterior parts of the right temporal
lobes, who showed a familiar people recognition disorder.
Although a general review of these investigations can be found
in Gainotti (2007), I more recently expanded the study of the
different hemispheric specialization that might concern the repre-
sentation of different verbal (name) and non-verbal (face and
voice) modalities of person identification (Gainotti 2013). With
this aim in mind, I took into account investigations that had
evaluated laterality effects in recognition of familiar names,
faces, and voices in normal subjects, by means of behavioral,
neurophysiological, and neuroimaging techniques. Results of
this survey indicated that: (a) recognition of familiar faces and
voices shows a prevalent right lateralization, whereas recognition
of familiar names is lateralized to the left hemisphere; (b) the right
hemisphere prevalence is greater in tasks involving familiar than
unfamiliar faces and voices, and the left hemisphere superiority is
greater for the recognition of familiar rather than unfamiliar
names. Taken together, these data suggest that hemispheric
asymmetries in the recognition of faces, voices, and names are
not limited to their perceptual processing, but also extend to
the domain of their cortical representations.
Also consistent with these general views, but more specifically
relevant to the problem of the relations between loss of face famil-
iarity feelings and disruption of the right anterior temporal lobe are
the results obtained recently by Borghesani et al. (2019), who stud-
ied, in a large sample of patients with neurodegenerative disorders,
the neuroanatomical substrates of three different steps of famous-
face processing. Using voxel-based morphology, these authors
correlated whole-brain gray matter volumes with scores on three
experimental tasks that targeted, respectively: (a) familiarity judg-
ment, (b) semantic/biographical information retrieval, and (c)
naming. Although performance in naming and semantic informa-
tion retrieval correlated significantly with gray matter volume in
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the left anterior temporal lobe, familiarity judgment correlated
with the integrity of the right anterior middle temporal gyrus.
Taken together, these findings suggest that computational
operations linked to the different formats of representations sub-
sumed by the right and left anterior temporal lobes should be
taken into account in a general model which aims to describe
the neurocognitive architecture of representations and operations
underlying recollection and familiarity.
It could be objected that the integrative memory model aims
to understand the organization of episodic memory, whereas the
above-surveyed data are more relevant to the organization of
semantic rather than episodic memory. However, even leaving
apart the interdependence between episodic and semantic memory
(e.g., Greenberg & Verfaellie 2010), the specific subject of this com-
mentary concerns familiarity for faces that, due to its relevance in
social interactions, lies at the border between the episodic and
semantic memory systems.
How do memory modules
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Abstract
We fully support dissociating the subjective experience from the
memory contents in recognition memory, as Bastin et al. posit in
the target article. However, having two generic memory modules
with qualitatively different functions is not mandatory and is in
fact inconsistent with experimental evidence. We propose that
quantitative differences in the properties of the memory mod-
ules can account for the apparent dissociation of recollection
and familiarity along anatomical lines.
Bastin et al.’s integrative memory model of recognition memory
conceptually separates the subjective experience, which is created
in an attribution system, from the memory contents, which are
stored in and retrieved from core memorymodules. Basing recogni-
tion memory on generic perceptual-mnemonic systems seemsmore
appropriate to us than postulating two dedicated memory systems
based on differences in phenomenology (Brown & Aggleton
2001). Since phenomenology is private to the individual, it cannot
confer an evolutionary benefit and, therefore, evolution cannot
select for memory systems based on subjective experiences
(Cheng et al. 2016; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). In the integrative
memory model, the memory modules have qualitatively different
functions: The entity representation core system processes single
items and the relational representation core system processes the
relationships between the items. The integrative memory model
postulates that retrieval from the former is always associated with
familiarity, but familiarity can also arise from the latter, when
certain types of stimuli, for example, images of scenes, are used.
By contrast, recollection arises only based on the relational represen-
tation core system. However, memory retrieval from a particular
system by itself is not sufficient to account for the phenomenology,
according to the integrative memory model. Instead, subjective
experiences of familiarity and recollection are generated by a sepa-
rate attribution system that evaluates the retrieved memory.
Although we embrace the diversity of memory systems
(Werning & Cheng 2017), we argue that memory modules
might differ in ways other than those considered by Bastin
et al., and that other differences are potentially more consistent
with the available evidence on recognition memory. Memory
modules can (1) have qualitatively different functional properties,
(2) receive different inputs, and (3) have different quantitative
properties. The integrative memory model considers the first
two cases. Here, we present the confounds of their assumptions
and discuss the third possibility.
The integrative memory model predicts that the perirhinal and
entorhinal cortices are part of the entity representation core
system, which performs entity pattern separation, that is, distin-
guishing between similar stimuli based on conjunctive representa-
tions. The authors suggest that experiments manipulating
the similarity between targets and lures can test the role of the
perirhinal/entorhinal damage on recognition performance. Such
studies exist. When lures were highly similar to targets, recogni-
tion performance of aged individuals with mild cognitive impair-
ment (MCI) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is indeed impaired,
compared to age-matched controls (Westerberg et al. 2006).
However, the deficits might arise from comorbid hippocampal
damage in the early stages of AD and in MCI (Du et al. 2001)
rather than from perirhinal damage, or from hippocampal
impairment due to aging (Raz et al. 2005), resulting in difficulty
in distinguishing similar items (Stark et al. 2013).
Moreover, evidence suggests that it is the hippocampus that is
important for distinguishing highly correlated items. In the
Westerberg et al. (2006) paradigm, patients with selective hippo-
campal lesions rejected highly related lures less frequently than
healthy controls (Bayley et al. 2008; Holdstock et al. 2002),
whereas recognition performance with unrelated lures is often
preserved. In agreement with these findings, theoretical work con-
cludes that representational overlap in cortex is higher than in the
hippocampus (Greve et al. 2010; Norman & O’Reilly 2003). These
experimental and theoretical results seem to oppose the predic-
tions of the integrative memory model.
The second possibility is that memory modules differ in their
inputs. According to the dual stream model (Mishkin et al. 1983),
perirhinal cortex processes object information (“what” stream),
while parahippocampal cortex receives spatial inputs (“where”
stream). Information from both streams converges in the hippo-
campus (Beer et al. 2018). Because, both perirhinal cortex and
hippocampus receive object information and almost all recogni-
tion memory experiments employ visual stimuli in the same phys-
ical location, difference in inputs cannot account for possible
differences in phenomenology in recognition memory task. In
contrast to Bastin et al., we regard images of scenes as “what”
information, which is quite different from information about
the animal’s current location (“where” information) (Azizi et al.
2014; Neher et al. 2017).
Finally, memory modules can differ in their quantitative
properties. The phenomenology of familiarity and recollection, in
principle, could be generated within a single type of memory mod-
ule, for example, in a memory retrieval process with attractor
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dynamics (Greve et al. 2010). Specifically, after the presentation of
a retrieval cue, the state of the memory network is updated until it
converges to an attractor state. The success of retrieval depends on
the attractor landscape. If the attractor state is veridical, it contains
indices to neocortical representations providing additional details
in the spirit of the hippocampal indexing theory (Fang et al.
2018a; 2018b; Teyler & DiScenna 1986; Teyler & Rudy 2007). If
these keys lead to the retrieval of meaningful information, the
retrieved details are assigned higher weights and lead to high-
confidence recollective experiences. However, if the attractor state
is spurious, then either no details are retrieved or the retrieved
information seems improbable. So, a familiarity response is gener-
ated with a strength depending on the depth of the attractor state.
Therefore, high- and low-confidence responses can rely on famil-
iarity and recollection (Ingram et al. 2012) depending on the attrac-
tor depth, the amount of recollective details, and the consistency of
the details. This suggestion is akin to the one in the integrative
memory model that the attribution system assesses the amount
of mnemonic information and leads to recognition phenomenol-
ogy based on the relevance and strength of retrieved details.
In conclusion, we suggest that the perirhinal cortex gives rise
to familiarity more often, because the attractors are shallower
due to weaker plasticity, and the network is more prone to gener-
ating spurious attractors due to higher noise or less robust repre-
sentations. By contrast, the hippocampus has stronger plasticity
and is less prone to generate spurious attractors, consistent with
its specialization for one-shot encoding of episodic memories
(Cheng 2013; Cheng & Werning 2016).
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Abstract
We argue that while the proposed memory model by Bastin et al.
can explain familiarity-based memory judgements through the
interaction of a core representation system and an attribution
system, recollection-based memory judgements are not based
on non-mnemonic signals being attributed to memory.
Bastin et al.’s integrative memory model proposes that subjective
memory experiences result from the interaction between core rep-
resentational systems and an attribution system. The relevant core
representational system in the case of familiarity concerns “entity”
processing, the implementation of which involves perirhinal cor-
tex, a region regarded to be at the apex of visual object processing.
The core representation system for recollection concerns “rela-
tional” processing, and includes hippocampus, posterior cingu-
late, and retrosplenial cortex, which together are believed to
coordinate the reactivation of stimulus- and context-specific
representations distributed through cortex. So far, this picture is
broadly consistent with our impressions of the cognitive, neuro-
psychological, and neuroimaging literatures on recollection and
familiarity.
The “attribution system” is more nebulous, and perhaps more
controversial. The term “attribution” implies that in addition to
mnemonic signals, non-mnemonic signals are sometimes inter-
preted as having arisen due to prior exposure to the test item.
In general, this could be a sensible heuristic, since many non-
mnemonic effects, be they perceptual, emotional, aesthetic, and
so forth, are known to result from prior exposure to an item,
even sometimes in the absence of explicit memory for that
prior exposure (e.g., Hamann & Squire 1997; Oppenheimer
2008; Schwarz & Winkielman 2004), so the attribution of such
signals to memory is effectively a reverse inference.
In the case of familiarity, it is well established that the fluency
with which a test item is processed can be (mis-)attributed to famil-
iarity due to past exposure to the item. By experimentally manip-
ulating the fluency with which a test item is processed (e.g., via
masked repetition priming), researchers can induce a familiarity-
like feeling which is then attributed to memory. This so-called
Jacoby–Whitehouse illusion (Jacoby & Whitehouse 1989) has
further been found to be specific to familiarity (Rajaram 1993); a
finding that has been replicated many times, including in several
studies by one of the present authors (Li et al. 2017; Taylor &
Henson 2012a; Taylor et al. 2013; Woollams et al. 2008). We there-
fore agree that familiarity judgements can be based on the attribu-
tion of a non-mnemonic signal (i.e., processing fluency) to
memory, as stated in the model.
The integrative memory model further proposes that
recollection-based memory judgements are also made based on
the interaction between its core system and an attribution system.
It is implied that the participant will experience a subjective feel-
ing of recollection if the attribution system assesses the memory
trace reactivated to be relevant and sufficient (in terms of amount
of information retrieved). However, by the authors’ description of
the core representational system subserving recollection, the rele-
vant signals for recollection judgements are all memory signals,
and therefore, we do not see why an attribution system needs to
be posited to intervene between the core representational system
and the decision module.
In several studies, we have found that masked conceptual
primes (rather than repetition or lexically associated primes) pre-
sented before items in a recognition memory test increase correct
recollection responses (Li et al. 2017; Taylor & Henson 2012a;
Taylor et al. 2013). However, we do not agree that this constitutes
evidence for an attribution system mediating recollection deci-
sions. This is because one hallmark of the attribution framework
is that it sometimes misfires, resulting in increased false alarms
( primed unstudied items being endorsed as old more often than
unprimed unstudied items). But in our studies, only correct
recollection responses are increased by conceptual primes; false
alarm recollection responses are not increased, and therefore, mis-
attribution does not reliably occur. Instead, conceptual priming
appears to facilitate veridical retrieval of the encoding event.
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This is consistent with the notion that the decision module that
subserves a recollection judgement relies only on mnemonic
signals and therefore, contrary to the target model, it does not
require mediation by an attribution system.
It is noteworthy that the evidence for the attribution system
comes exclusively from studies using single words as stimuli,
whereas much of the rest of the model is mainly based on studies
that use objects, pairs of objects, pairs of words, and/or visually
rich scenes or environments. One crucial difference between
these types of stimuli is that the very same word stimuli are com-
monly encountered outside of the laboratory, whereas object and
scene images and their relations are often (though admittedly not
always) unique to the experiment. A second crucial difference is
that, at least in the priming and recognition memory studies
discussed above, words are often presented in visually impover-
ished encoding conditions (e.g., one at a time on a blank screen),
whereas in studies investigating relational memory, object images
are often presented in trial-unique contexts, in pairs, or in well-
defined locations in an environment. Thus, it is likely that recol-
lection decisions in word-list memory experiments rely heavily on
retrieval of contextual elements from the encoding episode (since
the stimuli themselves are not distinctive), and these contextual
elements are likely to be internal (e.g., what the participant
thought of when they read the word in the study phase) rather
than external (e.g., where in the environment, or with which
other object or context the target object was presented).
We suggest that the mechanism by which conceptual primes
increase correct recollection is related to a (partial) reactivation
of the internal context participants activate during the encoding
stage, and not to an attribution of a non-mnemonic signal to mem-
ory. Crucially, in the present model, when creating a memory trace
during encoding, an item is bound to its external context (e.g.,
object-scene), and internal context (e.g., conceptual associations/
personal experiences with a target word) is not accounted for.
Perhaps the neural networks subserving the core representational
system for recollection could be expanded to include regions
supporting semantic associations (e.g., anterior temporal lobes).
In summary, we agree that familiarity judgements can be based
on the attribution of a non-mnemonic signal to memory, as
described in the proposed model, but we do not see evidence
for an attributional basis of recollection judgements. In addition,
we suggest expansion of the core representational system for
recollection to include internal context.
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Abstract
Although the integrative memory model proposed by Bastin
et al. is interesting, particularly for Alzheimer’s disease, it may
benefit from incorporating the subjective experience of recollec-
tion. We therefore offer complementary lines of interpretation to
explain how recollection and familiarity in Alzheimer’s disease
can be dissociated based not only on accounts of their neural
correlates but, critically, on the subjective experience of memory
in patients.
The integrative memory model proposed by Bastin et al. is theo-
retically and clinically relevant as it provides a framework for the
chronological pattern of recollection and familiarity processes in
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), depending on the brain regions most
affected at each stage of the disease. That being said, the frame-
work can be extended to include the subjective experience of
both recollection and familiarity and their abnormalities in
patients with AD. Recollection and familiarity have been associ-
ated with distinct subjective experiences: Recollection is typically
associated with a subjective experience of “mental time travel,”
in which we experience the conscious sensation of traveling
back in time to relive the original event and to see it in our
mind’s eye, whereas familiarity is typically associated with a feel-
ing of knowing characterized by a vague and unspecific experi-
ence of remembering (Tulving 2002). Regarding Alzheimer’s
disease, patients typically demonstrate a shift from the ability to
mentally relive past events (i.e., a shift from recollection) to a
general sense of familiarity that may be expressed by the patients
as a sense of “having experienced this before” (El Haj et al. 2015).
The decline of recollection in Alzheimer’s disease can be
attributed to decline in specific processes of the recollective expe-
rience. This decline has been pointed out by research demonstrat-
ing decline in the recollective experience during retrieval of past
personal events in patients with AD, including decline in subjec-
tive processes, such as reliving, travel in time, remembering, real-
ness, rehearsal, and visual imagery (El Haj et al. 2016). Among
these subjective processes, decline of visual imagery seems to
play a key role in the decline of recollective experience in patients
with AD. The decline of visual imagery in AD seems to deprive
patients from the ability to retrieve and manipulate mental images
during retrieval, and also deprive them from visual cues that
mediate and/or accelerate their search through memory stores
(El Haj et al. 2019a; 2019b).
The relationship between decline of visual imagery and decline
of the recollective experience in AD can be understood by high-
lighting research using the Field/Observer paradigm, which has
been widely used to assess the subjective experience of recollection
and familiarity in general populations (Nigro & Neisser 1983; Rice
& Rubin 2011). In one study in AD, patients were invited to retrieve
past personal events and, subsequently, provide a “Field” response,
if they could visualize the event through their own eyes, or an
“Observer” response if they could visualize themselves in the
scene as a spectator would (El Haj et al. 2019b). Results demon-
strated increased “Field” and decreased “Observer” responses in
patients, suggesting a diminished ability of patients with AD to
construct vivid images when recollecting the past.
In summary, the decline of the recollective experience during
retrieval can be associated with declines in several components of
the subjective experience, such as reliving, travel in time, remem-
bering, realness, and rehearsal. Critically, decline of visual imagery
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seems to deprive patients from the ability to construct mental
images when recollecting the past. We propose that these processes
should be considered by the integrative memory model, as pro-
posed by Bastin et al., to better account for recollection deficits
in patients with AD. We believe that a decline in the subjective
experience during retrieval in patients with AD leads to a decline
of recollection and, consequently, to the emergence of a general
sense of familiarity that is typically associated with a sense of
“having experienced this before.” As pointed out by Bastin et al.,
the integrative memory model is not comprehensive and should
evolve to incorporate other mechanisms. Therefore, we propose
that the integrative memory model is sufficiently flexible to include
these subjective processes and may be enriched by this inclusion.
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Abstract
Cognitive control constrains retrieval processing and so restricts
what comes to mind as input to the attribution system. We
review evidence that older adults, patients with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, and people with traumatic brain injury exert less cognitive
control during retrieval, and so are susceptible to memory mis-
attributions in the form of dramatic levels of false remembering.
We agree with Bastin et al. that attributional processes play an
important role in memory performance, but we argue that attri-
butional processes should be considered in the broader context
of issues related to cognitive control. In particular, the authors
emphasize the importance of attributions that follow a potential
response coming to mind but they make only passing reference
to the role of task context as well as goals that are important
for bringing a potential response to mind. In contrast, we need
to distinguish forms of cognitive control that constrain retrieval
processing to restrict what comes to mind (pre-access control)
and post-access source monitoring. Burgess and Shallice (1996)
used a similar distinction to argue that confabulation stems
from a failure to properly constrain retrieval processing, rather
than being limited to post-access monitoring. In what follows,
we briefly describe data from our studies done with others to
show that a difference in ability to constrain retrieval is important
for understanding memory misattributions in special populations.
Our early work revealed both correct attributions of fluency
(e.g., Jacoby & Dallas 1981) as well as memory misattributions of
the sort focused on in the target article (e.g., Jacoby et al. 1989;
Kelley & Rhodes 2002). Our more recent work shows the impor-
tance of pre-access cognitive control as a means of avoiding mem-
ory misattributions. Jacoby et al. (2005a) used a response-priming
procedure to reveal dramatic false remembering by older adults.
Younger and older participants studied word pairs (e.g., knee
bone), and their memory was tested by providing the left-hand
member of each pair along with a fragment of the right-hand
member (e.g., knee b_n_) as cues for its recall. Immediately prior
to the recall test for each pair, a prime was presented that was either
(i) the same as the target word (a congruent prime; e.g., bone), (ii) a
misleading alternative to the target word (an incongruent prime;
e.g., bend), or (iii) a neutral, non-word stimulus (a baseline
prime; &&&). The misleading prime word fit the word-fragment
context, making it a plausible response. A decline in cognitive
control was revealed in that older adults were much more likely
to report the misleading prime as being the word previously stud-
ied than were young adults. Further, they were 10 times more likely
than were young adults to show dramatic false memory by claiming
to “remember” having studied the misleading prime (0.42 vs. 0.04).
A multinomial model fit to these data revealed that the poorer
performance of older adults largely reflected a deficit in their
ability to constrain retrieval. Older adults were more likely to be
“captured” by the misleading prime to an extent that prevented
any subsequent attempt to recollect.
A subsequent study using the capture procedures (Millar et al.
2018) found that participants in an early stage of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease (AD) were more likely to be misled by an incongruent prime
than were normal older adults. Results from the multinomial
model revealed that AD participants were more often captured
by the misleading prime (see Balota & Duchek 2015 for a review
of evidence that a deficit in cognitive control underlies memory
deficits in AD participants.) A parallel study showed that patients
with traumatic brain injury (TBI) also are prone to being captured
by the misleading prime (Dockree et al. 2006), and have higher
rates of false “remembering” of the prime than do normals.
These studies show that memory deficits sometimes reflect a deficit
in the ability to constrain retrieval processes, rather than reflecting
a late occurring, post-access deficit in memory attributions.
Cognitive control problems reflecting capture are general. In a
preliminary study, Failes et al. (unpublished manuscript) found a
high correlation for older adults between false memory and false
hearing. The capture procedure was used to show false memory,
whereas the procedure for showing false hearing used a capturing
sentence context that misled responding. False hearing can reflect
poor cognitive control in the form of an absence of careful listen-
ing; instead, people rely on what readily comes to mind. Similarly,
false memory can be described as reflecting a deficit in careful
remembering (recollection). In a related vein, Dockree et al.
(2006) found that correct responding by TBI participants in the
misleading prime condition of the capture paradigm was posi-
tively correlated with performance on a prospective memory task.
For older adults, Jacoby et al. (2005a; 2005b) found that use of
a recognition memory test largely eliminated the effects of a mis-
leading prime, showing that capture effects are largely pre- versus
post-access. Although recall tests are likely to be more revealing
of deficits in cognitive control, such deficits can be revealed on
recognition memory tests. Jacoby et al. (2005b) used a memory-
for-foils procedure to reveal such a deficit. During a study
phase, words in one condition were “deeply” processed
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( judge pleasantness), whereas those in another condition were
“shallowly” processed (Does the word contain an O or U?). For
both conditions, studied words were intermixed with new
words (foils) for a test of recognition memory. Subsequently, a
test of memory for the foils was given. Younger adults showed
better memory for foils from the prior test of deeply encoded
words, compared to memory for foils from the prior test of shal-
lowly encoded words, showing that they had recapitulated the
encoding task in an attempt to constrain recognition memory.
In contrast, such pre-access cognitive control was not shown by
older adults, suggesting that they did not engage in source con-
strained retrieval during the recognition test. Kelley and Alban
(2015) describe results from further experiments using the
memory-for-foils procedure to investigate differences in cognitive
control.
The above-mentioned studies show the importance of specify-
ing the nature of misattributions, distinguishing between pre-
access cognitive control of what comes to mind and post-access
monitoring of why a response came to mind after it has done
so. Much prior research has focused on post-access attribution
processing (source monitoring). Deficits in pre-access cognitive
control are likely as or more important. Pre-access constraint
on what comes to mind limits the possibility of memory misattri-
butions, whereas a lack of constraint places people at risk.
There is more to memory than
recollection and familiarity
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Abstract
Theoretical models of memory retrieval have focused on pro-
cesses of recollection and familiarity. Research suggests that
there are still other processes involved in memory reconstruc-
tion, leading to experiences of knowing and inferring the past.
Understanding these experiences, and the cognitive processes
that give rise to them, seems likely to further expand our under-
standing of the neural substrates of memory.
Dual-process theories have much to recommend them in the
study of memory, as elsewhere in psychology (Anderson &
Bower 1972; Jacoby 1991; Mandler 1980; Yonelinas 2002). One
particular version of dual-process theory has come to dominate
both psychological and neuroscientific thinking: the distinction
between recollection and familiarity. Ordinarily, we think of
remembering as a full-fledged, conscious recollection, including
the time and place at which the event took place and some refer-
ence to the person’s role as agent, patient, stimulus, or experi-
encer. But another retrieval process, generally known as
“familiarity,” lacks all of these accoutrements: there is just the
event itself, absent any spatiotemporal or personal context,
shimmering in the mind, feeling somehow familiar. In the target 
article, Bastin et al. have done an excellent job in summarizing 
the neural substrates of these two recollective experiences, and 
their integrative model seems both comprehensive and persuasive.
Identifying the neural substrates of mental functions depends 
critically on the availability of an accurate description of the func-
tions themselves. In that sense, at least, cognitive (and social and 
affective) neuroscience depends critically on cognitive (and social 
and affective) psychology. “An analysis at the behavioral level lays 
the foundation for an analysis at the neural level. Without this 
foundation, there can be no meaningful contribution from the 
neural level” (Gallistel 1999, p. 843; see also Coltheart 2006; 
Hatfield 2000; Kihlstrom 2010). So the question remains whether 
the dualism of recollection and familiarity exhausts the forms that 
memory retrieval can take.
This may not be the case. For example, one of the most impor-
tant contributions to dual-process theories of memory was a 
paper by Tulving (1985), which distinguished between two 
forms of memory retrieval: “remembering” that an event 
occurred, as a full-blown episodic memory, and “knowing” that 
it happened, somewhat on the order of semantic memory. 
Rather quickly, “remembering” was relabeled as “recollection,” 
while “knowing” was reinterpreted in terms of familiarity, similar 
to priming or implicit memory (e.g., Gardiner 1988; Yonelinas 
2002); but in both formulations “knowing” was a residual cate-
gory: any memory not classified as “remembered” was perforce 
classified as “known.” As a consequence, “knowing” may include 
a variety of distinct recollective experiences, each of which may 
have its own separate neural substrate.
In fact, evidence from a variant on the “remember/know” par-
adigm shows that there is more than one alternative to remember-
ing an event (Kihlstrom, in press). We can have abstract 
knowledge that an event occurred, in the absence of conscious rec-
ollection of its environmental and personal context, much as we 
know where we were born without actually remembering it. Or 
we can have an intuitive feeling that something is familiar, the 
way someone’s face or voice can “ring a bell” at a cocktail party, 
even though we cannot remember the person’s name or the 
circumstances under which we might have previously met him 
or her. In these ways, recognition-by-knowing can be distinguished 
from recognition-by-feeling in much the same way as, in the tradi-
tional remember/know paradigm, recognition-by-remembering 
can be distinguished from recognition-without-remembering.
Reports of “knowing” are more likely to occur following deep 
semantic processing, whereas reports of “feeling” are more likely 
to occur following shallow, phonemic processing. Recognition-
by-knowing is associated with higher confidence ratings than 
recognition-by-feeling, while recognition-by-feeling is increased 
when subjects are encouraged to adopt a liberal criterion for 
item recognition. Recognition-by-feeling is associated with longer 
response latencies than recognition-by-knowing, and increases 
when subjects are given a long time to think about their 
responses. False recognition is often accompanied by “feeling,” 
but rarely accompanied by “knowing,” so that signal-detection 
measures of recognition accuracy are higher for knowing than 
for feeling. Recognition-by-knowing increases with additional 
study trials, eventually supplanting recognition-by-remembering, 
while recognition-by-feeling drops essentially to zero. In these 
and other ways, knowing the past can be distinguished from the 
feeling of familiarity.
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While these experimental findings support a tripartite classifi-
cation of recollective experience into remembering, knowing, and
feeling, there is also “believing” – the inference that an event
occurred, in the absence of any recollection at all. Remembering-
as-believing is relevant to the controversy over recovered memories
and “false memory syndrome,” if patients have been inappropri-
ately persuaded by their therapists, friends, or prevailing cultural
memes that they were traumatized in the past (Kihlstrom 1998;
2006; McNally 2003). It may also be involved in cases of false
confession (Kassin 2008; 2017). “Believing” may also be involved
in memory illusions observed under laboratory conditions
(Roediger 1996), including the post-event misinformation effect
(Loftus 2005; Loftus & Palmer 1974) and the associative and cate-
gorical memory illusions (Gallo 2010; Knott et al. 2012; Roediger &
McDermott 1995; Smith et al. 2000). Having studied a list of vehi-
cles, for example, subjects may be inclined to incorrectly say “Yes”
to items on a recognition test only because they, too, name types of
vehicles. This might be an associative priming effect, similar to
familiarity, but it might also simply reflect the subject’s beliefs
about the items that were on the list.
Just as there is more tomemory than recollection and familiarity,
there is more to memory than the medial temporal lobe (MTL).
Long ago, Bartlett (1932) argued that remembering went far beyond
mere trace retrieval, and involved problem-solving, inference, and
even creativity as the individual reconstructed a mental representa-
tion of the past. More recently, Mandler (1980) reminded us that
recognition involved the judgment of prior occurrence, suggesting
that signal-detection analyses should pay as much attention to the
bias in the decision process as we do to the sensitivity of the sensory
process. The implication is that, in examining the neural substrates
of recollection, familiarity, and other memory retrieval processes,
we need to move beyond our almost-exclusive focus on the MTL,
as Bastin et al. and others (e.g., Ranganath & Ritchey 2012) have
begun to do. Considering recollective experiences such as knowing,
feeling, and believing may take our understanding of memory
retrieval beyond recollection and familiarity, and expand our
understanding of the neural bases of memory even further.
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Abstract
We suggest that the inclusion of anxiety, as one relevant mood
factor, could enhance the implementation of the integrative
memory model in research and the clinic. The role of anxiety in
Alzheimer’s disease neuroanatomy, symptomology, and progres-
sion is used as an example. Customization of the integrative
memory model can establish strong foundations for pathology-
specific models of memory deficits, enhancing the development
of precision medicine applications.
The integrative memory model presented by Bastin et al. could be
augmented to apply more directly to specific memory deficits.
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) etiology, which is used to describe the
application of their model, often involves significant anxiety
and comorbid depression (Zhao et al. 2016). The authors note
the involvement of affective and subjective factors, and suggest
that memory deficit-related anxiety may be due to not meeting
cognitive and memory goals, but do not go into great detail.
Failure to meet goal-associated stress could interfere with the
salience and strength of cues critical to effective recollection
and/or familiarity processes. In both symptomology and assess-
ment, anxiety can significantly affect memory task context,
adversely interfering at the familiarity stage and with recollection
circuit signaling. Anxiety is also likely to disrupt memory through
interactions with metacognition.
While the literature related to the impact of anxiety on specific
AD-associated memory nuclei discussed by Bastin et al. is not
substantial, there is growing evidence of associations between
anxiety and AD (Donovan et al. 2018). Anxiety is a predictor
for early onset AD (Kaiser et al. 2014) and the conversion of
mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to AD (Gallagher et al.
2011). The importance of familiarity in early etiology and the
accumulating observations of anxiety during this period suggests
that an increased integrative focus on neural mechanisms of
anxiety and familiarity, where nuclei involved in both processes
are evaluated simultaneously, may provide valuable insight on
the specific nature of the role of anxiety in susceptibility to
MCI and AD, progression to AD, and the progression of AD
symptomology. Bastin et al. note that recollection is critically
dependent on the posterior cingulate, which has also been impli-
cated in anxiety as a component of the default mode network
(DMN) (Maddock & Buonocore 1997; Zhao et al. 2007). This
region could have anxiety-associated effects on recollection due
to its strong connections with hippocampal and entorhinal
areas, where adverse effects of anxiety exacerbate neurodegenera-
tive changes in the posterior cingulate, disrupting recollection
processes there and in related regions. As AD progresses, and as
recollection circuits are impaired, the role of anxiety becomes
more difficult to assess due to decreased awareness of cognitive
and memory deficits. Although the degree to which metacogni-
tion is intact in AD is debated (Moulin et al. 2003), it is possible
that anxiety has more substantial adverse effects in individuals/
populations and/or early stages where metacognition is relatively
intact. Focusing research on these individuals and/or stages
would more effectively target the role of anxiety in AD-related
memory deficits.
One could argue that while an anxiety domain could enhance
the application of the integrative memory model, it may not be
initially necessary. However, it is also possible that the inclusion
of the effects of anxiety on memory processes is critical to an
accurate and comprehensive understanding of AD, given the
acute impact on memory processes, high comorbidity, and grow-
ing evidence of anxiety- and stress-related depression as AD risk
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factors. Anxiety and associated stress may modify interactions
between familiarity and recollection, affecting memory acutely
through neuroendocrine mechanisms and chronically through
neurodegenerative mechanisms (amyloidopathy, tauopathy,
neuroinflammation, and microglial dysfunction). Amyloid β has
been specifically associated with symptoms of anxiety and depres-
sion in cognitively normal older adults (Donovan et al. 2018), and
neuroticism may mediate this association (Snitz et al. 2015).
Neuroticism-related anxiety may increase susceptibility for
emotional distress and negative affect, and subsequent age-related
cognitive decline, MCI, and AD. Anxiety may be more strongly
associated with amyloid β and tau levels than depression
(Ramakers et al. 2012), and increased consideration of anxiety
may lead to greater consistency in mechanistic studies of predis-
posing factors. Psychosocial stress has been linked to neuroin-
flammation and microglial dysfunction in AD (Piirainen et al.
2017), and it is postulated that this could involve anxiety-
mediated mechanisms. The inclusion of the anxiety domain
could be used to identify a key subpopulation of AD patients
who would benefit from a targeted intervention, whether it be
psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy, or a complimentary interven-
tion, such as mindfulness. Identifying how and when anxiety
contributes to memory deficits could also identify key early inter-
ventional periods.
The inclusion of anxiety, and potentially other mood factors,
in the integrative memory model is not limited to AD, and paral-
lels can be made with the customization of mindfulness-based
stress reduction techniques for pathologies ranging from depres-
sion and anxiety to hypertension, including dementia (Russell-
Williams et al. 2018). Given the heterogeneity of AD etiology,
this type of precision medicine approach could substantially
improve disease progression and/or quality of life outcomes
(Reitz 2016). It is suggested that the integrative memory model
can be used as a strong foundation for additional population
and pathology-specific models of memory deficits.
Two processes are not necessary
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Abstract
Bastin et al. propose a dual-process model to understand
memory deficits. However, results from state-trace analysis
have suggested a single underlying variable in behavioral and
neural data. We advocate the usage of unidimensional models
that are supported by data and have been successful in under-
standing memory deficits and in linking to neural data.
Bastin et al. advocate a dual-process model to understand mem-
ory deficits. While this model is a popular framework, the evi-
dence for it is weak. Much of the argument for the dual-process
model hinges on double dissociations in behavioral data, includ-
ing remember-know responses and parameters of the dual-
process signal-detection model (Yonelinas 2002), and in neural
data, such as between the frontal-negativity component and the
parietal late-positive component in event-related potentials
(Rugg & Curran 2007) and between the hippocampus and
surrounding cortical regions such as the perirhinal cortex in
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Eichenbaum
et al. 2007).
Unfortunately, a double dissociation is not sufficient evidence
to infer the existence of more than one latent variable or processes
(Dunn & Kirsner 1988). A more principled method is provided by
state-trace analysis (Bamber 1979; Dunn & Kalish 2018; Newell &
Dunn 2008). State-trace analysis evaluates the number of latent
variables that are required to explain performance across multiple
dependent variables. State-trace analysis in recognition memory
consistently refutes dual-process theory, as it has not revealed
evidence for more than one latent variable in remember-know
responses (Dunn 2008), item recognition and source memory
across development (Hayes et al. 2017), and event-related poten-
tials (Brezis et al. 2017; Freeman et al. 2010).
Double dissociations in these paradigms are consistent with a
monotonic but non-linear relationship between dependent mea-
sures, as illustrated in the hypothetical demonstration in our
Figure 1. Although state-trace analysis has not yet been applied
to fMRI data, Squire et al. (2007) proposed that dissociations
between the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex can be explained
by non-linear relationships between the two regions, and evidence
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Figure 1 (Osth et al.): A hypothetical example of how manipulations can produce
double dissociations between two dependent variables (DVs) within a unidim
http://ensional model where the relation between the two DVs is non-linear. The
black dots depict performance across a range of manipulations.
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for such a non-linearity has been found using fMRI (Song et al.
2011).
We argue that a more fruitful approach to understanding cog-
nitive and neurological deficits in memory is to use models that
contain a single underlying latent variable. One-dimensional
models, such as signal-detection theory, have often been found
to provide a better fit to receiver-operating characteristics than
the dual-process model (Hayes et al. 2017; Heathcote 2003;
Heathcote et al. 2006). Signal-detection theory has also been
highly successful as a measurement model; even graded levels
of memory deficits in Alzheimer’s disease have been able to be
identified using this model (Pooley et al. 2011).
The diffusion model of Ratcliff (1978) is an even better candi-
date for understanding memory deficits because it can also
account for response times. In the diffusion model, evidence accu-
mulates toward one of the two response boundaries correspond-
ing to response alternatives, such as “old” and “new” in the case
of recognition memory. Once a boundary is reached, the associ-
ated response is given and the time taken to reach the boundary
plus time for non-decision processes is the response time. The rate
at which evidence is accumulated is called the drift rate and is
analogous to memory strength in signal-detection theory. As
drift rate increases, the rate of correct responses increases and
latency decreases.
The diffusion model is advantageous because, unlike signal-
detection theory and the dual-process model, it leverages both
accuracy and latency into relevant psychological variables. These
include memory strength (measured by drift rate), speed of per-
ception and motor processes (measured by non-decision time),
and response caution (measured by response boundaries). The
diffusion model has been highly successful in explaining data
from recognition memory paradigms (Osth et al. 2017; 2018;
Ratcliff 1978). Although recollection in the dual-process model
has been described as being slower than the familiarity process,
to date there is no formal instantiation of the dual-process
model that has made contact with latency data.
The diffusion model has also been extremely fruitful as a mea-
surement model. A noteworthy example is the study by Ratcliff
et al. (2004), which compared younger and older adults’ recogni-
tion performance. While both groups exhibited similar accuracy,
latencies were much longer in older adults. Diffusion modeling
revealed that older adults were more cautious in their responding
and had higher non-decision times, but otherwise exhibited very
similar drift rates. Without the aid of the model, researchers could
easily be misled into believing that the older adults had slower
rates of processing in the task. In other applications, diffusion
model parameters such as the drift rate have been shown to be
more sensitive to group-level differences than measures based
on accuracy or latency alone (White et al. 2010).
Diffusion modeling applied to Alzheimer’s disease is in its
infancy, but shows promise. Memory deficits associated with a
family history of Alzheimer’s disease have been best described
by differences in the drift-rate parameter (Aschenbrenner et al.
2016). Even more critically, the drift-rate parameter predicted
group-level differences better than neuropsychological tests.
In addition, diffusion models have been extremely successful
in linking to neural data. Ratcliff et al. (2016a) were able to
explain variability in single-trial indices of memory strength
using only the drift-rate parameter. In addition, a great deal of
work in neuroscience has uncovered neural mechanisms that
resemble evidence accumulation in the diffusion model (Gold &
Shadlen 2007), suggesting that the neurological underpinnings
of dementia may be able to be understood through the lens of
diffusion models.
We suggest that adoption of a dual-process framework for rec-
ognition memory is unlikely to lead to progress in understanding
memory deficits. It is not strongly supported by existing evidence
and, if it is the wrong model of memory, will lead to misleading
conclusions (Pazzaglia et al. 2013). Models that contain a single
latent variable are consistent with the neural evidence and provide
a framework for unifying accuracy and latency; they are suitable
measurement models for memory impairment. In our view, the
application of this framework will lead to a deeper understanding
of the nature of memory deficits.
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Abstract
Misidentification syndromes occur commonly in neuropsychiat-
ric practice and can be explained through aberrant integration of
recollection and familiarity, in keeping with a dysfunction at the
level of the attributional system in the new integrative memory
model. We examine neuroimaging findings associated with
Fregoli and Capgras syndromes and compare these with the
proposed neural substrate of the integrative memory model
supporting the core and attribution functions.
There are a few prominent eponymous syndromes in psychiatry;
two of the most well-known are the Capgras delusion and the
Fregoli delusion. These are delusionalmisidentification syndromes:
In the Capgras delusion, the sufferer believes that a close relative has
been replaced by someone, or is not who they say they are, despite
them physically resembling the person they have replaced. The
original description [paper], published in 1923, described the delu-
sion as an “agnosia of individual identification”(p. 1) and not
necessarily a symptom of false recognition (Capgras & Reboul-
Lachaux 1923/1994), highlighting the separation between recogni-
tion and identification. In the Fregoli syndrome, the patient holds
the delusional belief that one person is constantly changing his or
her appearance and occupying different forms, thus appearing as
different people. The Fregoli delusion was originally described in
a 1927 publication as a complimentary antonym to Capgras syn-
drome (Courbon & Fail 1927/1994). In the Capgras delusion, the
patient can recognize the similarity of the “imposter” to the close
friend or relative and can recollect the facial detail of said person
(Josephs 2007). An additional element for those suffering from
Fregoli syndrome is that patients appreciate that the person looks
different, but believe this is the same person despite the different
superficial appearance (Langdon et al. 2014). Thus, both these
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syndromes reflect a dichotomy between recollection and familiar-
ity. What does the new integrative memory model presented in
the current target article by Bastin et al. suggest may be the issue
in these psychiatric syndromes? Ostensibly, in the Capgras delusion
there is intact recollection and a deficit in or absence of familiarity;
while in the Fregoli delusion, there is a deficit in recollection and
over-attribution of familiarity. The deficits could occur at the
level of the initial or core processing, or at the higher-order attribu-
tional stage where recollection and familiarity are combined and
contextualized.
These delusional misidentification syndromes commonly occur
in schizophrenia and psychosis (Förstl et al. 1991) affecting around
15% of those suffering from schizophrenia (Feinberg & Roane
2005; Salvatore et al. 2014). However, delusional misidentification
syndrome has also been attributed as a symptom of many other
disease states, including dementia, epilepsy, Parkinson’s disease,
trauma, and other organic brain diseases (Oyebode & Sargeant
1996; Pandis & Poole 2017). Neuroimaging has highlighted the
role of organic brain dysfunction in delusional misidentification
syndrome (Atta et al. 2006). These studies of delusional misidenti-
fication syndrome have highlighted prominent dysfunction in
frontal cortical regions, with a focus on right-hemispheric change,
and in temporoparietal cortical regions, with an emphasis on left-
hemisphere change. A few studies have suggested parahippocam-
pal atrophy. Specific studies have demonstrated Fregoli’s delusion
associated with right-frontal and left-tempo-parietal contusions
following trauma (Feinberg et al. 1999). Meta-analyses of delu-
sional misidentification syndrome point to the involvement of
the right frontal lobes (Atta et al. 2006; Feinberg & Roane 2005),
with other changes observed in the left temporal lobes (Edelstyn
& Oyebode 1999; Feinberg et al. 1999; Huang et al. 1999; Signer
1994). Further, neuroimaging data in delusional misidentification
syndrome and schizophrenia have demonstrated structural volume
reduction in the frontotemporal area of the brain (Turkiewicz et al.
2009), as well as reductions in structural magnetic resonance in the
right frontal lobe (Coltheart et al. 2007). A few studies showed
damage to the right fusiform gyrus and para/hippocampal atrophy
indicating temporal lobe deficiencies (Hudson 2000).
In the integrative memory model, the fluency heuristic estab-
lishes familiarity, while the attribution system underpins recollec-
tion. These combine with the core systems generating the memory
trace that is made available to these familiarity and recollection
systems to ensure accurate memory-related decisions. The imag-
ing data in delusional misidentification syndrome largely impli-
cate dysfunction at the level of the fluency heuristic and
attribution, based on the prefrontal cortex and possibly its con-
nections with perirhinal regions, rather than reflecting any core
dysfunction in the entity or relational processes associated more
with the hippocampus and perirhinal regions. The model appears
to lack parsimony as it proposes that a dissociation between famil-
iarity and recollection can occur through damage to the hippo-
campus or the perirhinal cortex – but it is not clear how it is
possible to distinguish the consequences of this from any prefron-
tal cortical dysfunction which will impact attribution and lead to
misrecognition and impaired familiarity.
In summary, the structural and functional anomalies found in
patients suffering from Capgras and Fregoli misidentification syn-
dromes, that demonstrate aberrant integration of recollection and
familiarity, fit with a dysfunction at the level of the attributional sys-
tem rather than a core representational deficit in Bastin et al.’s new
model. However, the authors propose that similar dissociations are
also possible with a core dysfunction in hippocampus or perirhinal
cortex, which suggests that the model may lack parsimony and
potentially fits less well with the available data on dissociation.
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Abstract
In this commentary on Bastin et al., we suggest that spatial con-
text plays a critical role in the encoding and retrieval of events.
Specifically, the translation process between the viewpoint-
independent content of a memory and the viewpoint-dependent
stimuli activating the retrieval (mental frame syncing) plays a
critical role in spatial memory recollection. This perspective
also provides an explanatory model for pathological disturbances
such as Alzheimer’s disease.
In the target article, Bastin et al. convincingly propose an integra-
tive memory model as a neurocognitive framework of episodic
memory to describe the cognitive and neural mechanisms under-
lying both recollection and familiarity. However, a critical point
not sufficiently addressed in their article is the role that spatial
context plays in this process.
Each event we experience in our life is framed in a unique spa-
tial scaffold (Bicanski & Burgess 2018; Bird et al. 2012; Byrne et al.
2007). Earlier, O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) pioneered the existence
of a functional relationship between the episodic and spatial
domain under the control of medial temporal lobes. This perspec-
tive has been revised and extended by the multiple trace theory
(Nadel et al. 2000), and evidence from both amnesic patients
with hippocampal damage and experimental studies have consis-
tently suggested that hippocampus is involved in both episodic
and spatial processing (for a review, see Graham et al. 2010).
In line with this perspective, the spatial mechanisms underly-
ing episodic encoding and retrieval have been modeled in some
detail (Burgess et al. 2001), stressing the role of information pro-
vided by space-related brain cells playing in concert in the medial
temporal lobes (place cells: O’Keefe & Dostrovsky [1971]; head-
direction: Taube et al. [1990]; grid cells: Hafting et al. [2005];
and boundary cells: Solstad et al. [2008]).
In brief, egocentric (i.e., body-centered and corresponding to a
specific point of view) representations of the local sensory environ-
ment are transformed thanks to the retrosplenial cortex into
viewpoint-independent (allocentric, or world-centered) represen-
tations for long-term storage in the medial temporal lobes
(Byrne et al. 2007). In particular, head-direction cells (Bicanski
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& Burgess 2018) allow the transformation from egocentric direc-
tions (left, right, ahead) in allocentrically referenced directions
(north, south, east, west).
This process, however, is bidirectional. In fact, the reverse pro-
cess is used in memory retrieval to reconstruct viewpoint-
dependent egocentric representations in parietal areas from stored
hippocampal-based allocentric representations, supporting both
imagery and recollection. According to this perspective, episodic
retrieval implies the construction of a transient egocentric repre-
sentation (i.e., the distances of the elements in a scene from the
left, the right, or ahead of the individual) that can be inspected
and used to retrieve the past event or envision future/imaginary
events (Gomez et al. 2009). This reconstructed egocentric scenario
is also updated with the egocentric heading (i.e., our viewpoint in
the scene) for both successful navigation and effective episodic
retrieval (Julian et al. 2018; Serino & Riva 2013).
In our view, there is a specific cognitive process (i.e., the “men-
tal frame syncing”) underlying this egocentric–allocentric trans-
formation that is critical for the recollection of spatial scenarios
(see our Figure 1). It is responsible for placing the egocentric
heading into the stored abstract allocentric representation, provid-
ing the reconstructed scenario with the same viewpoint in respect
to those of the encoding (Serino et al. 2015; Serino & Riva 2013).
If there is a break in this process, we cannot use the retrieved
representation to guide our spatial behavior.
The mental frame syncing hypothesis provides a useful frame-
work that can also be applied to pathological conditions that
report episodic memory deficits along with spatial reference
impairments. As an example, the scientific outcomes of different
systematic reviews have critically underlined the presence of both
allocentric and allocentric-to-egocentric transformation impair-
ments in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) population (Colombo et al.
2017; Lithfous et al. 2013; Serino et al. 2015; 2017), where the epi-
sodic memory impairments characterizing the clinical profile of
these patients are also accompanied by a more profound deficit
in the synchronization between allocentric and egocentric refer-
ence frames (Serino et al. 2015). In support of this, a recent
proof-of-concept preliminary study demonstrated the efficacy of
a novel virtual reality (VR) treatment based on enhancing the
ability to synchronize an allocentric viewpoint-independent rep-
resentation with an egocentric one, by providing participants
with real-time information about their current egocentric heading
in the environment (Serino et al. 2017). Results indicated a clear
improvement in long-term spatial memory performance after the
VR-based training for patients with AD.
Furthermore, a growing body of studies have highlighted that
spatial factors might be implicated also in disordered awareness of
memory deficits (commonly known as “anosognosia”). In partic-
ular, studies have suggested that the spatial perspective in which
the information is presented (i.e., first- vs. third-person perspec-
tive) has a prominent role in affecting AD patients’ self-awareness
of their memory deficits (Bertrand et al. 2016). Patients typically
show better awareness when evaluating others’ abilities than their
own, suggesting that shifting from a first-person perspective (i.e.,
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Figure 1 (Riva et al.). Mental Frame Syncing.
Sensory inputs from the environment are processed
in the egocentric reference frame in parietal areas
and then transformed for long-term storage in
hippocampal allocentric representations. When
needed (for imagery or prompted by a retrieval
cue), the reverse process permits the reconstruction
of a parietal egocentric image from allocentric-
based storedmap. To correctly retrieve our location
in space, it is necessary to synchronize our egocen-
tric heading within the allocentric viewpoint-
independent representation. Therefore, we have to
update the retrieved allocentric representation
with the correct egocentric heading. If there is a
break in this process, we cannot use the retrieved
representation to guide our spatial behavior.
Commentary/Bastin et al.: An integrative memory model of recollection and familiarity to understand memory deficits 31
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
egocentric) to third-person perspective (i.e., allocentric) might
make them more aware of their deficits. Accordingly, it is possible
to speculate that a “break” in the ability to update the allocentric
representations (i.e., unrelated to the self) with egocentric infor-
mation (i.e., related to the self) does not allow these patients to
translate their spatial memories into a “lived space” that they
can use to navigate and remember the past (Serino & Riva
2017). Moreover, the break can also produce an impairment in
their ability to use their spatial memories to place themselves in
a “future space” and consequently to use the content of such
memories to update their first-person perspective, which is
required for self-awareness (Serino & Riva 2017).
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Abstract
According to Bastin et al.’s integrative memory model, familiar-
ity may be attributed to both entity representations and rela-
tional representations. However, the model does not specify
what triggers familiarity for relational representations. I argue
that fluency is a key player in the attribution of familiarity
regardless of the type of representation. Two lines of evidence
are reviewed in support of my claim.
Bastin et al. make a valiant attempt to rejuvenate the dual-process
theory of recognition – a theory formulatedmore than 40 years ago,
and which has triggered intense debate and research ever since
(Dunn 2004; Wixted 2007; Wixted & Mickes 2010; Yonelinas
2002). Their attempt yields the integrative memory model.
The most novel and significant aspect of this model is the clear
distinction between mnemonic representations – entity and
relational – and the subjective experiences – familiarity and
recollection – that are attributed to reactivation of the correspond-
ing representations. This distinction has been misleadingly blurred
in previous dual-process model of recognition. According to the
integrative memory model, familiarity is typically associated with
entity representations and recollection is typically associated with
relational representations. However, recollection and familiarity
are not necessarily triggered by relational and entity representa-
tions, respectively. Thus, the model makes the novel prediction
that the subjective experience of familiarity may also be triggered
by relational representations and, likewise, the subjective experience
of recollection may also be triggered by entity representations
(though this latter point is only implied, and not explicitly men-
tioned in the target article). This is an important prediction – per-
haps the most important prediction that the model makes.
However, its implications are not fully explored by the authors and
are not sufficiently elaborated on. In this commentary, I focus on
one specific aspect of this prediction – namely, that reactivation of
a trace in the relational core system may trigger familiarity.
Bastin et al. claim that “even if the relational representation
core system reactivates specific item-context details, one may
experience a feeling of familiarity” (sect. 3, para. 2). This claim
begs the question: What gives rise to this feeling of familiarity?
However, the model remains mute regarding the source for the
experience of familiarity for relational representations. For entity
representations, the source triggering familiarity is the fluency
heuristic, defined as “the speed and ease with which a stimulus
is processed” (sect. 2, para. 2). Importantly, while mentioning
other factors that are potential sources of familiarity (e.g., propri-
oceptive and affective information), the authors acknowledge that
these may also be intricately linked to fluency – either being a
by-product of fluency, or by triggering fluency (see sect. 4.2.1).
Thus, familiarity emerges predominantly from the fluency with
which a stimulus is processed. In line with the vast majority of
the relevant literature (e.g., Kleider & Goldinger 2004;
Whittlesea et al. 1990; Whittlesea & Leboe 2000), Bastin et al.
describe fluency only as a property of processing entity represen-
tations (e.g., single words, pictures). However, I maintain that
there is no reason to preclude fluency as a relevant property of
relational representations as well. Hence, a feasible source for
the subjective experience of familiarity for relational representa-
tions is the fluency with which these representations are
processed. Two lines of evidence support this notion.
First, though fluency is typically examined in the context of sin-
gle entities, effects of fluency have also been demonstrated for
information which can be construed as relational. Such relational
informationmay include a variety of content types which, critically,
involve the binding of two or more items – namely, forming a link
between the items while preserving the meaning of each individual
item (Eichenbaum et al. 1994). For instance, processing of arith-
metic problems, which are comprised of several numbers and the
relations between them, is affected by fluency (manipulated as
the number of exposures to each problem; Paynter et al. 2009;
Reder & Ritter 1992). Sentences are an additional instance of rela-
tional information whose representations include both their con-
stituent elements (namely, the words) and the relationships
between them. Fluency for sentences has been manipulated both
visually, by comparing sentences written in a degraded font to
those written in a clear font (Alter et al. 2007; Laham et al. 2009;
Song & Schwarz 2008a), and aurally, by comparing sentences pro-
nounced with a non-native accent versus a native accent (Lev-Ari &
Keysar 2010). Interestingly, the effects of the fluency with which
sentences got processed were demonstrated on various dependent
measures, including syllogistic reasoning, speakers’ credibility,
and moral judgments. Going beyond sentences, fluency has been
shown to affect processing of whole paragraphs (Diemand-
Yauman et al. 2011; Song & Schwarz 2008b). Finally, fluency has
also been shown to exert its effects on processing of ambiguous
paintings which, as in previous examples of relational information,
are composed of several elements and the relationships between
them (Jakesch et al. 2013).
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A second line of evidence supporting the relevance of fluency
to relational representations concerns repetition suppression –
reduction of neural activity to repeated presentations of stimuli.
Repetition suppression is regarded by many (apparently, Bastin
et al. included) as a neural marker for fluency (e.g., Ward et al.
2013). The target article describes several pieces of evidence for
repetition suppression in the perirhinal cortex, a key structure
in the entity representation core system. However, repetition
suppression is not limited to neural structures within the entity
representation system, and has also been demonstrated for rela-
tional representations in the hippocampus (Duncan et al. 2012;
Düzel et al. 2003; Kumaran & Maguire 2006; 2007; 2009). For
instance, in one study relational representations were operational-
ized as face–object and face–location associations (Düzel et al.
2003). Decreased activity in the hippocampus was found for
repeated associations (intact pairs) versus novel associations
(recombined pairs). Thus, the hippocampus – a key structure in
the relational representation core system – also exhibits repetition
suppression, the neural correlate of fluency.
To conclude, the integrative memory model makes the novel
prediction that familiarity can be attributed to relational represen-
tations. However, the model does not specify what would lead to
this attribution. Therefore, an exciting avenue for future research
is to elucidate the sources of information or heuristics that may
give rise to familiarity for relational representations. Based on
the two lines of evidence reviewed above, I suggest considering
fluency as a major candidate.
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Abstract
Bastin et al. present a framework that draws heavily on existing
ideas of dual processes in memory in order to make predictions
about memory deficits in clinical populations. It has been diffi-
cult to find behavioral evidence for multiple memory processes
but we offer some evidence for dual processes in a related
domain: memory for the time-of-occurrence of events.
Bastin et al. present a model that is designed to make predictions
about memory deficits in clinical populations. This model draws
upon dual-process views of episodic memory. Laboratory work
analyzed using advanced methods such as state-trace analysis
(Dunn 2008) and computational modeling (Wixted 2007) has failed
to find evidence of multiple processes, bringing into question a fun-
damental assumption of the model. However, in the domain of
memory for the time-of-occurrence of events, there is extensive
literature on multiple memory processes. In an influential review,
Friedman (1993) made a distinction between “distance-based” and
“location-based” processes. Location-based processes involve
retrieval of information associated with the available cues, which
is then used to draw inferences about when the event occurred.
Location-based processing, therefore, is analogous to recollection.
Distance-based processes are very similar to familiarity in that
they rely on some quality of memory (such as strength) to infer
when the event took place. Friedman (1993) concluded that
location-based processes are most common.
Much of the work in the domain of memory for the time-of-
occurrence of events has relied on testing people’s memories for
events that are part of the public record or those that have been
recorded in personal diaries (Kemp 1999). Most of these studies
used event stimuli that occurred outside of the laboratory, but
which could be dated because they were part of the public record
or had been recorded in personal diaries (Kemp 1999). Many of
the existing studies also asked people to determine the exact dates
of occurrence of these events. The method of reporting, however,
may influence the strategy that people employ. Furthermore, using
public events may tend to emphasize unique flashbulb-type memo-
ries which, in turn, may not reflect how people retrieve the
time-of-occurrence of everyday mundane and personally experi-
enced events.We conducted several studies using smartphone-based
sensors to record people’s everyday life events and used those events
to probe how they retrieved the week and day of occurrence of these
events a fewweeks after they occurred (Dennis et al. 2017; Sreekumar
2015; Yim et al. 2019). Using a hierarchical Bayesian model-
comparison framework, we concluded that location-based processes
were employed when people had to retrieve more precise informa-
tion (i.e., day of occurrence) compared to distance-based strategies
when asked about the week of occurrence. Therefore, experience
sampling work suggests that when one looks at people’s real-world
memories that have not been stripped of cues necessary to form reli-
able inferences, one can see clear evidence of a distinction between
what Friedman (1993) called “distance”- and “location”-based pro-
cesses. The prior difficulty in dissociating location-based and
distance-based processes behaviorally also led to neuropsychological
research on the contribution of various brain regions to memory for
time. For example, Curran and Friedman (2003) recorded event-
related potentials (ERPs), where participants engaged in temporal
memory tests that were designed to emphasize one of the two pro-
cesses and showed greater late-frontal ERP effects under conditions
that fostered location-based processing.
In memory-for-time experiments, it is easier to manipulate
these different components than in a recognition memory exper-
iment because it is possible to vary the nature of the query and the
time-scale probed (e.g., month, week, day, hour, etc.). We also
have access to a wider range of the ratio between retention interval
and the temporal separation between probe events, which has
been identified as another factor that plays a role in fostering
one process over the other. Therefore, both neuropsychological
and more recent behavioral experiments based on experience
sampling provide evidence for multiple processes in memory
for when an event occurred, where the dominant processes are
very similar to recollection and familiarity in recognition
memory.
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While the multiple memory processes assumption has some
support from the memory-of-time literature, Bastin et al. rely
on findings of fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging)
activation of brain regions in discrimination tasks to support
the assumption that the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cor-
tex is specialized for pattern separation of entities (i.e., objects).
Although the hippocampal circuit has known mechanisms that
allow both pattern completion and pattern separation, the mech-
anisms that would allow the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal
cortices to specifically pattern-separate entities are unclear. In
fact, major types of computation in the brain seem to be redun-
dant and distributed (e.g., Siegel et al. 2015; Tian et al. 2016).
Furthermore, assigning “entity separation” computations to a
very specific brain region seems somewhat contradictory to the
goal of moving away from assigning processes to brain regions,
to thinking about the type and complexity of representations
they are capable of. Temporal context signals, which guide mem-
ory encoding and retrieval, are found everywhere in the brain
(e.g., in various regions within the temporal lobe; El-Kalliny
et al. 2019). Folkerts et al. (2018) found that even highly visually
selective units participate in a gradually changing representation
of temporal context. However, the rate at which these signals
drift in time may depend on where the brain region lies along
the representational hierarchy because temporal receptive win-
dows follow the same hierarchy (Lerner et al. 2011). Within
the lateral entorhinal cortex specifically, Tsao et al. (2018)
reported that population states encoded temporal context infor-
mation. They also previously identified a population of lateral
entorhinal cortex cells that encoded object-location associations
(Tsao et al. 2013) and, importantly, these cells were different
from object-specific cells. Therefore, even the anterolateral ento-
rhinal cortex (human homolog of the rodent lateral entorhinal
cortex) “entity representational core” assumed in Bastin et al.’s
model seems to have an important role to play in context and
associative representations that extend beyond conjunctions of
simpler features. Similarly, the hippocampal formation is not
required for some context-discrimination tasks. For example,
such contextual discrimination tasks can be readily learned
even by animals with hippocampal lesions (see Rudy [2009]
for a review).
In summary, Bastin et al.’s framework is motivated by dual-
process accounts of memory which are well supported by both
behavioral and neuroimaging data; but the distinctions made
between entity and context representational systems may not
accurately reflect the distributed nature of these representations
in the brain.
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Abstract
The memory impairment of neurological and psychiatric
patients is seen as occurring mainly in the autobiographical-
episodic memory domain and this is considered to depend on
limbic structures such as the amygdala or the septal nuclei.
Especially the amygdala is a hub for giving an emotional flavor
to personal memories. Bastin et al. fail to include the amygdala
in their integrative memory model.
As the title of Bastin et al.’s target article indicates, their integrative
memory model is intended to “understand memory deficits.”
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Figure 1 (Staniloiu & Markowitsch): Schematic sagittal sections through the human
brain showing the arrangement of the two main circuits implicated in memory bind-
ing. (Top) The medial or Papez circuit. (Bottom) The basolateral limbic circuit. The
medial circuit is probably associated with cognitive acts of memory processing
and the basolateral circuit with the affective evaluation of information. Both circuits
interact.
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Memory processing is largely a product of structures of the limbic
system, including (among others) the hippocampal formation, the
amygdala, the basal forebrain (septal nuclei), thalamic and hypotha-
lamic nuclei (mammillary bodies), and their interconnections (see
our Figure 1) (Markowitsch 1999). As most structures of the limbic
system are engaged in processing emotional stimuli, this implies
that especially the most important memory system – namely,
episodic-autobiographical memory (our Fig. 2) – is always emotion-
based (e.g., Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2011; Stanley et al. 2017).
Piolino et al. (2009) formulated that:
visual mental imagery and emotional experience are critical phenomenolog-
ical characteristics of episodic AM [autobiographical memory] retrieval.
Hence, the subjective sense of remembering almost invariably involves
some sort of visual (Greenberg & Rubin 2003) and emotional (Rubin &
Berntsen 2003) re-experiencing of an event. (Piolino et al. 2009, p. 2315).
This becomes most evident in patients with dissociative amnesia
(Staniloiu & Markowitsch 2014), who – based on stressful or
traumatic events – lose the capacity to recollect episodic-autobio-
graphical memories, while still being (largely) unimpaired in
semantic, and therefore mainly unemotional, memory. We
(Brand et al. 2009) found in the brains of patients with dissociative
amnesia hypometabolic zones in the right inferolateral prefrontal
and anterior temporal regions (including the amygdala), indicat-
ing that in these patients the synchronization of “emotional and
factual components of the personal past linked to the self”
(Brand et al. 2009, p. 38) is no longer possible. But patients
with clear structural damage in the amygdala or in the septal
nuclei also demonstrate major deficits in episodic-autobiographi-
cal memory (Cramon et al. 1993; Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2011;
2012a; 2012b). This is most evident from the rare patients with
symmetrical bilateral amygdalar damage due to Urbach–Wiethe
disease (Cahill et al. 1995; Markowitsch et al. 1994; Siebert et al.
2003). And in normal individuals, the right amygdala is especially
engaged in episodic-autobiographical memory retrieval (com-
pared to fictitious memory retrieval) (Markowitsch et al. 2000).
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Figure 2 (Staniloiu & Markowitsch): The five long-term memory systems (after Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2012a; 2012b). Procedural memory refers to motor-based
routines; priming to a higher likeliness of re-identifying already perceived stimuli. Perceptual memory allows us to distinguish an object based on distinct features.
Semantic memory is factual memory (general world knowledge). Episodic-autobiographical memory is context-specific with respect to time and place, and allows
mental time traveling; it is associated with an emotional overtone.
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As researchers Bocchio et al. (2017) write, in the very first sen-
tence of their Abstract: “The neuronal circuits of the basolateral
amygdala (BLA) are crucial for acquisition, consolidation,
retrieval, and extinction of associative emotional memories.”
Canli et al. (2000) identified a correlation between amygdala acti-
vation and episodic memory for highly emotional, but not for
neutral stimuli. Similarly, many other researchers have empha-
sized amygdala activations in relation to memory consolidation
(e.g., McGaugh 2015) and retrieval (e.g., Markowitsch et al.
2003). And already in the 1980s, in two reviews by Sarter and
Markowitsch, it was argued that the human amygdala is respon-
sible for activating or reactivating those mnemonic events which
are of an emotional significance for the subjects’ life history,
and that this (re-)activation is performed by charging sensory
information with appropriate emotional cues (Sarter &
Markowitsch 1985a; 1985b).
The importance of the amygdala and related structures for
episodic-autobiographical memory is therefore undisputed; and
it is also stressed in Pessoa’s review in which he states that the
amygdala is in fact no longer viewed as a simple emotional
brain structure, but rather as a hub that plays a critical role in inte-
grating emotive and cognitive processes (Pessoa 2008). There are
strong pathways between amygdala and hippocampus (Wang &
Barbas 2018), as well as between amygdala and prefrontal cortex
(Barbas 2000), a cortical region centrally implicated in memory
recollection as well (Bahk & Choi 2018; Eichenbaum 2017b;
Lepage et al. 2000).
On the other hand, Bastin et al. mention the amygdala only
once and very cursorily by stating that the “extended anterior
temporal system … also includes the ventral temporopolar cortex,
lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and amygdala” (sect. 2.1.4, para. 1).
They fail to include the amygdala (or the septal nuclei) in their
integrative memory model. On account of this omission, their
integrative memory model lacks essential neuroanatomical
components that are necessary for memory recollection – a
lack, particularly, when it comes to understanding the brain
bases of memory deficits in neurological and psychiatric patients.
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dementia as a lesion model for
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Abstract
The syndrome of semantic dementia represents the “other side
of the coin” to Alzheimer’s disease, offering convergent evidence
to help refine Bastin et al.’s integrative memory model. By con-
sidering the integrative memory model through the lens of
semantic dementia, we propose a number of important exten-
sions to the framework, to help clarify the complex neurocogni-
tive mechanisms underlying recollection and familiarity.
Human lesion studies offer a powerful means of validating and
refining neurocognitive models of memory (Irish & van Kesteren
2018). In their integrative memory model, Bastin et al. provide a
compelling overview of the processes of recollection and familiar-
ity, invoking evidence from Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in support of
its central tenets. Although this new framework can accommodate
many of the memory and pathological changes in AD, we note
significant gaps that warrant consideration.
We propose to extend the integrative memory model by
considering complementary human lesion findings from the
syndrome of semantic dementia; a neurodegenerative disorder
characterized by progressive atrophy to core nodes of the entity
representation (i.e., anterior temporal lobes and perirhinal cortex)
and relational representation (i.e., hippocampus) systems
(Brambati et al. 2009). The cognitive profile of semantic dementia
is commonly taken to represent the “other side of the coin” to
AD, with profound semantic processing impairments emerging
in the context of relatively spared episodic memory (Hodges &
Patterson 2007). Importantly, the neurocognitive sequelae of
semantic dementia pose several challenges to the integrative
memory model, which we address here.
First, the integrative memory model fails to consider how the
inherent features of the to-be-remembered stimulus potentially
influence processes underlying familiarity. The key role of the
entity representation system in familiarity is primarily supported
by evidence from nonverbal measures, such as object recognition
tasks. Studies of recognition memory in semantic dementia,
however, reveal the importance of stimulus modality in familiarity
judgments. For example, when pictures of objects are used as
stimuli, semantic dementia patients demonstrate intact recogni-
tion (Simons et al. 2002a), despite severely impaired recognition
for words (Graham et al. 2002). As such, the anterior temporal
lobe degeneration in semantic dementia does not manifest in an
all-encompassing recognition deficit, but rather produces an
impairment specific to verbal stimuli. As suggested by the integra-
tive memory model, perceptual fluency signals, likely mediated
by intact occipitotemporal regions, are co-opted to support
recognition of pictorial stimuli in semantic dementia, even
when the conceptual representation of that stimulus is degraded
(Simons et al. 2002b). For verbal stimuli, however, no such
compensatory strategy can be deployed, as the poor perceptual
discriminability of written words precludes the use of perceptual
fluency signals (Graham et al. 2002). Collectively, these findings
from semantic dementia suggest that the relative weightings
of perceptual versus conceptual fluency signals during
familiarity judgments vary, contingent upon the nature of the
to-be-remembered stimulus.
Building on this argument, the role of the anterior temporal
lobe in supporting familiarity judgments may also scale, depend-
ing on the “meaningfulness” or conceptual loading of pictorial
stimuli. In line with the integrative memory model, damage to
the perirhinal cortex in semantic dementia has been shown to
impair discrimination of objects with highly ambiguous percep-
tual features (Barense et al. 2010). Importantly, however, in
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semantic dementia these deficits are amplified for items embed-
ded within a distinct semantic framework (e.g., animals) as com-
pared with non-meaningful items (e.g., blobs). This
disproportionate impairment of semantically loaded items likely
manifests because of the co-occurrence of both perirhinal and
temporopolar atrophy in semantic dementia. By contrast, amnesic
patients with exclusive medial temporal (including perirhinal)
damage, and spared temporal poles, are more accurate at discrim-
inating between perceptually similar items that are meaningful,
compared with novel ones, potentially by harnessing intact
semantic constructs to boost recognition (see Barense et al.
2010). Accordingly, we propose an extension to the integrative
memory model, in which the role of the anterior temporal
lobes in familiarity judgments is particularly pertinent for stimuli
that are both perceptually ambiguous and conceptually meaning-
ful (see also Chiou & Lambon Ralph 2016).
Contemporary models of memory recognize the importance of
a distributed core recollection network including medial tempo-
ral, frontal, and parietal regions in mediating successful episodic
retrieval (Rugg & Vilberg 2013). While the hippocampus is an
important node of this network, findings from semantic dementia
suggest that models of episodic memory must look beyond the
medial temporal lobes (Irish et al. 2016). Despite pronounced
hippocampal atrophy from early in the disease course
(Chapleau et al. 2016), semantic dementia patients demonstrate
remarkably intact nonverbal memory retrieval. This profile of
sparing reflects the preservation of frontal and parietal brain
structures (Irish et al. 2016), including the angular gyrus, poste-
rior cingulate cortex, and lateral prefrontal cortex. Moreover,
when recollection is affected in semantic dementia, it relates
primarily to prefrontal, rather than hippocampal, degeneration
(Simons et al. 2002b). These findings emphasize the multifaceted
nature of recollection, and its dependency upon lateral prefrontal
and parietal brain regions. Further iterations of the integrative
memory model should consider how distinct aspects of recollec-
tion, such as strategic retrieval (Rugg et al. 1999) and contextual
binding (Ramanan et al. 2018), are differentially underwritten
by subdivisions of lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices.
Finally, we believe it is important to validate the integrative
memory model with respect to ecologically valid expressions of
memory, which are essential for self-continuity and identity
(Strikwerda-Brown et al. 2019). The integrative memory model
is predicated largely on evidence from highly decontextualized
experimental measures (e.g., object recognition, source memory).
Although useful, such laboratory tasks fail to capture the idiosyn-
crasies of self-referential episodic recall as experienced in the real
world. Autobiographical memory represents the prototypical
expression of contextually detailed episodic retrieval, imbued
with vivid sensory-perceptual and semantic elements, and strong
self-referential and emotional connotations. Studies of autobio-
graphical memory in semantic dementia reveal intact retrieval
of recently experienced events (Irish et al. 2012; Piolino et al.
2003), attributable to preservation of sensory-perceptual represen-
tations stored in posterior parietal brain regions (Irish et al. 2018).
In contrast, recall of remote autobiographical events is impover-
ished in semantic dementia (Irish et al. 2011), given the increased
semanticization of episodic experiences with the passage of time
(Moscovitch et al. 2006). Considering how profiles of autobio-
graphical memory corroborate or challenge the integrative
memory model framework will be crucial to validate and update
the model with respect to self-defining expressions of the episodic
memory system.
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Abstract
The ventral lateral parietal cortex (VLPC) shows robust activation
during episodic retrieval, and is involved in content representa-
tion, as well as in the evaluation of memory traces. This suggests
that the VLPC has a crucial contribution to the quality of recol-
lection and the subjective experience of remembering, and
situates it at the intersection of the core and attribution systems.
The ventral lateral parietal cortex (VLPC) is one of the most active
regions during successful episodic retrieval (reviewed by Levy
2012; Rugg & King 2018; Sestieri et al. 2017; Shimamura 2011;
Vilberg & Rugg 2008; Wagner et al. 2005). Nevertheless, patients
with VLPC lesions can often successfully retrieve episodic mem-
ories, and are not usually considered to be amnesic. This alleged
discrepancy has led to growing interest in VLPC activation in the
context of episodic memory.
In considering the contribution of the VLPC to episodic
retrieval, the integrative memory model proposed in the target
article by Bastin et al. builds on the attention-to-memory account
(AtoM; Cabeza et al. 2008). AtoM associates VLPC activation
during retrieval with bottom-up capture of attention by relevant
memory cues and/or recovered memories. Accordingly, the inte-
grative memory model suggests that the VLPC interacts with a
connectivity hub (centred in the posterior cingulate) and a frontal
attribution system, to support orientation of ecphory-related
attention. Nevertheless, growing evidence suggests that the role
of the VLPC in retrieval goes beyond the ancillary attentional
function ascribed by the integrative memory model. More specif-
ically, building on two separate lines of evidence – the first show-
ing VLPC involvement in content representation and the second
in the evaluation of the memory trace – I suggest that the VLPC
should be considered an essential part of the connectivity hub that
links together the core systems and the attribution system.
Recent evidence suggest that VLPC activation reflects retrieved
information, either by holding an actual representation, or by link-
ing distributed memory traces. Particularly compelling is evidence
from studies that employed multi-voxel pattern classification to
decode the content of the retrieved information in the VLPC.
For example, Kuhl and Chun (2014) employed a task in which
words were paired with pictures (faces/scenes) during an initial
study phase, and subsequently used as cues in a cued-recall test,
followed by a recognition test for pictures alone. Activity patterns
elicited by word cues during recall were compared with activity
patterns elicited by pictures during recognition. Strikingly, in the
VLPC, patterns elicited by words were more similar to the specific
pictures with which they were studied than with “unassociated”
pictures from the same category, strongly suggesting that the
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VLPC holds event-specific representations. Arguably, however,
these retrieved representations are not passively held in the
VLPC. Rather, their content is further evaluated and transformed
into signals that can be used by the attribution system.
An influential account (Yazar et al. 2012) posits that the VLPC
is involved in subjective aspects of recollection. This account
derives from several studies showing that, while accuracy of recog-
nition judgements is typically unaffected by VLPC lesions, patients
consistently express lower confidence in their judgements, and are
less likely to report that recognised items engendered a subjective
experience of recollection (e.g., Hower et al. 2014; Simons et al.
2010). Thus, while “objective” memory performance, as expressed
in response accuracy, exhibits no obvious decline in patients with
VLPC lesions, “subjective” memory – that is, the personal experi-
ence of one’s own episodic memory – is impaired. In support of
this view, fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) studies
have shown that the relative number of “remember” (vs. “know”)
responses, high-confidence responses, and measures of richness,
vividness, and specificity of retrieved episodic events, all correlate
with VLPC activation (Qin et al. 2011; Richter et al. 2016; Tibon
et al. 2019; Yazar et al. 2014). Taken together, these findings suggest
that the VLPC is involved in the subjective evaluation of memory
traces, and affords conscious access to the quality of the memory
signal that serves as the basis for such judgements (e.g., Rugg &
King 2018).
The integrative memory model suggests that the connectivity
between core systems and the attribution system relies mostly
on the posterior cingulate cortex. Of particular interest is the ven-
tral posterior cingulate cortex (vPCC), which connects notably
with the VLPC, and is assumed to support pattern completion
of a whole memory trace by allowing the reactivation of the self-
referential properties of personally experienced events. Arguably,
these recovered traces are then processed by the VLPC, which
computes the subjective evaluation of the trace (e.g., vivid mem-
ories will be evaluated as highly confident; memories that contain
many contextual details will be evaluated as recollective). The
memory trace, coupled with its evaluation, is then transferred to
the attribution system, which translates the signal according to
task demands and particular contexts (e.g., the memory will be
endorsed as “Remembered”). Altogether, the interactions between
these components contribute to the quality of recollection and the
subjective experience of remembering.
In contrast to the integrative memory model, the current view
suggests that the frontal attribution system relies mostly on VLPC
output, which represents the evaluated memory trace, rather than
on vPCC output. Moreover, the interactions between the vPCC
and the VLPC are (generally) hierarchical: the vPCC generates
self-referenced memory traces, which are subsequently evaluated
by the VLPC.
Interestingly, a recent study confirms this suggested role of the
VLPC in the intersection of the core and attribution systems:
Following initial recognition of studied words, participants
made a remember/know judgement, and then recalled the colour
and the spatial position in which the word was studied.
Importantly, on trials where both features were retrieved (but
not on trials where one or neither source feature was retrieved)
healthy controls were more likely to make Remember relative to
Know judgements, whereas parietal patients could not do so. In
their interpretation, Ciaramelli et al. (2017) argue that unlike
patients, controls were able to use the richness of the experience
accompanying the reinstatement of multiple features as an impor-
tant basis for endorsing an item as “Remembered.”
To conclude, the integrative memory model integrates a large
corpus of findings and theories, and provides a framework that
affords better understanding of memory deficits. It will, neverthe-
less, benefit from further specification of the processes that occur
at the intersection of the core and attribution systems; some of
which are supported by VLPC.
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Abstract
Bastin and colleagues present an integrative model of how
recollection- and familiarity-based memories are represented
in the brain. While they emphasize the role of attribution mech-
anisms in shaping memory retrieval, prior work examining
implicit memory suggests that memory deficits may be better
understood by separating attributional biases from the underly-
ing memory traces.
In the last decade, advances in functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) have shifted the focus of cognitive neuroscience
research toward understanding how memory traces are repre-
sented in the human brain. In their thoughtful synthesis of recent
neurocognitive models, Bastin et al. illustrate the important role
that attribution plays in recollection and familiarity, and incorpo-
rate multiple factors to put forth a holistic account of episodic
memory. However, while the attribution system described in
their integrative memory model is demonstrably essential for
recollection and familiarity, it is secondary to the underlying
memory representations.
Although judgments of recollection and familiarity are the mea-
surable outputs in episodic memory tests, objective memory traces
may sometimes be biased by the attribution system. For example,
in a simultaneous fMRI and eye-tracking study, Hannula and
Ranganath (2009) reported that hippocampal activation predicts
eye gaze to the correct item during a relational memory test,
even when limited to incorrect explicit memory responses (i.e.,
implicit memory). Moreover, functional connectivity between
hippocampus and lateral prefrontal cortex was greater for correct
than incorrect responses. Together, these results tie episodic
memory traces to implicit behavior (i.e., eye gaze), unbiased by
attribution, as well as to explicit behavior (i.e., memory response),
biased by attribution signals from prefrontal cortex.
As Bastin et al. discuss, the entity representation and relational
representation core systems are recruited in the service of cognitive
tasks beyond episodic memory (Graham et al. 2010; Yonelinas
2013). Notably, there is evidence of shared neural substrates
(Wang & Giovanello 2016) and cognitive mechanisms (Wang &
Yonelinas 2012) between explicit forms of memory such as recollec-
tion and familiarity, and implicit forms of memory such as priming.
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In other words, entities and relations may not need to be explicitly
retrieved in order to involve recollection- and familiarity-based
mechanisms. Consistent with the importance of these core systems
for mnemonic representations, medial temporal lobe activation
is related to objective oldness, rather than subjective or perceived
oldness (Daselaar et al. 2006).
Therefore, in studying memory-impaired populations, it is
essential to separate an inability to formmnemonic representations
from attributional biases that affect the use of these representations.
For example, memory-impaired patients with intact attribution
systems may interpret processing fluency differently than healthy
controls (Ozubko & Yonelinas 2014). The entity and relational sys-
tems are the backbones by which memories are encoded, and their
retrieval can be most accurately assessed by cutting out the middle-
man – through implicit measures that do not rely on attributional
systems. Moreover, separating attributional biases from memory
deficits will also help to resolve inconsistent findings in the litera-
ture with regard to clinical populations. This perspective largely
agrees with how Bastin et al. have described the integrative memory
model. However, separating attributional biases is an important
point of emphasis with both theoretical implications for how
recollection- and familiarity-based memory is conceptualized, as
well as practical implications for how residual memory function
can be best harnessed in clinical populations.
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Abstract
In the integrative memory model proposed by Bastin et al.,
familiarity is thought to arise from attribution of fluency signals.
We suggest that, from a computational and anatomical perspec-
tive, this conceptualization converges with a global-matching
account of familiarity assessment. We also argue that consider-
ation of global matching and evidence accumulation in decision
making could help further our understanding of the proposed
attribution system.
We commend Bastin et al. on developing an integrative dual-
process model of recognition memory that considers the role of
distinct brain regions in representing information, and in making
attributions about experience-dependent changes to these repre-
sentations, in memory decisions. In our view, such an integration
has been missing in the extant cognitive neuroscience literature,
which has typically focused exclusively either on representations
or on cognitive processes when characterizing the role of different
structures (e.g., Bussey & Saksida 2007 versus Brown & Aggleton
2001). Past accounts of recognition memory that have made
reference to attribution have discussed it in relation to fluency,
with attribution of fluency to prior experience being at the core
of familiarity-based judgments (Dew & Cabeza 2013; Jacoby
et al. 1989). In the current model, the authors take a similar stance
when specifying the role of perirhinal cortex (PrC) and anterolat-
eral entorhinal cortex in providing fluency signals. As the authors
acknowledge, this fluency account contrasts, at least on the sur-
face, with another dominant account of familiarity assessment
that focuses on global-matching computations, which have also
been linked to PrC (LaRocque et al. 2013; Norman 2010).
We would like to point out that global matching and fluency
accounts of familiarity may not be mutually exclusive. In the inte-
grative model proposed here, fluency can arise from repetition (i.e.,
prior exposure) of perceptual or conceptual features at different lev-
els of a representational hierarchy, with PrC being sensitive to rep-
etition at the entity level where features are highly conjunctive and
can differentiate between different exemplars of objects with high
feature overlap. Critically, feature overlap also plays a key role in
global matching and has been linked to behavioral evidence,
such as false alarm rates to lures similar to targets, in recognition-
memory judgments (Montefinese et al. 2015). In the influential
MINERVA 2 model (Hintzman 1984) of global matching in recog-
nition memory, a retrieval cue induces an echo whose intensity is
directly based on a scalar measure of feature overlap between the
cue and all stored memory traces. Fluency may be a signal that sim-
ply reflects this intensity measurement.
Global matching and fluency can also be linked to a common
neural phenomenon in terms of changes to representations that
occur with repeated exposures: namely, repetition suppression.
Repetition suppression is well documented in the perirhinal
cortex (Suzuki & Naya 2014) and has been suggested to reflect
a fluency signal that can inform decisions on a variety of tasks,
including but not limited to familiarity-based memory judgments
(Dew & Cabeza 2013). Although the functional significance and
underlying mechanisms of repetition suppression in neural
recordings remain contentious (Barron et al. 2016; Grill-Spector
et al. 2006), at least one of the proposed mechanisms, “sharpen-
ing,” can support both computations of global matching and flu-
ency signaling. In a sharpening account, neural representations of
a stimulus become sparser over repetitions, as neurons that
initially responded weakly to a stimulus gradually “drop out.”
In the complementary learning system neural network model
(Norman & O’Reilly 2003; see also Norman 2010), such sharpen-
ing is the result of a competitive Hebbian learning process
between neurons in neocortical regions; it is linked to global
matching by virtue of stimuli with high degree of feature overlap
also being represented with overlapping neural patterns.
Inasmuch as repetition suppression in single cell recordings and
in fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) BOLD signals
is not limited to the PrC, and has also been shown to occur,
for example, in other ventral visual pathway regions (Barron
et al. 2016), wide-spread repetition suppression effects are consis-
tent with the proposal in the present integrative memory model
that fluency signals can arise at multiple levels.
Considering global-matching computations (and their link to
fluency) may also be of value when trying to understand the
mechanisms that underlie the attribution process in recognition
memory as proposed in the integrative memory model. It is our
impression that this attribution system is currently less well spec-
ified, and supported by less empirical evidence overall, than the
proposed representation system. In the integrative memory
model, the attribution system interprets changes in
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representations toward the goal of making overt memory deci-
sions. A promising account that may help to elaborate on how
attribution processes lead to memory judgments is provided by
the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff 1978; see also Ratcliff et al.
2016b). This model addresses the temporal unfolding of memory
retrieval and treats the comparison of feature overlap between
cues and stored traces during this retrieval process as accumulat-
ing noisy evidence. Because all memory traces are compared in
parallel, these computations can be understood as global match-
ing, with fluency reflecting the combined speed of these parallel
accumulation streams.
An emerging body of evidence from functional neuroimaging
and other recording techniques points to a role for lateral parietal
cortex in evidence accumulation during decision making, includ-
ing but not limited to memory judgments (Wagner et al. 2005).
Some studies have even identified specific neurons in the lateral
intraparietal sulcus whose activity profile can be interpreted as
evidence accumulation (Shadlen & Newsome 2001). Against
this background, the specification of structures involved in mem-
ory attribution in the integrative memory model may require
expansion beyond prefrontal cortex, and additional emphasis on
lateral parietal cortex as a key player. At present, the latter struc-
ture is primarily concerned with attentional mechanisms in this
model. There is some evidence to suggest, however, that attention
effects observed in the lateral parietal lobe are at least in part spa-
tially distinct from memory effects (Hutchinson et al. 2009; 2014).
Therefore, exclusive reference to attentional mechanisms may
not fully capture its role in attribution processes as part of the
decision making just described.
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Abstract
The integrative memory model formalizes a new conceptualiza-
tion of memory in which interactions between representations
and cognitive operations within large-scale cerebral networks
generate subjective memory feelings. Such interactions allow to
explain the complexity of memory expressions, such as the
existence of multiples sources for familiarity and recollection
feelings and the fact that expectations determine how one recog-
nizes previously encountered information.
The integrative memory model takes into account the complexity
of memory, from the representations of elements of past experi-
ences to the subjective feelings accompanying memory retrieval.
As suggested by commentators Curot & Barbeau, the model
could have been called the interaction memory model, as interac-
tions between representations and cognitive operations within
large-scale cerebral networks are at the core of the proposal.
The majority of the commentaries follow the path of this integra-
tion/interaction scheme. We are grateful to all commentators for
the insightful comments and the abundance of new ideas to be
tested. In this response, we will address the issues raised in the
commentaries by relating them to the key aspects of our integra-
tive memory model: the representation core systems (sect. R1), the
attribution system (sect. R2) and the subjective experiences of
memory (sect. R3).
R1. Representation core systems
The idea that the content of past experiences are encoded in core
systems that specialize in specific kinds of representations shaped
by dedicated computational operations and the level of associativ-
ity that characterize constituent brain regions has been approved
explicitly (Axmacher; Brady & Utochkin; Gainotti; Patchitt &
Shergill; Sadeh) or tacitly by the large majority of the commen-
tators. There is some controversy, however, concerning (1) the
role of specific regions, (2) the specific nature of the computa-
tional operations distinguishing the various core systems, and
(3) the consideration of additional types of information, such as
emotion. In the sections below, we group the commentators’
arguments by focusing in turn on the postulated core systems –
the entity, the context, and the relational representation core
systems – before considering interactions with the self and emotion.
R1.1. The entity representation core system
In the target article, we propose that encountered entities pertain-
ing to experienced events are encoded hierarchically in terms of
the complexity of the representation: from individual features
(e.g., shape, texture, color) in ventral occipitotemporal areas and
conceptual features in anterior temporal areas, to unique conjunc-
tive representations allowing the resolution of ambiguity in the
face of objects with overlapping features and the identification
of objects in a viewpoint-invariant manner.
Gainotti points to the lateralization of the representations,
with faces and voices prominently stored in right temporal
areas and names lateralized to the left temporal areas. There is
indeed a degree of hemispheric specialization in the medial and
lateral temporal lobes. This is notably seen in material-specific
double dissociation between recall and recognition memory in
patients with selective unilateral hippocampal versus perirhinal
lesions (Barbeau et al. 2011). In semantic dementia, some
material-specific effects are also described, with better recognition
memory for objects than for words (Graham et al. 2002; Simons
et al. 2002a). However, in this case, the reason for material-
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specific dissociation is to be found in the pathology affecting the
anterior temporal lobe (Strikwerda-Brown & Irish). We agree
with Strikwerda-Brown & Irish, as well as with Ionita, Talmi,
& Taylor (Ionita et al.), that the inherent features of the stimuli
will determine the kind of information supporting memory deci-
sions, and notably feelings of familiarity. Words will rely much
more on conceptual features than will object pictures, and conse-
quently words are particularly vulnerable to the anterior temporal
pathology in semantic dementia. Critically, however, the interac-
tion between the anterior temporal lobe and the perirhinal cortex
is important for the discrimination of objects that can be confused
because of high perceptual and/or conceptual feature overlap.
Amnesic patients with damage to the perirhinal cortex, but intact
anterior temporal lobes, are impaired at discriminating between
objects with a high, not low, degree of perceptual feature ambigu-
ity, but their difficulty is attenuated when objects are meaningful
(Barense et al. 2010). In semantic dementia, when both anterior
temporal and perirhinal regions are affected, the deficit in dis-
crimination between confusable objects is exacerbated for concep-
tually meaningful stimuli (Barense et al. 2010). Finally,
discrimination between semantically confusable objects is more
impaired in patients who suffer from combined anterior tempo-
ral/perirhinal damage than in patients whose damage is limited
to the anterior temporal lobe (Wright et al. 2015).
By shedding light on the role of the anterior temporal lobe,
Strikwerda-Brown & Irish join Axmacher in calling for more
consideration of representations in neocortical areas. We
acknowledge that we placed much emphasis on the anterolateral
entorhinal/perirhinal region and its proposed role in representing
entities. Because of the historically central role of the medial tem-
poral lobe (MTL), we wanted to make the point that the perirhinal
cortex is not supporting familiarity per se, but rather a particular
kind of representations (i.e., entities). Nevertheless, implicit in the
inclusion of neocortical areas within representation core systems,
and in the claim of representations being shaped by unique com-
putational operations, is the idea that the formats of representa-
tions are determined by the properties of underlying neocortical
(and MTL) regions (as suggested by Axmacher). Furthermore,
Axmacher argues that these representational properties may be
determinant features of the subjective experience of memory
rather than attribution mechanisms, a point to which we return
in section R3.
Additionally, the fact that our model includes interactions
between hierarchically organized representation regions is empha-
sized by Curot & Barbeau, who point out a related prediction:
activation of these regions should follow a precise order. This
opens a whole avenue for research using various techniques that
allow an evaluation of temporal dynamics in neural activity.
Some preliminary EEG data centered on the time course of iden-
tification of objects via a 1-back task (in which one tells whether
an object is the same as the one seen just before) at various levels
of the hierarchy within the entity core representation system indi-
cate that access to an entity representation comes later than access
to a conceptual representation, which itself arises later than access
to a low-level perceptual representation (data from an as-yet
unpublished study by Besson and colleagues). More work remains
to be done, however, notably by using methods that enable us to
examine the temporal dynamics of precisely localized regions,
such as intracranial EEG (Curot & Barbeau).
Our hypothesis of entity-level representations in the anterolat-
eral entorhinal/perirhinal cortex is somewhat challenged by
Brady & Utochkin who argue that entities also require relational
coding and binding (see also Hakobyan & Cheng; Sreekumar,
Yim, Zaghloul, & Dennis [Sreekumar et al.], for related sugges-
tions). Indeed, numerous studies - from working memory to
long-term memory, on arbitrary to semantically meaningful
objects – do not support the idea of a pure perceptually unitized
representation of objects (Brady et al. 2013; Chalfonte & Johnson
1996; Fougnie & Alvarez 2011); and we acknowledge that this was
overlooked when we wrote that “at the level of the perirhinal cor-
tex and anterolateral entorhinal… all visual features are integrated
in a single complex representation of the object” (target article,
sect. 4.1., para. 3). Behind this sentence and our definition of
the entity representation lies the idea that at this level, entities
could be distinguished as a whole rather than as a sum of overlap-
ping features represented in order to distinguish objects at their
individual level. Cognitive data showing separate coding of the
exemplar and the object state also directly suggest that exemplar
recognition operates despite object state or pose (Brady et al.
2013; Utochkin & Brady 2019). Our view is that the entity-level
representations in the anterolateral entorhinal/perirhinal cortex
correspond to the higher level of representation of the object,
both anatomically and functionally, and as such represent the
individual object in a way abstracted from its presentation charac-
teristics (viewpoint, perceptual conditions of presentation, func-
tional state or pose, etc.). In that sense, the features integrated
at this level in a single complex representation of the object are
those that the system considers to be characterizing and defining
the object as a unique member of its category. Such defining fea-
tures may be contextual in nature (e.g., the classic coffee mug of a
specific brand used by a colleague at the lab might be encoded as a
distinct entity, as the exact same one that I use at home). They
must be distinguished from any other feature that the system con-
siders as associated with but not defining the object. In order to
retrieve any of this second class of features that were related to
the object, the flexible and relational representation offered by
the hippocampus might be critical.
R1.2. The context representation core system
In the target article we proposed that the contextual setting for an
event is represented first by elements of the environment (e.g.,
sounds, visual details, space perception…) stored in posterior
occipitoparietal sites and that these elements become more inte-
grated as scenes and spatial configurations in the parahippocam-
pal cortex. Moreover, the posteromedial entorhinal cortex would
encode an internally generated grid of the spatial environment.
If some of these elements become the focus of attention in a
memory task (e.g., a building), they can be recognized and can,
for example, generate a feeling of familiarity. Alternatively, they
will provide the context within which an event occurs or a specific
item is encountered, so that the context representation is bound
together with other information into the relational representation
core system.
Several commentators reproached us for not elaborating on
this core system sufficiently; but they did not question its rele-
vance (Axmacher; Hakobyan & Cheng; Riva, Di Lernia,
Serino, & Serino [Riva et al.]). The commentators are right in
underlining that more can be said about this system and they
highlight some dimensions that could help characterize the
respective content and representation formats of the context rep-
resentation core system (Axmacher). In particular, the case of
scenes is a puzzling issue. In our model, we suggested that scenes
are represented in the parahippocampal cortex, given evidence of
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a specific response of this region to scene familiarity (Kafkas et al.
2017; Preston et al. 2010). In contrast, Hakobyan & Cheng regard
scenes as part of the “what” information that is supported by the
ventral visual stream culminating in the perirhinal cortex. Yet,
other views are conveyed by Zeidman and Maguire (2016) who
suggest that the hippocampus is involved in the construction of
spatially coherent scene representations, and by Howett et al.
(2019) who relate impaired virtual reality navigation within scenes
to atrophy of the posteromedial entorhinal cortex in prodromal
Alzheimer’s disease (AD). There is clearly a need for further
research on this topic. It may be that there are qualitatively differ-
ent kinds of scenes, depending on the nature of constituent
elements (e.g., buildings, landscape, spatial configuration, etc.).
It could also be that the role of the scene in a given event, as
focus of attention versus as background context, would determine
how it is represented.
Another dimension that we overlooked in our model is the ego-
centric/allocentric distinction (Axmacher; Riva et al.). This dis-
tinction is particularly interesting when framing the role of the
retrosplenial cortex. We placed this region within the context rep-
resentation core system because it should enable cortical reinstate-
ment of the content of memories as a gateway between the
hippocampus and regions storing the sensory-perceptual details
of the memory (Aggleton 2010). A more detailed description of
its role in both encoding and retrieval of events could indeed be
the transformation of egocentric representations (mediated by pos-
terior parietal areas) into allocentric representations (mediated by
the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex), and vice versa (Aggleton
2010; Serino et al. 2015; Vann et al. 2009a). Several studies have
shown deficient translation between egocentric and allocentric
frames of reference in Alzheimer’s disease (Serino et al. 2015),
especially in early-onset cases (Pai & Yang 2013) and in the
stage of mild cognitive impairment (MCI; Ruggiero et al. 2018)
where the retrosplenial cortex shows prominent damage (Boccia
et al. 2016). Following on this, one could predict that the early
hypometabolism and atrophy of the retrosplenial cortex in Braak
Stage 3 would disturb the recollection of details from past events
because of such translation difficulty. Relatedly, the observation
of decreased “field” recall of personal past events (i.e., event visu-
alized through one’s own eyes, in the first-person perspective) and
increased “observer” recall (i.e., event seen as a spectator from a
third-person perspective) in Alzheimer’s disease may possibly
also be associated with retrosplenial-related impaired egocentric-
allocentric synchronization (El Haj et al. 2019a; Kapogiannis &
El Haj). However, distinct roles for the parahippocampal and ret-
rosplenial cortices have been reported in spatial navigation (Auger
et al. 2012), and reconciliation between spatial and non-spatial
roles of the retrosplenial cortex was recently identified as a scien-
tific challenge (Mitchell et al. 2018).
R1.3. The relational representation core system
Our view of the organization of the relational representation core
system matches traditional influential models of the role of the
hippocampus and the extended hippocampal system, by propos-
ing that it rapidly encodes a detailed representation of the item
bound to associated contextual information, or more generally
complex high-resolution bindings, via relational pattern separa-
tion (Aggleton & Brown 1999; Aggleton et al. 2011;
Eichenbaum et al. 2007; Montaldi & Mayes 2010; Ranganath &
Ritchey 2012; Yonelinas 2013). We do not make any novel
proposal regarding this core system and so we did not feel it
necessary in the target article to describe data showing that
damage to each part of the system (i.e., hippocampus, fornix,
mammillary bodies, and anterior thalamus nuclei) leads to mem-
ory disorders, especially affecting recollection. This omission is
regretted by Aggleton. Although this was beyond the scope of
our proposal, we agree that further research needs to assess
whether the mammillary body–anterior thalamic axis contributes
a specific function beyond that supported by the hippocampus in
the encoding and retrieval of complex events. In addition to
examining the specific memory (and non-memory) profile of
patients with diencephalic lesions, ultra-high resolution MRI
and functional connectivity analyses as well as examination of
coupling of neural oscillations may provide some insight about
the interplay between the medial diencephalon and other regions
(notably, the hippocampus, retrosplenial cortex, and prefrontal
cortex). Indeed, the specific role of each component of the rela-
tional representation core system may depend on its specific
afferent-efferent profile and, therefore, in the kind of information
it processes and how it is brought into the system or transferred
for further processing by other regions (Aggleton 2012; Ketz
et al. 2015; Vann 2010).
R1.4. Self and emotion
A few commentators deplored that we did not take into account
the emotional flavor of memories that can be provided through
the amygdala (Axmacher; Nephew, Chumachenko, & Forester
[Nephew et al.]; Staniloiu & Markowitsch; Strikwerda-Brown
& Irish). As we stated in the conclusion of the target article,
our proposed model is certainly not comprehensive and should
evolve to incorporate more brain regions (notably the amygdala
and basal forebrain) and more mechanisms. In terms of the
psycho-affective flavor of memories, we mainly described how
interactions with a self-referential system give self-relatedness
and personal meaningfulness to stored representations. Indeed,
personal memories are strongly interconnected with the self
(Conway 2005) and these interactions contribute to the subjective
feeling of reliving past events (Tulving 2002). In contrast, as most
of the evidence that we reviewed relied on memory for neutral
events, we did not elaborate on the role of emotion in shaping
representations and subjective memory experiences. However,
Staniloiu & Markowitsch are right to point out that this dimen-
sion is needed to understand the nature of memory deficits in
patients with lesions to the amygdala and in psychiatric cases,
such as dissociative amnesia (Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2011;
Staniloiu & Markowitsch 2014).
The role of the amygdala appears to be the modulation of
cognitive functions with emotional cues so as to incorporate the
biological and social significance of events and actions. In the
case of episodic autobiographical memories, the amygdala will
tag them with their specific emotional significance and facilitate
their retrieval (Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2011). According to
the emotional binding account, when an event involves an emo-
tional response, the amygdala binds this emotional response to
representations of items in the perirhinal cortex (Ritchey et al.
2019; Yonelinas & Ritchey 2015). Another dimension that mod-
ulates memories is stress and anxiety (Nephew et al.). For exam-
ple, acute stress could act as a memory filter at encoding, favoring
events that elicited a strong neural activity in the medial temporal
lobe (Ritchey et al. 2017). Nephew et al. further emit the interest-
ing idea that anxiety may affect task context and metacognition,
which would modify recollection and familiarity outputs by
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changing expectations and attentional focus. An intriguing exam-
ple that could support this idea is psychogenic déjà-vu, where an
individual with a high level of anxiety reported a form of persis-
tent déjà-vu without any neurological explanation (Wells et al.
2014).
Patchitt & Shergill interpret two psychiatric syndromes, the
Capgras delusion and the Fregoli syndrome, in light of the inte-
grative memory model. We have reported the case of a patient
with probable Alzheimer’s disease who presented symptoms of
Capgras syndrome with regard to her husband (Jedidi et al.
2015). Compared to other probable Alzheimer’s disease patients
without any misidentification symptoms, the patient showed
decreased metabolism in the posterior cingulate gyrus/precuneus
and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. We interpreted the
Capgras syndrome in this patient as related to impaired recogni-
tion of a familiar face and impaired reflection on personally rele-
vant knowledge about a face. Other interpretations include a
disconnection between regions supporting face representations
and regions encoding the emotional significance of the face
(Breen et al. 2000). Investigating the role of a disruption of the
attribution system due to frontal dysfunction, as suggested by
Patchitt & Shergill, is certainly worthwhile, but we believe that
this is an example of a disorder for which the role of emotion
must be taken into account (see Staniloiu & Markowitsch).
R2. The attribution system
One of the most critical claims of the integrative memory model is
that the attribution system modulates the use of memory traces
reactivated in representation core systems as a function of expec-
tations, task context, and goals, thus modulating subjective expe-
riences and explicit judgments. In other words, we incorporated
mechanisms from attribution theories (Bodner & Lindsay 2003;
McCabe & Balota 2007; Voss et al. 2012; Westerman et al.
2002; Whittlesea 2002) into more traditional recollection/famil-
iarity views. This proposal, approved by many commentators
(Bodner & Bernstein; Curot & Barbeau; Hakobyan & Cheng;
Kelley & Jacoby; Patchitt & Shergill; Sadeh; Tibon; Wang;
Yang & Köhler), raises new questions for future work (Curot &
Barbeau; Hakobyan & Cheng; Kelley & Jacoby; Strikwerda-
Brown & Irish; Tibon; Wang; Yang & Köhler), but also generates
controversy (Aggleton; Axmacher; Ionita et al.). These commen-
taries refer mainly to fluency cues, attribution mechanisms, and
false memories.
R2.1. Fluency cues
In the target article, we argue that fluency cues are important
signals for familiarity when recognizing studied items. More
precisely, when a previously encountered item is repeated in a
memory task, processing of the item and its constituent compo-
nents (perceptual and conceptual features and their unique
configuration as entity) is facilitated. This easier and more rapid
processing (i.e., fluency), when in contrast with the expected
baseline fluency of processing, produces a vague experience of
ease (Masson & Caldwell 1998; Oppenheimer 2008; Reber et al.
2004b; Whittlesea & Williams 2000) which is attributed to past
occurrence and generates a feeling of familiarity. The translation
from the repetition-related facilitated processing into a feeling
of familiarity thus requires the attribution system (see sect.
R2.2). Familiarity for fluent items is not obligatory, as the attribu-
tion system may lead to disqualification of fluency cues.
While Aggleton thinks that too much importance is given to
fluency in the generation of feelings of familiarity, other commen-
tators support our point of view and even reinforce it with addi-
tional suggestions (Ionita et al.; Sadeh; Wang; Yang & Köhler).
It is likely that part of the controversy is due to a blurry definition
of fluency in our target article. In our view, perceptual fluency as a
“change in threshold for information that has been previously
experienced” (Aggleton) may correspond to the full fluency heu-
ristic, given that the setting of the decision threshold falls within
the duty of the attribution system. Like Sadeh, and Yang &
Köhler, we define repetition-related fluency, at the behavioral
level, as facilitated perceptual/conceptual/entity-level processing
of repeated stimuli; and, at the neural level, as reduced activity
of neurons where these features were first processed (Bogacz
et al. 2001; Reber 2013; Suzuki & Naya 2014). While Ionita
et al. refer to repetition-related fluency as a “non-mnemonic” sig-
nal, we would argue that it is mnemonic when it concerns a stim-
ulus that has been encountered at least once before (even if we are
not aware of that). As underlined by Yang & Köhler, reduced neu-
ronal activity for repeated stimuli (or repetition suppression) has
been interpreted as sharpening (Norman 2010).Yang & Köhler
further suggest that sharpening may be a neural phenomenon
common to both fluency and global matching (which indexes
the degree of feature overlap between a cue and stored represen-
tations). Finally, Sadeh proposes that fluency is a key player in the
attribution of familiarity even when information is retrieved from
the relational representation core system. This author points to
different findings to support this hypothesis, such as fluency
effects for relational information in the form of facilitated judg-
ments in a variety of tasks, as well as repetition suppression in
the hippocampus for repeated associations. Another argument
can be found in a study by Gomes et al. (2016), which showed
a hippocampal deactivation linked to fluency-based supraliminal
associative priming (size judgments for pairs of objects).
However, one needs to determine whether relational fluency is
interpreted as a feeling of familiarity or an experience of recollec-
tion in explicit memory tasks.
As reminded by Wang, repetition-related fluency is a mecha-
nism shared by explicit forms of memory (e.g., familiarity) and
implicit forms of memory (e.g., priming). On this basis, Wang
suggests that implicit measures may best capture the status of
representations in the core systems, contrary to explicit judgments
in memory tasks that are biased by attribution mechanisms.
We think that, more than the implicit or explicit character of the
task, it is important to consider its objective demand (Whittlesea
& Price 2001). The performance-oriented priming tests with objec-
tive measures, such as word-stem completion or picture naming,
are probably the best to capture the status of representations, com-
pared to more subjective implicit memory tasks that rely also on
attributional processes, such as mere exposure effect or fame effect
paradigms, or other illusion-oriented implicit memory measures
(Buchner & Brandt 2003). In addition, some studies shed light
on the role of fluency attribution even in performance-oriented
priming tests, such as the possible-impossible decision task.
Indeed, in this task, fluency seems to lead subjects to respond
‘‘possible” to both possible and impossible objects that have been
previously studied (Marsolek & Burgund 2005; Ratcliff &
McKoon 1995; Willems & Van der Linden 2009).
Nevertheless, beyond repetition-related fluency, there are other
sources of fluency that we would regard as non-mnemonic fluency,
but which can also lead to a feeling of familiarity (Ionita et al.).
The existence of these non-mnemonic sources of fluency could
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help to explain partially the finding, pointed by Aggleton, that
some patients with amnesia are not able to use fluency as a cue
for recognition memory, despite successfully completing priming
tasks (Levy et al. 2004), a fact that has led several authors to con-
clude that fluency has no or only small influence on people’s
memory decisions (Conroy et al. 2005; Squire & Dede 2015).
Recently, however, studies have shown that changes in how amne-
sic patients attribute fluency to the past could account for this
pattern of results (Geurten et al. 2019; Geurten & Willems
2017; Ozubko & Yonelinas 2014). For instance, Geurten et al.
(2017; 2019) examined the influence of the introduction of an
alternative (non-mnemonic) source of fluency on amnesic
patients’ recognition decisions by manipulating the perceptual
quality of stimuli during a forced-choice recognition test. They
found that patients disregard fluency when they detect an alterna-
tive source that can explain the easy processing of the stimulus, as
do healthy subjects in the same paradigm (Willems & Van der
Linden 2006). However, amnesic patients detect this alternative
source more readily than healthy participants and thus disqualify
more often fluency as a cue for memory. Patients’ underuse of flu-
ency could result from a learned reinterpretation of fluency as a
poor cue for memory rather than from a real inability to rely
on it. Because of the high number of situations where fluency
leads to memory errors in patients’ daily lives, the ecological
validity of the correlation between fluency and past occurrence
gradually decreases. In order to reduce fluency-based memory
errors, patients would progressively learn to implement strategies
to track biasing fluency sources. Behaviorally, this leads them to
rely on fluency only when they can attribute it to their memory
with a high level of confidence (Geurten et al. 2017; 2019).
An alternative and complementary explanation to the
priming-without-recognition pattern in amnesia can be found
in the retrieval mode, attention orientation, and processing style
adopted by participants in some contexts. This idea is compatible
with Kelley & Jacoby’s pre-access control hypothesis. More pre-
cisely, qualitatively different processing strategies – analytic versus
non-analytic – have been shown to ensure or prevent the fluency
experience (Whittlesea & Price 2001; Willems et al. 2010; Willems
et al. 2008; Willems & Van der Linden 2009). An analytic form of
processing consists in isolating some component parts of a stim-
ulus – for example, to determine whether any of them acts as a
cue for recalling diagnostic details. This style of processing can
be preferred when a given recognition memory task appears as
a considerable challenge. On the other hand, a non-analytic
mode corresponds to examining the stimulus as a whole.
Healthy participants and patients with Alzheimer’s disease some-
times believe that their only hope of discriminating new from old
stimuli is by discovering some specific details that they could
recognize (Willems et al. 2008). However, Whittlesea and Price
(2001) demonstrated that, even when a stimulus is presented in
the same form as it was encountered earlier, if the participants
analyze the stimulus into parts at testing, they will not experience
enhanced processing fluency.
Within the integrative memory model, such a pattern of results
can be explained by the interaction between metacognitive knowl-
edge and components that create the retrieval mode during mem-
ory search (top-down attention and cue specification/memory
search supported by dorsal parietal and ventrolateral and dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex). This allows individuals’ expectations
and beliefs to constrain the type of information that will be
favored during memory retrieval, as illustrated above. But also,
as emphasized by Kelley & Jacoby, this can guide inferential
mechanisms in order to avoid misattributions, such as false mem-
ories. For instance, Kelley & Jacoby describe a capture effect by
which older adults, patients with Alzheimer’s disease, and patients
with traumatic brain injury are more prone to falsely remember
misleading primes than young and healthy individuals (Dockree
et al. 2006; Jacoby et al. 2005a; Millar et al. 2018).
R2.2. Attribution mechanisms
We claim that the attribution system is a key player in the gener-
ation of subjective experiences of memory and explicit judgments
in memory tasks by modulating the use of reactivated content in
core systems through the lens of metacognitive, monitoring, and
attention mechanisms. This seems a contentious proposal as
some commentators believe that such attribution mechanisms
may not always be necessary (Axmacher; Ionita et al.), while oth-
ers abound in our direction and evoke mechanisms that could
contribute to the functioning of such a system (Hakobyan &
Cheng; Kelley & Jacoby; Tibon; Wang; Yang & Köhler). We
readily acknowledge that the description of the attribution system
and of the role of the parietal regions in our target article was
poorly elaborated. Our aim was first to put forward its role in
shaping subjective and explicit outputs. But there is clearly a
need to unpack its underlying mechanisms and associated neural
correlates. We are delighted to see that, when admitted, many
ideas for refining our understanding of the functioning of this
attribution system arise (Hakobyan & Cheng; Kelley & Jacoby;
Tibon; Yang & Köhler).
First of all, it may be that the term “attribution” is fuzzy and
misleading and does not fully capture the complexity of inferen-
tial mechanisms that lead to subjective feelings and explicit judg-
ments. For instance, Ionita et al. posit that recollection does not
need attribution mechanisms because the details from past expe-
riences that are reactivated in the relational representation core
system are mnemonic in nature and diagnostic of past encounters
and, therefore, do not require interpretation by an attribution sys-
tem, in contrast to familiarity which may arise from non-
mnemonic fluency cues (e.g., perceptual clarity). So, Ionita et al.
suggest that attribution comes into play only when there are sev-
eral possible signals, either mnemonic or non-mnemonic, that
could be interpreted as evidence of prior exposure and, thus,
when there is a possibility of misattribution (e.g., interpreting a
non-mnemonic signal as due to memory). Actually, our meaning
behind “attribution” was more in line with Whittlesea and
Williams’ (2000) view and refers to subconscious inferential pro-
cesses that allow one to make sense of the quality of different data
and processing (and not only as source attribution processes), and
that can be applied to any kind of memory experiences (i.e., rec-
ollection and familiarity) and also to non-memory judgments
(e.g., aesthetic judgments, preference judgments).
According to this definition, inferential “attribution” processes
are necessary to explain the fact that some non-mnemonic processes,
such as metacognitive expectations, may influence recollection-
based memory decisions. For example, Simmons-Stern et al.
(2012) have found that people held the (wrong) metacognitive belief
that they would recollect more information after encoding some
materials via a song than after a spoken encoding, leading them to
adopt a more conservative response criterion regarding the amount
of information they feel they should be able to recollect after studying
sung materials. This results in a reduction of both correct and false
recognitions on a subsequent memory test. Such a pattern is difficult
to explain without the intervention of some metacognitive processes
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that, in the integrative memory model, are included in the attribu-
tion system. Another kind of evidence comes from studies that
found a fluency effect on recollection responses. Ionita et al. point
out that one hallmark of the attribution processes is the presence
of fluency-based false alarms that signal the occurrence of misattri-
bution. This pattern was noted by Kurilla and Westerman (2008) in
experiments showing that perceptual and conceptual priming at test
increased claims of recollection and familiarity (via remember/know
responses), with a larger effect for lures than for targets.
However, we agree that some of the control/monitoring
processes involved in familiarity and recollection decisions are
probably more of a pre-retrieval than of a post-retrieval nature
(Kelley & Jacoby; see also sect. R2.1). Restricting what comes to
mind, depending on task context and people’s goals, is probably
an important step to avoid memory misattribution. The context
or the task demand could influence metacognitive expectations
and the retrieval mode adopted by the participants, favoring
fluency (Whittlesea & Price 2001; Willems et al. 2008) or the
search for some specific types of details (Bodner & Lindsay
2003; Bodner & Richardson-Champion 2007). The interaction
between the pre- and post-access monitoring processes is thus
expected to influence the quality of the evaluation, producing a
feeling of coherence or discrepancy responsible for the emergence
of familiarity and recollection.
The role of parietal regions in memory is clearly a larger sub-
ject that requires more in-depth discussion than the concise treat-
ment we gave in the target article. Indeed, we mainly linked
ventral parietal activity to bottom-up attention following the
attention-to-memory model (Cabeza et al. 2012). According to
this model, the presentation of a cue or an output captures the
focus of attention in both memory and perception tasks. Tibon
argues that ventral parietal activity should not only be attributed
to attention processes, but also to the representational quality and
the subjective evaluation of the memory trace, justifying its posi-
tion at the intersection of the core and attribution systems.
Previous fMRI studies found increased brain activity in the ventral
parietal cortex during episodic memory retrieval, but whether
this pattern of activity resulted from the engagement of attention
or memory processes was unclear (Rugg & King 2018).
Interestingly, Kuhl and Chun (2014) showed that the angular
gyrus was not only sensitive to whether an item was correctly
remembered but it also represented what the item was, which sug-
gests that the parietal cortex may hold some item representations,
in line with the idea that representational features are not only
stored in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) (Axmacher; Tibon).
Nevertheless, the role of parietal regions seems to go beyond
mere representation. Many fMRI studies found activity in the
ventral parietal cortex when participants assigned remember judg-
ments (Wang et al. 2016), vividness ratings (Richter et al. 2016;
Tibon et al. 2019) or confidence judgments (Qin et al. 2011).
These findings are congruent with the view that the parietal
cortex, and more precisely the angular gyrus, contributes to our
subjective experience of remembering (Yazar et al. 2012). More
direct support for this assumption comes from neuropsychologi-
cal data showing reduced confidence ratings but spared “objec-
tive” source memory performance in patients with parietal
lesions (Simons et al. 2010).
As noted by Yang & Köhler, it is most likely that different
parietal regions support different functions. To give only one
illustration, the angular gyrus was found to track the strength of
recollection, whereas the temporoparietal junction was more
active during incorrect source memory than true recollection
(Hutchinson et al. 2014). Rather than adopting a modular view,
examination of gradients within the parietal areas (notably, in
terms of connectivity) may help to resolve the complex nature
of the interplay between parietal areas and key regions from the
representation core systems and attribution system (Huntenburg
et al. 2018). Therefore, within the parietal cortex, some parts
may be more involved in attention-to-memory mechanisms and
others in the generation of subjective aspects of memory. Tibon
proposes the interesting idea that some parietal areas may provide
an index of the quality or quantity of signals reactivated in core
systems that will be used by the attribution system to make
some inference and that will lead to subjective experience of
remembering (see also Rugg & King 2018). Additionally, Yang
& Köhler evoke the role of parietal regions in evidence accumula-
tion. In this view, the parietal cortex would accumulate signals
about a situation until a decision is made (Wagner et al. 2005).
In the case of a memory task, this would imply integrating signals
from the MTL and the posterior cingulate hub on which
prefrontal-related decision processes can apply. How exactly
parietal and prefrontal areas interact during the retrieval process
is an unresolved issue that is central to the understanding of
the attribution system (Strikwerda-Brown & Irish).
In the search for an operationalization of the steps leading
from representations to overt memory decisions, Yang &
Köhler suggest that the diffusion model (Ratcliff et al. 2016b)
may provide a promising framework (see also Osth, Dunn,
Heathcote, & Ratcliff [Osth et al.]). According to the diffusion
model, in a recognition memory task, decision about whether
or not a stimulus has been previously encountered relies on the
accumulation of evidence until a threshold is reached in favor
of one of the choices (i.e., yes/no). Moreover, Hakobyan &
Cheng draw a parallel between the attribution system and the
retrieval process described in terms of attractor dynamics
(Greve et al. 2010). However, this view is quite different from
our own as Greve et al. (2010) propose that recollection and
familiarity emerge from distinct retrieval processes applied to a
single representation, whereas we argue that recollection and
familiarity memory experiences usually rely on qualitatively
different representations which undergo processing in a single
(but complex) attribution system. Notwithstanding, we fully
agree that more elaboration of this attribution system is needed
and that existing models, such as the diffusion model, could
help to describe operations – but this would need to incorporate
the critical role of metacognition.
R2.3. False memories
A few commentators regret that we did not elaborate on how false
memories are generated, in particular false recollections (Bodner &
Bernstein; Hakobyan & Cheng; Ionita et al.). Notably, Bodner &
Bernstein refer to several phenomena in which false recollections
occur, such as the misinformation effect, the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) effect, or rich false memories in which people
believe that they remember entire events that actually never
happened.
In the integrative memory model, false recollections can be
understood when considering that the subjective experiences of
recollection and familiarity are generated through a unitary attri-
bution system, so that a recollective experience could occur
regardless of whether or not a test item was studied, provided
that the test item acts as an effective retrieval cue for past events
even if they do not concern the experimental context. This fits
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with the source misattribution account (McCabe & Geraci 2009),
according to which false recollections are the result of a misattri-
bution of the source of the information within the attribution
system. In such cases, unstudied test items cue the actual (true)
recollection of extra-list contextual information that are errone-
ously attributed to the study context. For example, a participant
may experience a feeling of remembering when an object picture
reactivates a past encounter with this object outside the experi-
mental task, but if this exact source is not identified, this may
induce him or her to endorse the object picture as recollected
in a recognition memory task. The way such extra-list informa-
tion would be cued within the core representational systems
could be assimilated to the process of pattern completion
(Yassa & Stark 2011).
Ionita et al. suggest that certain types of materials may be
more prone to misattribution (see also Strikwerda-Brown &
Irish for suggestion of material-related differences). They point
out that studies supporting the idea of an attribution system for
recollection often use less distinctive stimuli (i.e., words) that
are more commonly encountered outside the laboratory than
objects or scenes, and that are often presented in visually impov-
erished encoding conditions. In such cases, recollection decisions
would rely heavily on the reactivation of contextual elements from
the encoding episode, which are likely to be internal rather than
external. We agree that retrieval mechanisms differ as a function
of the nature of the materials. However, this is not incompatible
with the source misattribution account, if both internal and exter-
nal contextual elements represent the source of the occurrence of
a given stimulus, considering that our definition of “attribution” is
not restricted to non-mnemonic signals (see sect. R2.2). This
implies that the difference between true and false recollections
is not so much in the quality or veracity of the representations
within the representation core systems, but, rather, false recollec-
tions would differentiate themselves from true memories by the
erroneous attribution of a given representation within the core
systems to the wrong past episode.
Also, Hakobyan & Cheng tackle the question of false recogni-
tion of lures with features that highly overlap with targets features,
which we suggest are dependent upon the perirhinal and entorhi-
nal cortices as pattern separators of individual entities. Precisely,
Hakobyan & Cheng argue that some results from patients with
selective hippocampal lesions challenge this idea, since these
patients show increased false alarms toward similar lures with
no increase toward unrelated lures. We can only agree that the
hippocampus might contribute somewhat to entity pattern dis-
crimination. However, we also note that, in these studies, most
patients actually do manage to perform the task well above chance
(Bayley et al. 2008; Holdstock et al. 2002), suggesting that they do
have some ability to discriminate highly similar lures. Therefore,
the hippocampus could contribute, while not being necessary,
to entity pattern separation.
Bodner & Bernstein further suggest that the case of false
memory could help in understanding how the neuro-
architecture underlying recollection and familiarity develops
and shifts across the lifespan. Notably, they wonder how our
integrative memory model might handle the fact that the “like-
lihood of different memory errors shifts in childhood and adult-
hood,” with misinformation and rich false memories following a
U-shaped development (Brainerd & Reyna 2005) and the DRM
illusion following a linear trajectory. We postulate that the meta-
cognitive component of the attribution system could help
explain these patterns. Indeed, metacognitive abilities undertake
dramatic changes throughout the course of childhood, changes
that have been shown to impact children’s memory performance
and, particularly, false memories. For instance, Geurten et al.
(2018) have found age-related differences in how 4-, 6-, and
8-year-old children relied on their metacognitive expectations
about the quality of their memory to guide memory decisions
in a recognition memory test. Indeed, younger children have
more difficulties than older children in determining how
much information they should be able to recollect and in setting
a well-adjusted decision threshold. Moreover, in a study examin-
ing familiarity-based memory illusions (Geurten et al. 2017),
8-year-old children and adults relied more on fluency when it
was greater than expected in a given context (i.e., for lures
more than for targets). In contrast, 4- and 6-year-old children
based their memory decision on the absolute level of fluency
(i.e., the more fluent an item, the more likely to be called “stud-
ied”). These results are important because they suggest that
changes in children’s metacognitive expectations about what is
a fluent item in a specific context could account for the develop-
mental decrease observed in the frequency of false memories
during childhood.
R3. How are subjective experiences of memory generated?
In many memory situations, the explicit judgments and the sub-
jective experience that the individuals report match the nature of
the representations that are reactivated in representation core
systems (e.g., the reactivation of item-study context associations
during item-recognition memory would lead to a feeling of
recollecting the encoding episode). However, sometimes, the qual-
itative and subjective experience in a given memory task may dis-
sociate from the memory reconstructed by a core system. One
example is the disqualification of fluency cues (see sect. R2.1).
In the target article, we argue that the inclusion of an attribution
system is necessary to explain the modulation of the translation of
reactivated content into outputs. This idea is supported by many
commentators (Curot & Barbeau; Hakobyan & Cheng;
Kapogiannis & El Haj; Kihlstrom), who evoke the diversity of
the explicit outputs and the subjective experiences that we can
have and how they are modified in pathology. Axmacher never-
theless questions the extent to which the attribution system
defines the subjective quality of memories.
R3.1. Do attribution mechanisms shape subjective experiences
of memory?
Axmacher argues that the representational formats of contents
within the medial temporal lobe and the neocortex are sufficient
to determine the subjective qualities of the explicit memory expe-
rience without the need for an attribution system. We strongly
agree that the subjective quality of a memory is mainly shaped
by its content or representational properties, and does not come
from the attribution system itself. In many cases, inferential
processes only validate the adequacy of retrieved content to expec-
tations for a given decision. In this view, the subjective memory
experience of recollection or vivid recall (e.g., a remember
response or a vividness rating) is based on the reinstatement of
the context and relational representations. For instance, using
trial-by-trial analyses, we found that subjective vividness judg-
ments are based on the properties of a remembered episode –
the objective amount of retrieved details (Folville et al. 2019).
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Nevertheless, it can happen that participants report a memory
decision (e.g., old/new) or a particular subjective experience that
does not match the reactivated representation. For example, a
crime scene detail of medium retrieval difficulty elicits a remem-
ber judgment more often when mixed with difficult details than
easy details (Bodner & Richardson-Champion 2007). Another
example is the observation that amnesic patients reject fluent
old stimuli, instead of using the fluency signal as a cue for oldness
as healthy people do (Geurten & Willems 2017; Geurten et al.
2019; Ozubko & Yonelinas 2014). Another illustration is the find-
ing that healthy older people claim that their memory for a given
scene or episode is very vivid despite the small amount of details
they can recall about it (Hashtroudi et al. 1990; Robin &
Moscovitch 2017). These examples and others suggest that the
explicit memory report given by a participant is also modulated
by metamemory, monitoring, and pre-access control mechanisms
(sect. R2.2; see also Kelley & Jacoby). For instance, Folville et al.
(2019) have shown that the amount of recalled details about a
scene predicted the associated vividness ratings for memory of
the scene in young and older adults, but this relationship was sig-
nificantly smaller in older participants. An interpretation for this
observation is that both young and older adults used the proper-
ties or the details of memories to shape their vividness feeling,
but older adults monitored/weighted these details differently
when calibrating their subjective ratings (Johnson et al. 2015;
Mitchell & Hill 2019).
Axmacher raises a very good point by asking, “if feelings of
familiarity or recollection do not match with the typical represen-
tational format of the corresponding memories, are these feelings
really the same as in more usual cases?” At face value, the
endorsement of categorical responses (remember/know; old/
new; high versus low vividness) does not allow us to distinguish
atypical from typical experiences. fMRI cortical reinstatement
analyses would likely show that the representations behind the
judgments are not the same; yet this does not tell us anything
about the detailed phenomenology of the feelings. This may be
a topic for future studies.
R3.2. The diversity of subjective memory experiences
Kihlstrom underlines that other types of memory experiences
than the classical remembering and feeling of familiarity could
be considered as well, such as “recognition-by-knowing,”
“recognition-by-feeling,” and “remembering-as-believing.” With
the remember/know paradigm, know responses are assigned to
memory experiences devoid of the retrieval of contextual encod-
ing details. Therefore, a know response could be assigned to a
face, for instance, either in a situation in which one individual
recognizes that face with a high degree of confidence but is not
able to consciously remember where and when this person was
met (recognition-by-knowing), or in a situation in which one
individual feels that this face is intriguingly familiar but with a
poorer degree of confidence about this feeling (recognition-
by-feeling). So, know responses may include memory experiences
that vary not only in their content but also in their cognitive and
neural bases (Kihlstrom). To assess these, subjective self-paced
reports of Remembering and Knowing should be complemented
with verbal justifications (Bodner & Lindsay 2003), electrophysi-
ological measures such as event-related potentials (ERPs)
(Woodruff et al. 2006), or cardiovascular measures (Fiacconi
et al. 2016). In the current context, verbal justifications would
allow experimenters to verify whether participants’ know
responses indeed corresponded to knowing, feeling, or believing
recognition experiences. Besides, accompanying the subjective
self-reports with more “objective” memory measures is of partic-
ular interest for the study of populations that have a decreased
ability to precisely assess their subjective memory experience
(reflected in know responses, vividness or confidence ratings),
such as older adults or patients with Alzheimer’s disease
(Duarte et al. 2008; El Haj & Antoine 2017; Folville et al. 2019;
Wong et al. 2012).
Beyond feelings of familiarity and recollection, the outputs of
processing within the systems described in the integrative mem-
ory model may take other forms, such as thinking about future
events, preference judgments, and so forth. Sreekumar et al.
give the example of judgments about the temporal context in
which an event took place. For instance, when people are asked
to judge whether a stimulus was seen in the first or second part
of an experiment, they can use two kinds of strategies
(Friedman 1993). On the one hand, location-based processes
involve the reconstruction of the time of occurrence, based on
the contextual information encoded with the event (likely to be
recovered from the relational representation core system). On
the other hand, distance-based processes involve evaluation of
the time elapsed since the event occurred, based on the global
strength of the memory. This could be indexed by the output of
attribution system evaluating the speed and/or the amount of
details during memory retrieval.
R3.3. Subjective experiences of memory in the pathology
Kapogiannis & El Haj argue that declines in the components of
the subjective experience of remembering, such as reliving, mental
time travel, or vividness, could account for the recollection deficit
observed in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). We agree that mental
imagery processes may certainly influence how the memory rep-
resentation is shaped when it is consciously brought back to
mind. However, we assume that the deterioration of mechanisms
taking place earlier may account to a greater extent for the
impaired recollective abilities observed in AD. In our view,
impaired recollection abilities is first related to the deterioration
of item-context bindings in the relational representation core sys-
tem (Braak’s Stage 3) and impaired pattern completion in the hip-
pocampus (Ally et al. 2013; Xue 2018). As the disease progresses,
pathology extends to posterior regions such as the retrosplenial
and posterior cingulate cortices, affecting the reinstatement of
complex representations and autonoetic consciousness of remem-
bered episodes (Genon et al. 2013), and decreasing the ability to
have the subjective feeling of mentally reliving the past (El Haj
et al. 2016).
At the same time, AD patients have difficulties switching
between egocentric and allocentric representations during retrieval
(Riva et al.; Serino et al. 2015; see also sect. R1.2). Of interest is the
finding that taking a first-person perspective and recalling episodic
details when remembering are both related to the volume of the
precuneus (Ahmed et al. 2018). Moreover, changes in visual per-
spective during memory retrieval are associated with changes in
precuneus activity (St. Jacques et al. 2017). An atrophy of the pre-
cuneus is observed in AD (Ryu et al. 2010) and it may arise along
with the more global atrophy found in posterior brain regions
during Braak’s Stages 4 to 6. Together, these findings highlight
that AD is associated with a decline in recollection abilities that
may result first from an impairment in the relational representation
core system supporting pattern completion, along with progressive
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dysfunctions of posterior regions supporting autonoetic conscious-
ness, mental imagery, and visual perspective.
R4. Concluding remarks
A last question needs to be considered: Is the integrative memory
model a dual-process model of recognition memory? As
reminded by Osth et al., whether memory retrieval is best
explained by the involvement of two processes (i.e., recollection
and familiarity), or by a single process, has been a matter of
debate for the past 20 years at least. Rather than taking side in
this debate, we would like to emphasize that the critical notion
in our framework is interaction. The subjective feelings and the
explicit judgments provided in a memory task are qualitatively
different because they rely on the reactivation of qualitatively dif-
ferent representations (core systems). In fact, there are not only
two possible outputs (recollection versus familiarity), but a variety
of feelings and judgments that can arise (see sect. R3.2). The
distinction between outputs and representations is critical, and
the nature of the output in a given situation will depend on the
interaction between reactivated representations and inferential
operations that rely on metacognitive, monitoring, control, and
attention mechanisms. We believe that future research on
memory should unravel the dynamics of this interactive system.
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